Bangladesh cannot escape its geographical reality, but it can shape its geopolitical destiny.听 If Dhaka can present itself as not only a victim but also a frontline negotiator of climate justice, it may extract the financing, technology and partnerships, write Md Moniruzzaman and Md Mominur Rahman
BANGLADESH has become a case study in the cruel irony of climate change. It contributes less than 0.5 per cent to global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it stands among the most climate-exposed nations. Situated on the world鈥檚 largest delta, with two-thirds of its territory less than five meters above sea level, it faces annual flooding, increasingly destructive cyclones, riverbank erosion and salinity intrusion that threatens its fertile lands. Today, the problem is no longer limited to disasters along the coastal belt. Climate change reshapes public health patterns, with vector-borne diseases such as dengue and chikungunya spreading deeper into urban life, overwhelming hospitals and eroding economic productivity. Bangladesh is, in short, at the frontline of a planetary crisis it did little to cause.
But vulnerability can be transformed into leverage. In an era where the G20, the International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks struggle to translate climate pledges into financing, Bangladesh has the opportunity to recast its climate burden into geopolitical bargaining power. The country should not position itself merely as a victim but as a strategic actor whose adaptation demands that it should highlight the global imbalance between responsibility and consequence.
The physical toll is staggering. The Global Climate Risk Index 2021 ranked Bangladesh as the seventh most affected country in two decades, suffering damage worth billions each year. Cyclone Amphan in 2020 alone caused losses estimated at $13 billion and every year, nearly 700,000 Bangladeshis are displaced because of climate-related disasters. Projections suggest that by 2050, one in every seven citizens could be displaced by sea-level rise. These are not abstract numbers. They carry implications for migration flows, regional security and social cohesion.
Internationally, the risks place Bangladesh in a unique geopolitical position. Rising sea level in Khulna or the loss of arable land in Satkhira is not local crises alone. They feed into the global conversation about climate-induced migration, food security and, even, political stability in South Asia. Dhaka must capitalise on this reality by pressing for a fair share of climate financing, not as charity but as an obligation owed by the biggest emitters.
The 2009 Copenhagen Accord promised developing nations $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020. That pledge remains unmet. According to the OECD, actual flows reached only $89.6 billion in 2021, much of it in loans, rather than grants. For Bangladesh, which requires an estimated $230 billion by 2050 to implement its delta plan, the gap is vast. Current support mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund remain too small and bureaucratically slow to meet urgent adaptation needs.
Here lies the strategic opening. As the International Monetary Fund explores expanding its Resilience and Sustainability Trust and the G20 debates climate-linked debt restructuring, Bangladesh should assert its frontline status in every forum, from COP summits to bilateral trade negotiations. Rather than accepting fragmented project-based aid, Dhaka can push for predictable, long-term financing, tied to adaptation infrastructure, renewable energy and health preparedness.
Climate diplomacy is also becoming entwined with geopolitics. China has invested heavily in renewable energy and infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative while the United States and the European Union are advancing just energy transition partnerships in select countries. Bangladesh is at the risk of being pressured to align with one camp or another. Instead, Dhaka should adopt strategic non-alignment, leveraging offers from all sides to maximise gains. It can, for example, accept Chinese investments in solar and wind while securing western financing for resilient infrastructure and technology transfer. The message should be clear: Bangladesh will work with any partner that strengthens its adaptation capacity without compromising sovereignty.
Leverage is only credible if matched with strong domestic governance. Corruption, weak institutions and inefficiency have undermined development projects in Bangladesh. International partners will hesitate to channel billions into adaptation funds unless Dhaka shows transparency and accountability. This requires building robust monitoring systems, publishing transparent climate expenditure reports and involving civil society and local governments in oversight.
Bangladesh has already taken some important steps. The Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan and the Delta Plan 2100 offer long-term frameworks that could serve as models for other climate-vulnerable states. The government has also created the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund, financed from domestic resources. Expanding these initiatives with international backing could position the country as a pioneer in climate governance.
Fragility into power: To move from fragility to influence, Bangladesh should adopt a three-pronged strategy. First, by highlighting the links between climate impacts, migration and regional instability, Dhaka can elevate its concerns onto the global security agenda. This will attract not only development aid but also strategic interest from global powers seeking stability in South Asia. Second, Bangladesh should lobby for grant-based financing and the transfer of affordable green technology. Without access to efficient renewable technologies and resilient infrastructure, adaptation will remain piecemeal. Third, by partnering with other vulnerable nations in the Climate Vulnerable Forum and the G77, Bangladesh can amplify its voice. As the current chair of the the Climate Vulnerable Forum in previous years, Dhaka has already showed that collective bargaining can pressure wealthier nations. Revitalising that role could give the country new diplomatic weight.
Bangladesh cannot escape its geographical reality, but it can shape its geopolitical destiny. Every cyclone that flattens villages in Barguna or every dengue outbreak in Dhaka is a reminder that climate change is not a distant threat. It is a present crisis. But crises can be transformed into tools of negotiation. If Dhaka can present itself as not only a victim but also a frontline negotiator of climate justice, it may extract the financing, technology and partnerships it needs to safeguard its people. Climate vulnerability, when reframed strategically, is no longer just a burden. It is Bangladesh鈥檚 most potent geopolitical card.
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Md Moniruzzaman ([email protected]) is a professor and Md Mominur Rahman ([email protected]) is an assistant professor at at the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Management.
