¶¶Òõ¾«Æ·

AN INDEPENDENT police commission plays a crucial role as an oversight body by ensuring transparency, accountability and professionalism within the police force. In many countries, such commissions are entrusted with monitoring police conduct, investigating complaints of misconduct and addressing cases of abuse of authority or excessive use of force. By operating independently from political or institutional influence, they serve as a safeguard against corruption, bias and unlawful interference in policing. This independence not only strengthens internal discipline and public trust but also reinforces the rule of law by holding the police accountable to democratic norms and human rights standards. Ultimately, an independent commission provides citizens with a reliable avenue for redress, while enabling the police to function more effectively and credibly in the service of society.

By contrast, Bangladesh still lacks a robust and genuinely independent oversight body of this nature. Complaints against the police are typically managed internally within the force or handled by the executive branch, raising serious concerns about impartiality, transparency and effectiveness. As a consequence, allegations of misconduct, politicisation and abuse of authority often remain unresolved, eroding public trust in the police. Many officers also find themselves vulnerable to political pressure, which further compromises professionalism and weakens the rule of law.

In Bangladesh, the idea of an oversight body — formally known as the Independent Police Commission — was first incorporated in the Police Ordinance of 2007 but never implemented. The July 2024 uprising, marked by indiscriminate police gunfire and the killing of protesters, laid bare the regime’s crisis of legitimacy and transformed the call for accountability into a national demand. Over the past 16 years, allegations of abuse, extrajudicial killing, selective enforcement and heavy-handedness had steadily eroded public trust, undermining the police’s credibility as a neutral force. In this context, the demand for an independent oversight mechanism gained urgent traction across political divides. At the same time, the uprising reshaped the morale, professional outlook and strategic orientation of the police, creating a pivotal moment and potential catalyst for reform. What was once framed as a bureaucratic initiative has now become a broader social and moral imperative: building a policing system grounded in democratic principles, accountability and respect for human rights — an aspiration that has long been in public consciousness and is now critically urgent.

In this context, the interim government established a Police Reform Commission, which recommended the creation of an independent police commission alongside broader reforms such as aligning the use of force with UN peacekeeping standards, eliminating custodial torture, extortion, arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, and modernising outdated police laws. In response, the Bangladesh Police submitted its own framework for the commission, but the ministry of home affairs opposed that proposal and offered a different version, revealing deep institutional divisions and conflicting perspectives on the issue. Ultimately, the commission recommended the formation of an independent and accountable police commission but deferred the crucial question of whether it should be a statutory or constitutional body, leaving the matter to expert opinion — a cautious stance that seemed less an act of consensus than a strategic delay to sidestep politically sensitive decisions. This reflects a broader pattern in Bangladesh: institutional reform is repeatedly stalled by bureaucratic inertia, political hesitation and slow policy implementation. Earlier, political, bureaucratic and police forces have formed a triangular resistance to block reforms, as preserving the status quo serves the interests of those in power. The ruling elite consistently seek to evade accountability, and throughout Bangladesh’s history, political forces have shown little to no willingness to pursue genuine police reform.

In the aftermath of the July mass uprising, a significant number of police officers voiced support for the creation of an independent police commission. Their demand reflected a broader aspiration to insulate the force from political interference, enabling it to operate with professionalism, accountability and fidelity to the rule of law. Such a commission, it was argued, could put an end to the entrenched practice of political meddling in recruitment, transfers and promotions — practices that have long undermined morale and eroded public trust. Yet, despite these calls, no concrete initiative has been undertaken, leaving officers disillusioned and reinforcing the perception that the police remain captive to political interests.

Earlier, in July 2025, the Bangladesh Retired Police Officers Welfare Association organised a round table conference at the National Press Club, bringing together a diverse group of participants that included members of civil society, academics, politicians, journalists, senior bureaucrats and other stakeholders. The retired police officers, drawing on their professional experience and public credibility, strongly advocated for the creation of an independent oversight body to ensure police accountability and restore public trust in law enforcement. The event sparked significant discussion and received wide coverage in the national press, amplifying the call for structural reforms within the policing system.

Very recently, under the patronage of a daily newspaper, a round table conference titled ‘Need for Police Reform: Civil Society Perspective’ was organised, where speakers, lawyers, politicians, academics, and both serving and retired police officials openly voiced their criticisms and offered recommendations for building a pro-people police force. The central message that emerged was clear: meaningful reform depends on the establishment of an independent commission. With the right mandate and resources, such a body could shield the police from political interference, enforce accountability by ensuring impartial investigations into misconduct, set professional standards for promotions and foster a culture of respect for human rights. In doing so, it would not only create a more people-friendly force but also restore public trust in policing.

Bangladesh’s current legal framework is another obstacle. Existing laws — most notably the Police Act of 1861 — are relics of the colonial era and provide no space for independent oversight. While some laws address accountability, they are either weak or poorly enforced, thereby limiting the possibility of meaningful reform. Without new, robust legislation, any proposed commission would lack the authority to function effectively or to hold law enforcement accountable.

