THE images remain vivid: Narendra Modi clasping Donald Trump’s hand before a roaring crowd of Indian Americans in Houston in 2019; the ‘Namaste Trump’ rally in Ahmedabad the following year, replete with pageantry, promises and mutual admiration. For many in New Delhi, these spectacles signalled the arrival of a new era — an India finally embraced as a partner, even a peer, by Washington.
Fast forward to Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, and the glow has dimmed. Instead of strategic favours, India has received tariff hikes, public scolding and diplomatic indifference. For all the bonhomie of the past, the US has treated India with the cold calculus it applies to all partners: useful when convenient, disposable when not. The problem is not merely Trump’s capriciousness. It is India’s chronic misreading of both America’s intentions and its capacity to constrain India. The result is a country weakened by avoidable misjudgments, adrift in a geopolitical order where illusions carry a steep price.
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A turbulent history of India-US relations
THIS is hardly the first time India has miscalculated. During the Cold War, New Delhi believed that its non-alignment, coupled with moral authority, would win its respect in Washington. Instead, America saw a troublesome neutral tilting towards Moscow. Only in the 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed and China began its ascent, did Washington rediscover India — less as a partner for its own sake than as a counterweight to Beijing.
Indian leaders mistook this tactical alignment for strategic benevolence. They interpreted American flattery as recognition of India’s rightful great-power status, overlooking that Washington’s real aim was to fold India into its own China policy. That confusion between respect and utility continues to haunt New Delhi.
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Agreements as chains, not bridges
CONSIDER the litany of agreements hailed in India as breakthroughs. The 2005 Nuclear Suppliers Group exemption, engineered by Washington, gave India access to nuclear technology. But the deal primarily opened the door for American companies to enter India’s nuclear market — often with outdated technology at inflated costs. The 2008 civil nuclear agreement deepened this entanglement, binding India more closely to US commercial and strategic interests.
Defence pacts followed in quick succession. LEMOA in 2016 allowed logistical coordination between militaries; COMCASA in 2018 provided access to US defence technology; BECA in 2020 facilitated geospatial intelligence sharing. Each was touted as evidence of India’s rising stature. In reality, each deepened Indian dependence on American systems while offering little deterrence against China. The Doklam standoff in 2017 and the deadly Galwan clash in 2020 demonstrated that US assurances did not prevent Beijing from testing India’s resolve. Washington never saw these agreements as partnerships of equals. They were tools of tethering, not trust.
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Lure of America’s strategy
PART of the American playbook has been to dangle inducements that flatter India’s ambitions. The Quad was presented as an exclusive club of Indo-Pacific democracies, advanced weapons were marketed as symbols of trust, diaspora events projected emotional ties, and trade negotiations dangled the promise of prosperity. Yet each gesture carried strings: economic concessions, alignment against China, or acceptance of US oversight.
India convinced itself these were badges of honour. They were, in truth, instruments of leverage.
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Misreading globalisation
INDIA’S economic missteps compounded its strategic ones. Since 2014, New Delhi has behaved as though American-led globalisation was a constant. But the world was already shifting. Trump’s first term ushered in tariffs and protectionism. Biden spoke of rebuilding alliances but hardened the trend through ‘friendshoring’ — privileging Japan, South Korea and Vietnam while bypassing India.
By the time Trump returned in 2025, deglobalisation was undeniable. Tariffs on Indian goods — 25 per cent at first, later doubled to 50 per cent — have ravaged industries from textiles to engineering. The rupee has wobbled, export-driven growth forecasts have dimmed, and small manufacturers are being edged out by nimbler competitors in Bangladesh and Vietnam. The $200 billion trade relationship with the US is now marred by mistrust. India assumed it would be treated as China was in the 1990s, showered with market access in return for alignment. Instead, it was treated as what it is: dispensable.
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The China delusion
PERHAPS the gravest misjudgement has been India’s faith that Washington’s hostility towards China automatically translates into unconditional support for Delhi. Indian strategists leaned heavily on the Quad, assumed that US defence pacts were deterrents, and allowed their border policy to harden against Beijing.
The result was predictable. China tested India militarily in 2020 at Galwan, exposing the emptiness of American assurances. In recent years, the US has also shown its willingness to pressure India directly — criticising its oil imports from Russia, raising tariffs and questioning its democratic credentials. Far from elevating India, Washington has reminded it of its place.
Meanwhile, Beijing has played the long game. Border de-escalation agreements in 2024, the resumption of flights in 2025, and Modi’s own public praise of ‘steady progress’ in bilateral ties underscore the irony: American coercion has nudged India closer to China.
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The absence of deception
THE contrast with China is striking. Beijing has mastered strategic deception, using the Belt and Road Initiative to create dependencies while cloaking its ambitions. India, by contrast, has been transparent to a fault — entering into US defence pacts as if between equals, mistaking transactional gestures for strategic commitments and sacrificing autonomy for fleeting validation. Great powers survive by practising the art of concealment. India, still seeking recognition, has exposed its hand.
The price is steep. Tariffs threaten entire export sectors, cutting into GDP growth. Defence dependency yields neither autonomy nor deterrence. Diplomatically, India finds itself in the worst of both worlds: alienated from Beijing for years, only now fumbling towards rapprochement, while Washington regards it less as a peer than as a pawn. India today resembles an oversized suitcase without a handle — too heavy to carry, too valuable to abandon.
The lesson is clear. US foreign policy is guided by interests, not sentiment, and India’s role will always be conditional. To safeguard its autonomy, New Delhi must diversify partnerships — strengthening ties with Europe, Russia, Southeast Asia — while approaching both Washington and Beijing with pragmatic caution.
Most importantly, India must cultivate the art of strategic deception. It must learn to extract benefits from partnerships without surrendering leverage, to cloak ambition beneath restraint, and to balance pride with prudence. History offers a warning. Pakistan once believed it was America’s indispensable ally. It learned, painfully, that it was dispensable. India risks the same fate unless it embraces realism.
The pageantry of ‘Howdy Modi’ and ‘Namaste Trump’ is now a faded memory. What remains are tariffs, slights, and strategic disappointment. India misread American intent as benevolent and its capacity as limited. It was wrong on both counts.
If it is to recover, India must shed its illusions and adapt. In geopolitics, there are no friendships, only convergences of interest. India must learn to navigate them, or it will continue to pay the price for its naiveté.
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MA Hossain is a political and defence analyst based in Bangladesh.
