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PROPORTIONAL representation might appear to cure Bangladesh’s winner-take-all distortions, yet in a patronage-soaked, institutionally weak democracy, it would almost certainly splinter the parliament into quarrelling factions, paralyse policymaking and invite both foreign meddling and military ‘rescues.’ Until the country fortifies its electoral bodies and culture of governance, switching to proportional representation would be less a democratic upgrade than a high-risk transplant on an ailing patient.

Proportional representation is an electoral system where a party’s share of parliamentary seats reflects its share of the popular vote, unlike Bangladesh’s first-past-the-post system, where candidates can win with 30–40 per cent of votes. Proportional representation ensures that seats match vote shares, reducing ‘wasted’ votes and distortions where a party wins 70–80 per cent of seats with 40 per cent of votes. After disputed elections and one-party rule, civic groups and minor parties, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, support proportional representation for a fairer, multi-party representation.

Advocates claim that proportional representation would curb muscle power, undisclosed money and nomination trading, create a level electoral playing field and ensure that Islamist and other minority voices gain seats alongside major parties, preventing any single winner from steam-rolling the opposition. It sounds like a democratic dream come true. But in practice, it could easily become Bangladesh’s worst nightmare.

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Fragmentation and weak governments

THE flip side of proportional representation’s inclusivity is political fragmentation. By making it easier for smaller parties (even fringe and single-issue groups) to win seats, proportional representation virtually guarantees a fractured parliament with many factions – and no single party anywhere near a majority. Proportional representation is the perfect vehicle through which the managerial state becomes even less decisive and political, in the truest sense of the word. Comparative evidence bears this out: worldwide, the first-past-the-post systems average about 2.5 effective political parties while proportional representation systems average around 4.5, nearly double the fragmentation. Inevitably, this means coalition governments would become the norm.

Between 2000 and 2017, only 23 per cent of elections in plurality systems, such as first-past-the-post, led to coalitions, compared with a whopping 87 per cent under proportional representation systems. In other words, if Bangladesh switches to proportional representation, it is almost certain that every future government will be a multi-party coalition cobbled together after the vote. And that is where the trouble begins. A higher frequency of coalition governments increases unpredictability regarding which parties will form them.

Coalition governments might sound conducive to ‘unity,’ but in reality, more coalition governments mean more unstable governments. A coalition is a marriage of convenience forged by post-election bargaining, deals struck not by voters but by party elites negotiating cabinet posts and pet projects. This process often takes weeks, if not months. On average, research has found that countries having proportional representation systems take about 50 days to form a government after an election versus ~32 days even in mixed systems.

For example, the Netherlands, which has proportional representation, often takes 2–3 months (eg, 225 days in 2017) while Germany (mixed system) averages 30–50 days (eg, 54 days in 2013 and 171 days in 2017). Belgium infamously went 541 days without a government in 2010–2011 because its proportional representation-elected parties could not agree on a coalition.

Do we really believe that Bangladesh would fare any better? It struggled to even hold timely, uncontested elections; imagine the added chaos of an election yielding a hung parliament and then protracted haggling as rival party bosses barter for power. As one Bangladesh country risk analysis noted, there is a very real possibility that a proportional representation-based election here would result in a hung parliament, leading to long-term political instability. This is definitely the last thing that foreign and domestic investors want for their businesses.

Add to this the academic finding that proportional representation systems, due to coalition governments, are associated with higher public spending and deficits, as parties negotiate budget concessions to maintain coalitions, undermining economic stability. The spectre of parliamentary deadlock looms large in the absence of consensus on the electoral system itself and that deadlock would only worsen after a proportional representation election produces no clear winner. Governing would require appeasing numerous small parties, many ideologically narrow, so that every bill could be vetoed by one disgruntled faction. With five or six parties constantly bargaining instead of two broad coalitions compromising internally, legislation would slow, horse-trading would dominate and fragile governments could collapse over minor disputes.

In a young democracy like Bangladesh, where trust in politicians is already low, this would breed further disillusionment; everyone can claim credit, but no one accepts blame and responsibility.

Worse still, a fragmented coalition government in Bangladesh would likely be weak and indecisive, precisely at a time when strong decisions are needed for a true democratic and ‘Bangladesh first’ transition. The country is facing economic and security gusts that demand coherent policy responses. Yet, coalition governments notoriously struggle to pursue bold reforms; every policy must be watered down to appease multiple partners.

For Bangladesh, adopting proportional representation could lead to paralysis on critical issues like infrastructure, financial stability and security. Proportional representation almost always leads to quick government turnovers before completing the intended term, which will require frequent expensive elections. Nepal’s experience with coalition politics serves as a warning: nine governments in eight years, delayed constitution finalisation by seven years and stalled economic growth due to constant infighting, party splits and unstable alliances. This led to high unemployment, youth emigration and investor withdrawal. This is the nightmare that proportional representation could bring to Bangladesh: serial governments that rise and fall before they can govern and a policy agenda held hostage by every junior coalition partner’s whims.

Indeed, even far more institutionalised democracies have buckled under the strain of fragmented proportional representation politics. Look at Italy and Israel, often cited as examples of proportional representation’s pitfalls. Both have suffered chronic instability due to excessive coalition fragmentation. These are societies with robust economies and state institutions. Bangladesh’s institutions are considerably more fragile, meaning that the effects of constant coalition instability could be even more dire.

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Institutions, political culture and geopolitics

BEYOND the arithmetic of coalition politics, one must ask: is Bangladesh institutionally prepared to make proportional representation work? Democracy is more than electoral formulas. It relies on a culture of compromise, strong neutral institutions and public trust in the system. On all these fronts, Bangladesh today falls woefully short. It is naive to think a mere change of voting system to proportional representation would overnight transform these deeply entrenched shortages.

Proportional representation replaces local candidates with party lists, making members of parliament beholden to party bosses rather than constituents. In Bangladesh’s patronage-heavy politics, this weakens accountability and intensifies loyalty to a central leadership clique, fostering sycophancy. Seats could go to big donors or loyalists, shifting corruption from constituency vote-buying to jockeying for high list positions. Thus, proportional representation risks trading today’s flaws for deeper internal party control and new forms of favouritism.

Under the first-past-the-post system, every locality, despite flaws, still has a dedicated member of parliament responsible for its needs. Proportional representation assigns members of parliament to nationwide party vote blocs; so, no one is clearly accountable for a remote village or district. In a country already grappling with weak accountability, such diluted ties between representatives and constituents could further erode effective local advocacy.

A coalition fragility under proportional representation could leave Bangladesh vulnerable to foreign manipulation and domestic military intervention. A hung parliament in Dhaka would invite external powers, western democracies pressing for process, regional rivals offering loans, to back their preferred factions, eroding sovereignty. Persistent gridlock might also tempt the armed forces to step in ‘to restore order,’ replacing elected leaders with a caretaker technocracy or outright coup. Thus, a voting system meant to deepen democracy could instead weaken the state and open the way for authoritarian actors.

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No cure-all, but Pandora’s box

BANGLADESH’S policy elites should heed regional experience and academic research: proportional representation may promise broader participation, but it risks crippling political stability and governance. Instead of rushing into a full proportional representation system, focus on incremental fixes, fortify the Election Commission, guarantee impartial caretakers and nurture respect for democratic norms. Introducing pure proportional representation into today’s polarised, fragile democracy would be like a heart transplant in a feverish patient: poor timing, low odds of success. Stronger institutions, not a new electoral formula, are the real cure.

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Dr Nazmus Sakib is a political scientist. He teaches at the University ofÌýKentucky, United States.