IN THE political history of Bangladesh, election periods have always been of paramount importance. From the Pakistan Movement to the birth of Bangladesh, the mass uprising of the 1990s, or the aftermath of the 2024 ‘July Uprising’, the right to vote has consistently been at the centre of political discourse. Although the three elections after 1990 were considered free and fair to some extent, they were also often marred by tensions, conflict and boycotts, frequently making headlines. Terms like ‘free’, ‘fair’, and ‘inclusive’ have often been the subject of heated debates.
In such a scenario, after three controversial elections, an authoritarian regime, and the bloodstained ‘July Uprising’ of 2024, there is renewed urgency in discussions around electoral reform among political parties, the Election Reform Commission, and the National Consensus Commission. A key proposal that has emerged from these discussions is the adoption of proportional representation. But the question remains: is this model realistically applicable in Bangladesh? Could it solve our long-standing political crises, or will it give rise to new complexities? This article aims to explore that question.
Proportional representation is a fairly straightforward system. Under this model, political parties receive a share of parliamentary seats proportionate to the percentage of votes they receive nationally. For example, if a party receives 10 per cent of the national vote, it would be entitled to 10 per cent of the seats in parliament, regardless of whether it wins in any particular constituency. The system does not depend on geographical constituencies but rather allocates seats based on the total number of votes nationwide. Some countries use a mixed system where part of the seats are filled through direct voting and the rest through proportional party lists.
Currently, Bangladesh uses the First Past the Post system, where the candidate who gets the most votes in a constituency wins, even if their vote share is as low as 30–40 per cent. A major flaw of this system is that it can allow a party to gain an overwhelming majority in parliament despite having only a minority of the total votes. For instance, a party with just 40 per cent of the popular vote could end up controlling 70–80 per cent of the seats, effectively distorting the will of the people and marginalising other voters and political parties. Since the executive branch is formed by members of the legislature, this can result in complete domination by one party. This phenomenon has been starkly evident during Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year-long autocratic and fascist regime.
In response, many civil society members, political parties, and the National Consensus Commission view proportional representation as a viable and effective alternative. They argue that it can ensure accurate representation, where parties receive seats in alignment with their actual vote share, aligning with democratic values of equity and justice. It can also prevent any one party or individual from becoming autocratic. Smaller political parties, often rendered irrelevant under the current system, would have a voice in parliament if they secure even a minimal percentage of votes. As a result, the representation of diverse ideologies, social classes, women, minorities, and marginalised communities would likely increase, bringing pluralism into parliament. If no party secures an outright majority, coalition governments would become necessary, encouraging political dialogue and compromise and fostering a culture of coexistence.
However, there are significant qualitative and practical challenges to implementing proportional representation in Bangladesh. The political culture here tends to view opposition parties as enemies, making coalition governance and consensus-building rare. Even in previous ‘acceptable’ elections with multi-party alliances, major parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party or Awami League typically held unilateral control. Often, smaller parties contested under the symbols of the larger ones, diluting the essence of coalition politics. Moreover, in an environment plagued by rigged elections, partisan administration, and a politicised Election Commission, introducing a complex proportional representation system may be difficult to implement effectively or gain public trust. In the proportional representation system, MPs are elected based on party lists rather than direct votes, which can weaken individual accountability and foster sycophancy within parties. This disconnect from constituents can undermine democratic responsiveness. Administering such a system would also require a technically capable and transparent administration, something Bangladesh currently lacks.
Another serious challenge is the difficulty of forming a government if no party crosses the 50 per cent vote threshold. This would necessitate coalitions, but the deep distrust between Bangladeshi political parties could destabilise any such alliance. Additionally, within PR, Islamic parties may try to consolidate under a single ballot to maximise seat allocations, making it harder to identify region-specific popularity and increasing internal conflicts. There’s also a risk that party-based vote allocation could intensify political favouritism and monetised nominations, with party leaders favouring loyalists and donors over public interest. Moreover, parties that oppose the democratic ethos of the nation may gain seats and use their platform to sow discord. While liberal democracy values minority and marginalised representation, it also opens the door for potentially disruptive fringe elements to enter parliament under proportional representation. Complicating matters further, Bangladesh’s largest political party, the BNP, continues to oppose the system, favouring its traditional strategy of seeking an absolute majority. This has stalled discussions within the National Consensus Commission, jeopardising the prospect of political unity during a critical national moment.
In the short term, Bangladesh could explore pilot projects and empirical research to test the feasibility of PR. Interestingly, a form of proportional representation already exists in women’s reserved seats in parliament, which are allocated based on the percentage of directly elected seats held by each party.
In the long term, public debate and awareness campaigns must be launched to educate citizens and political actors about electoral alternatives. A potential compromise could be implementing PR in a bicameral legislature’s upper house, as proposed by the National Consensus Commission. This would help political parties ease into the culture of proportionality and shared governance. As the political system adapts to this model through legislative and constitutional committees, it may eventually be extended to the lower house after one or two election cycles, based on political consensus and real-world outcomes. The cornerstone of any meaningful reform must be a fair electoral process, independent election institutions, and a nonpartisan administration.
Globally, about 91 countries use proportional representation or a mixed system. In South Asia, both Sri Lanka and Nepal employ such methods. Sri Lanka uses a pure proportional representation system: 196 of its 225 parliamentary seats are filled based on district-level vote shares. At the same time, the remaining 29 are allocated through national party lists. In Nepal’s federal parliament, a mixed model is used: 165 members are directly elected, and 110 members come from party lists based on proportional vote share. A party must receive at least 3 per cent of the national vote to qualify. Countries like Germany and New Zealand also use successful mixed systems. Voters in Germany cast two votes, one for a constituency candidate and another for a political party. Parliamentary seats are ultimately distributed based on the second vote. New Zealand follows a similar model. However, countries like Italy and Israel have faced chronic instability due to excessive coalition fragmentation.
For Bangladesh, if post-uprising political tolerance holds and constitutional institutions are empowered through reforms, proportional representation can be fruitful. Every country has customised its own version of mixed systems. Similarly, Bangladesh must consider developing a Bangladeshi hybrid model, tailored to its unique socio-political realities. Ultimately, proportional representation is no divine cure-all for authoritarianism. But it offers a practical path toward reducing autocracy, fostering political diversity, and reflecting the people’s will more accurately. If political parties can prioritise the state over self-interest, embrace dialogue, and commit to structural reforms, proportional representation can help reshape democracy into a participatory and just governance tool, fulfilling the democratic aspirations voiced during the July Uprising.
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ÌýMd Talha is a political analyst and co-founder of the Citizen Initiative.
