NEW Age’s August 16 editorial, ‘Govt must not put ACC reform on the back burner,’ is particularly timely as the tenure of the interim government approaches. The Anti-Corruption Reform Commission, formed by that government, submitted 47 recommendations on January 15 to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission and insulate it from political and bureaucratic influence. These proposals — calling for professionalization, financial autonomy, and abolition of prior government sanction before prosecuting officials — were designed to make the ACC an effective guardian against graft. Yet, most remain unimplemented. Conviction rates slumped to 47 per cent in 2023, case disposal steadily declined, and a massive backlog continues to clog the courts. Without urgent reform, the ACC risks remaining largely symbolic, leaving Bangladesh trapped in a high-corruption equilibrium where systemic graft thrives. This inertia illustrates exactly what plural equilibrium theory predicts: once corruption becomes the default balance point, even well-designed reforms struggle to take root.
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Understanding plural equilibrium
WE OFTEN think of ‘balance’ as a single point — like a scale that tips until both sides are equal. Systems, however, can have multiple stable states. Economists call this plural equilibrium. A country can settle into different ‘equilibria,’ each self-reinforcing. In corruption terms, a society can lock itself into a low-corruption equilibrium — where honesty is expected — or a high-corruption equilibrium — where graft is routine. Once entrenched, movement between equilibria requires deliberate, systemic effort.
Corruption does not disappear overnight; a country once trapped in a high-corruption environment (2001–2006), where bribery and graft were routine, cannot leap suddenly to the standards of the least corrupt nations. Reform unfolds in stages: old practices gradually lose ground, new habits and rules take root, and each stage often lasts the term of a government before the next shift occurs. Progress is incremental, often taking years or decades.
Plural equilibrium theory highlights that social expectations, institutional arrangements, and incentives reinforce each state. When corruption becomes normalised, even reforms that appear technically sound can fail because the system itself absorbs or resists change. Understanding this dynamic is key to designing anti-corruption strategies that can eventually shift the country toward a low-corruption equilibrium.
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How plural equilibria apply to corruption
PLURAL equilibrium theory explains why some countries remain relatively clean while others are trapped in systemic graft. In a high-corruption equilibrium, everyone expects corruption: citizens anticipate bribes, officials assume payment, businesses expect to grease palms, and politicians rely on illicit funding. Each participant’s behaviour reinforces the others’, producing a self-sustaining web.
Conversely, in a low-corruption equilibrium, honesty is expected, laws are enforced, and trust in public institutions thrives. Once a society is locked into one equilibrium, reformers face enormous obstacles; a few honest actors in a corrupt system are often punished, sidelined, financially ruined, or politically isolated. Unless change occurs across multiple institutions simultaneously, reform tends to be absorbed and neutralised by entrenched corrupt practices.
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Bangladesh’s corruption equilibrium
BANGLADESH exemplifies a country trapped in a high-corruption equilibrium. Between 2001 and 2006, Transparency International ranked it the most corrupt country globally for five consecutive years. This reflected a systemic pattern, not isolated individuals. Corruption operates as bureaupolitigraft — the symbiotic collusion of bureaucrats and politicians. From rural land offices to central ministries, officials engage in rent-seeking while politicians provide protection and share the spoils.
Since the Awami League took office in 2009, CPI numbers have occasionally improved, yet corruption has oscillated around the 146th rank globally. Rampant corruption has morphed into lootopoliticraft — the strategic orchestration of looting as governance. Toll extortion affects truck drivers and small businesses, banking scandals siphon billions through politically connected borrowers, and small investors are repeatedly burned in stock market manipulations — all nodes in a self-sustaining network.
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela and Russia illustrate a pattern in which multiple layers of corruption coexist, making piecemeal reform ineffective. In such systems, individual anti-corruption initiatives — however well-intentioned — fail because the broader equilibrium enforces compliance with corrupt norms.
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Why this equilibrium persists
CORRUPTION persists due to self-reinforcing expectations, institutional weakness, and economic incentives. Citizens expect to pay bribes because others do, and officials expect collection because payment is routine. Anti-corruption agencies, audit departments and oversight bodies are often politically captured, rendering formal rules ineffective.
Economic incentives favour the status quo. Illicit income frequently far exceeds salaries, and punishment is rare. Social and family pressures compound the problem, expecting public officials to ‘bring benefits’ home. Political patronage reinforces loyalty, funds campaigns and maintains control. In such a setting, honesty often seems irrational, while corruption is rewarded.
Moreover, the psychological dimension of social norms reinforces the high-corruption equilibrium. When citizens and officials internalise the belief that ‘everyone does it,’ corruption perpetuates itself, creating a cycle that is resistant to isolated reform efforts.
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The alternative equilibrium
A LOW-CORRUPTION equilibrium is achievable. In such a state, public officials are held accountable, citizens trust institutions, businesses compete on quality rather than connections, and political parties compete on policy performance. For Bangladesh, achieving this requires dismantling bureaupolitigraft, halting lootopoliticraft, and strengthening institutions to serve the law rather than individual patrons.
With an interim government and an independently operating ACC, there is cautious optimism that Bangladesh can gradually approach the standards of the least corrupt nations. The transition requires coordinated, multi-sectoral reform combined with sustained political will and public engagement.
Reform efforts are, however, often absorbed by the corrupt system. Digitizing land records, introducing new procurement rules, or increasing fines fails if enforcement rests in the hands of those benefiting from graft. Plural equilibrium theory predicts that unless a critical mass of change occurs across institutions simultaneously, reforms are neutralized. Stepwise reform unfolds over years or decades, with each equilibrium typically lasting the term of a government before the next shift occurs.
Incremental change without systemic alignment can even backfire: isolated honest actors may be punished, reform credibility erodes, and public cynicism deepens. Only when reforms are synchronized across bureaucracies, political structures and civic institutions does the equilibrium shift become feasible.
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Escaping the low-trust trap
MOVING to a low-corruption equilibrium requires a critical mass of coordinated changes across governance, legal and economic systems. Public institutions must become genuinely independent, with oversight bodies empowered to investigate and prosecute corruption without political interference. Judicial reform is essential to ensure swift and fair resolution of cases, reinforcing public confidence that rules apply to all. Political financing must be transparent to end illicit toll collection and the informal funding of campaigns that perpetuate corruption.
Equally important is active public participation and a vigilant media that exposes misconduct and celebrates integrity. Economic restructuring is needed to link prosperity to productivity rather than political connections, ensuring that merit and innovation are rewarded over rent-seeking. Finally, shifting public expectations is vital: citizens must see that honesty is rewarded, corruption punished and public service is honourable. When reform initiatives in one sector create complementary changes in others, they generate sympathetic resonance, amplifying the shift towards a new, low-corruption equilibrium.
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A question of will and coordination
PLURAL equilibrium theory frames corruption as a self-sustaining balance. Escaping it demands coordinated transformation of institutions, incentives and public expectations. Bangladesh’s history demonstrates that corruption without bureaucratic collusion is impossible.
The current equilibrium is not accidental — it is maintained by collective expectations, institutional weaknesses and systemic incentives. Breaking out is difficult but not impossible. Recognising that today’s ‘balance’ is not the only one is the first step. Another equilibrium exists — one where integrity is the norm, trust is the foundation, and governance serves the people rather than exploiting them. The challenge lies not in imagining it, but in building the momentum and courage to reach it.
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Dr Abdullah A Dewan is a former physicist and nuclear engineer at BAEC and professor emeritus of economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA.