However, under the initiative of the consensus commission headed by Dr Ali Riaz, political parties have finally reached a consensus on forming an independent police commission. According to the proposal, the commission will be a nine-member body chaired by a retired justice of the Appellate Division (under 75 years of age) and supported by a retired police officer (below the rank of Additional Inspector General, under 62) as member secretary. The other members will include representatives of the leader of the house, leader of the opposition, the speaker, and the deputy speaker, alongside a retired senior bureaucrat with field experience, a senior judicial officer or seasoned lawyer, and a human rights activist with at least a decade of proven work. Importantly, at least two of the members must be women, while only the chairperson and secretary will be salaried positions.

The commission’s composition reflects a conscious effort to balance institutional insiders with independent voices. By drawing in political representatives, members of the judiciary, civil society leaders and retired officials, it aims to prevent capture by any single stakeholder. Equally telling is the inclusion of a human rights activist — an acknowledgment that policing in Bangladesh has been most fraught precisely where citizens’ rights are at risk.

Departing from its earlier stance, the interim government of Bangladesh has now announced plans — recently reported in the media — to establish two separate commissions for the police: the Independent Investigation Service and the Internal Complaints Commission. The Independent Investigation Service, to be headed by the law adviser or minister, will be tasked with investigating police misconduct free from external interference. The Internal Complaints Commission, chaired by the home adviser or minister with the inspector general of police serving as member-secretary, will carry a wider mandate: addressing internal grievances, ensuring fair recruitment and promotions, reforming training and welfare systems, strengthening leadership selection and guiding policy.

Placing investigatory bodies under the chairmanship of a minister — whether a law or home adviser — undermines their independence by subordinating inquiries to political actors and inviting interference. International standards emphasize that effective investigatory agencies must function as autonomous statutory bodies, free from ministerial control. Moreover, the existence of parallel institutions under different ministries risks turf wars, duplicative procedures, inconsistent standards and unclear referral pathways, ultimately leading to delays and weakened accountability. Global experience demonstrates that such fragmented arrangements rarely succeed unless mandates are clearly defined and institutional independence is firmly guaranteed (Cleveland Community Police Commission).

Ìý

Global best practices and comparative examples

CIVILIAN, statutory independence with strong investigatory powers provides an effective model of oversight. Kenya’s Independent Policing Oversight Authority and South Africa’s constitutionally protected Independent Police Investigative Directorate are prominent examples; both are empowered to investigate police misconduct, with IPOA reporting to Parliament rather than the executive and IPID enjoying powers comparable to police investigators. Similarly, the UK’s Independent Office for Police Conduct investigates serious complaints with statutory authority, while in the US, Civilian Complaint Review Boards and Department of Justice consent decrees blend community oversight with judicially enforced reforms. Other models include Canada’s Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, which emphasises transparency and public reporting, and Australia’s Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, a civilian-led statutory body overseeing police and related agencies. By contrast, Hong Kong’s Independent Police Complaints Council, which lacks investigative powers, highlights the weakness of oversight without real autonomy.

The National Police Commission of Sri Lanka is an independent constitutional body composed of seven members, appointed by the president on the recommendation of the constitutional council. The membership generally includes retired senior public servants, legal experts and professionals with recognised integrity, ensuring neutrality and independence. Members serve for a fixed tenure (typically three years), with eligibility for reappointment. The National Police Commission is responsible for overseeing appointments, promotions, transfers and disciplinary matters of police officers, except for the inspector general of police, who is appointed by the president. It investigates public complaints against police officers to ensure accountability and upholds professional standards by maintaining discipline, impartiality and integrity within the force. The commission also advises the government on reforms to strengthen public trust in policing and serves as a safeguard against political interference in police functions.

Across these contexts, clear and transparent rules for appointment and removal remain critical: independent panels, fixed terms, removal only for cause and transparent criteria help insulate oversight bodies from political interference. Equally vital are operational autonomy and adequate powers — the ability to compel documents, secure scenes, interview witnesses, protect complainants and whistleblowers, and either prosecute or refer cases to independent prosecutors — without which accountability risks becoming symbolic. Finally, sustainability depends on permanent professional secretariats and predictable budgets rather than ad hoc political membership, ensuring continuity, capacity and resilience.

The proposal to establish a Police Commission in Bangladesh is a welcome step toward professionalising the force and restoring citizen confidence, but form without substance will ring hollow. Global experience shows that independent oversight succeeds only when backed by legal autonomy, civilian leadership, investigative authority and transparency. While the consensus commission’s draft reflects political willingness — an essential first step — structure ultimately defines outcomes. A body chaired by a retired judge may appear promising, yet if paired with partisan ex officio members, a police-linked secretary, and minister-led probe units, it risks becoming another cosmetic reform. For the commission to evolve into a transformative institution capable of addressing misconduct and driving long-term structural reform, Bangladesh must ensure statutory independence, civilian-led investigations, clear powers, secure financing, and safeguards against political interference. Anything less will leave the commission as a polite façade over the same old system, undermining the chance to bridge the gap between the state and its citizens.

Ìý

Dr Md Motiar Rahman is a retired additional inspector general of Bangladesh Police.