FOR years Bangladeshis have heard tantalising claims that vast sums of money — proceeds of corruption, untaxed profits and business kickbacks — have been spirited away to Switzerland and other financial havens. Each time a new figure surfaces about deposits in Swiss banks under Bangladeshi names, the same question echoes through public debate: can this money ever be brought home? The simple answer is that it can. The harder truth is that the process is painstaking, technical and slow, demanding strong evidence, deft diplomacy and, above all, unwavering political will.
The good news is that the international landscape has shifted. Switzerland is no longer the impregnable fortress of secrecy it once was. Under sustained global pressure, its banking laws have been reshaped to emphasise transparency and cooperation. Today, mechanisms exist for tracing, freezing, confiscating and ultimately repatriating illicit funds. They are not theoretical: the Philippines recovered part of the Marcos fortune through these channels; Nigeria clawed back billions from the Abacha loot; Tunisia and others have followed suit. Bangladesh is as entitled as any state to use the same instruments.
Much depends, however, on Bangladesh’s own capacity. The country already possesses an array of domestic laws and institutions that could form the backbone of an asset-recovery strategy. Since 2007 it has been party to the UN Convention against Corruption, which makes the return of stolen assets a fundamental principle. The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act of 2012 gives Bangladeshi authorities the right to request evidence, freezing orders and confiscation judgments overseas. The Money Laundering Prevention Act of the same year defines laundering offences and lays down mechanisms for seizure, while the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, linked to more than 150 counterparts through the Egmont Group, can exchange data that often precedes formal legal action. The glaring omission is Bangladesh’s absence from the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of bank information, without which detecting undeclared foreign accounts remains arduous.
To translate these tools into results, the government must first build impeccable cases at home. Allegations or intelligence will not persuade foreign courts; they require documented proof that assets abroad are the proceeds of crime under Bangladeshi law — bank transfers, shell-company records, property registries, tax files, customs data. Once evidence is in hand, swift moves to freeze suspect accounts are vital before money is spirited elsewhere. Thereafter, authorities must choose the right legal path: criminal confiscation following conviction, non-conviction confiscation where suspects are absconding or deceased, or civil suits in foreign courts. Requests must be meticulously drafted and routed through the proper channels — the Ministry of Home Affairs for formal assistance, the Financial Intelligence Unit for information exchange — to avoid technical setbacks. Even when recovery is agreed, negotiations on how funds will be used and monitored are crucial to reassure partners that the money will not vanish again. Nigeria’s agreements over the Abacha assets, monitored by the World Bank and earmarked for social projects, provide a model.
Experience worldwide shows why so many recovery efforts fail. Weakly prepared cases collapse under scrutiny. Requests stumble over mistranslations or missing documents. Years can be lost to bureaucratic inertia until statutes of limitation abroad expire. And where repatriation plans are vague, foreign governments hesitate, wary of seeing returned wealth siphoned off a second time. Only meticulous preparation and credible safeguards can overcome such scepticism.
Bangladesh therefore needs a clear, coordinated strategy rather than sporadic announcements. A dedicated asset-recovery taskforce — drawing together the Home and Law ministries, BFIU, Anti-Corruption Commission, police investigators, revenue authorities, diplomats and the Attorney General’s office — should be mandated to select priority cases and drive them forward. A national plan, perhaps covering 2025–28, could set standards for evidence gathering, model templates for requests and strict inter-agency timelines. Legal reforms to introduce stronger non-conviction confiscation provisions would align domestic law with foreign requirements. Accession to the Common Reporting Standard would provide annual bulk data on citizens’ overseas accounts, revolutionising detection. And given that laundered wealth is rarely parked in one country alone, Bangladesh must widen its sights beyond Switzerland to Singapore, Dubai, London, Toronto or the lucrative real-estate markets of the United States.
Investment in financial forensics is equally important. Specialist teams within the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Anti-Corruption Commission should be trained to follow complex transactions, from trade-based laundering to cryptocurrency flows. Just as critical is a commitment to transparency over the use of returned funds, ideally through agreements with development partners or independent monitors. This not only accelerates negotiations but reassures citizens that recovered money will serve public ends.
Three truths should be plain to the public. First, Swiss secrecy no longer offers an impregnable shield for illicit fortunes; the law now allows confiscation and return. Second, asset recovery is a marathon, not a sprint: the Philippines and Nigeria retrieved billions only after years of tenacity. Third, integrity at home is non-negotiable. Foreign authorities assess whether recovered funds will be protected; doubts about governance or renewed theft will chill cooperation.
Bangladesh must temper expectations: there will be no sudden deluge of repatriated money. Asset recovery should be approached as a steady pipeline — several strong cases each year, early freezes, gradual returns. Over time, success itself acts as a deterrent, sending a message that hiding wealth abroad is neither safe nor permanent. If Manila could reclaim Marcos’s ill-gotten fortune, and Abuja could retrieve Abacha’s billions, Dhaka too can recover what was stolen from its people. The legal frameworks exist; so do international precedents. What remains is rigorous preparation, deft diplomacy and, above all, the political resolve to see the job through.
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Shahidul Alam Swapan is a Switzerland-based private banking financial crime specialist, columnist and poet.
