MANY people are now openly saying that the government and the state are not functioning well. There is no reason to brand everyone making such observations as fascists or their sympathisers. A significant portion of those who directly participated in or supported the anti-fascist movement in the past are also openly voicing such concerns, motivated by their sincere commitment to the spirit of the July uprising. But why? Because they have made clear observations: the government has been making one mistake after another, taking misguided steps, showing signs of vagueness and indecision, and either deliberate or unintentional delays in implementing decisions. They have even had the misfortune of hearing the authoritarian claim from the chief adviser鈥檚 press secretary that 鈥榃e got a mandate to do everything.鈥� These are all unwanted and unfortunate incidents that have undoubtedly put the government under various questions. Among these missteps, some can justly be called blunders. I would identify five of them as major blunders.
With profound respect, deep affection, and firm support, I must say that the first major blunder after the current interim government took office was caused by Professor Muhammad Yunus. Just after becoming the chief adviser, instead of taking initiatives to bring students back to campuses and study desks, he took steps to involve them in state power and administration. This has become a major cause of the ongoing damage to the country鈥檚 education sector. The students鈥� movement for auto-pass is merely a symptom of that. In this regard, at least the authorities of private universities deserve thanks. They have been successful in promptly bringing their students back to campuses and study desks.
The second major blunder was made by the entire advisory council and those associated with it, as they failed to place at the top of their priority list the matters of compensating the victims of the July massacre, providing treatment for the injured, ensuring justice for the perpetrators, and implementing urgent national reforms. Even now, we hear about the helplessness and resentment of the families of the deceased; there are widespread complaints about negligence and shortcomings in the treatment of those who were injured during the July massacre. In nine months, the government could not carry out a single trial; in nine months, not even one reform could be confirmed. We are witnessing discussions initiated by the national consensus commission. However, there is not the slightest indication so far that any meaningful outcome based on consensus is emerging from those discussions. We saw in the past that some caretaker governments 鈥� the caretaker government led by Justice Shahbuddin Ahmed, for example 鈥� even with just a three-month term, were at least able to create an environment suitable for a fair election.
The third major blunder has been committed by a group who 鈥� apparently with the hidden ambition of gaining power in the near future, not by an immediate and fair national election but by some unexplained and undisclosed hidden and unfair tactics 鈥� has initiated steps to isolate and corner the largest political party, the BNP. One, however, does not need to be an activist or even a supporter of the BNP to observe that the BNP is the party that was the most persecuted party during the past fascist era; it is the party that was the most consistent participant in the anti-fascist movement in the last 16 years; it is the party that is unarguably the largest political party in the country; it is the party that is almost certainly expected to come to power in a fair and transparent election. But we see the aforementioned group with undisclosed, hidden and unfair tactics has been carrying a terrifying campaign of verbal violence against the BNP, mixing truth with lies. There has been a visible attempt to equate the BNP 鈥� the most persecuted political party of the fascist period 鈥� with the persecutors, the Awami League.
The BNP may have many faults, and certainly it does. But in the context of the spirit of July, the attempt to equate the BNP with the Awami League should rightly be considered a serious offence. The interim government cannot claim to be free of responsibility for this offence. This is because many individuals deeply connected with and supported by this government have been observed actively participating in this anti-BNP campaign; the government has never visibly attempted to restrain them. At the very least, the government has given no open indication that it does not align with this group in the anti-BNP campaign. The natural outcome of these activities is the growing distance between the BNP and the interim government and its allied circles, which has certainly made the government鈥檚 success increasingly uncertain.
The fourth major blunder has been caused 鈥� and continues to be caused 鈥� by some individuals with little or no experience who have suddenly turned into 鈥榠mportant and influential political leaders鈥� due to the situation. Out of an intense desire to remain close to state power and administration for as long as possible, these apparently government-backed 鈥榮uddenly emerged influential political leaders鈥� are trying to delay the national election as much as they can. These inexperienced leaders either do not know or deliberately deny the fact that although an election alone is not sufficient for democracy, it is nonetheless a necessary condition. Those who have even minimal political understanding know that although being elected does not make a government democratic, every unelected government is undemocratic.
It should always be remembered that the current interim government is merely a 鈥榯emporarily acceptable undemocratic government鈥�. This government is undemocratic, simply because it is not an elected government. There is no scope for debate here. Anyone who has a minimum level of knowledge about politics will not initiate a debate in this regard. Nevertheless, this government is temporarily acceptable because the forces behind the popular mass uprising placed it in power with the support of the people.
However, both the government and all those associated with it must take the word 鈥榯emporary鈥� seriously. It is worth noting here that if someone says, 鈥業 have confidence in this government,鈥� and the government or its affiliates interpret it to mean 鈥業 want this government to stay for five years,鈥� that would be a grave mistake. Rather, the statement should be understood, in this context, to mean, 鈥業 believe this government will lead the country towards a transition to democracy in the shortest possible time.鈥� But, judging by the situation, it appears that many of those associated with the government are misinterpreting public confidence in the former, mistaken way. This is an approach that is leading the country towards an unstable outcome.
The fifth major blunder has been caused 鈥� and continues to be caused 鈥� by some extremist individuals at home and abroad and their low-intellect followers. These people 鈥� denying the cautious and constructive role played by most army personnel and the chief during the final phase of the July uprising 鈥� are spreading slander, showing contempt, and carrying propaganda against the army and the chief of the army to create confusion and disorder in the army and in the state. However, everybody understands that without the positive role of the army and the army chief in the final moments, the success of the July mass uprising would have been uncertain. The aim of this extremist group is to create a division between the government and the army in order to implement its own agenda. Has the government not walked into their trap? It appears that it has. There have even been instances where individuals associated with the government have publicly belittled, shown contempt for, and criticised the army and the army chief in media interviews. It was expected that the government would take a clear stance against such unprovable statements, claims, and activities. But the government did not do so. Thus, the government cannot claim its disassociation from this blunder that is creating an undesirable distance between the government and the armed forces.
It is not the case that the government has committed only these five blunders. As mentioned before, beyond these, there are many other errors, flaws, and wrongful actions committed by the government, several of which are quite significant. However, I have identified these five as the major blunders. That said, all is not lost. There is still room for optimism. And for the sake of the nation, the government must embrace that opportunity. To do so, the very first step for the government is to acknowledge the mistakes that have indeed been made on its part. In Bangladesh, there is a long-standing habit of saying, 鈥淭he government was misled by others.鈥� Such insincere admissions are of no use. Even if the government was misled by others, the responsibility for being misled still lies with the government. This is a very straightforward matter. Therefore, the government must clearly and cordially admit its mistakes and take urgent corrective measures.
As an urgent corrective action, I expect that the chief adviser will soon deliver a speech to the nation in which he will (1) give a clear and serious directive to students to focus on their studies rather than on politics, power, or administration, (2) provide a clear update on compensation for those killed in the July popular uprising and on the medical treatment of the injured, (3) announce how far his government has progressed 鈥� on the basis of national consensus 鈥� towards implementing minimal reforms and clearly state when and how those reforms will be achieved, (4) clearly indicate in which month the schedule for the national election may be announced, (5) clearly declare that neither he nor his government holds or will hold any bias towards any political party, and that anyone (if there is any) in his government who is directly or indirectly affiliated with any political party will be asked to step down, (6) deliver a firm and unequivocal directive that all political leaders 鈥� whether seasoned veterans or newly emerged influential figures 鈥� must completely refrain from interfering in the administration, from the union level all the way up to the secretariat, (7) assure the major political parties that from now on, all significant and critical decisions of state will be made in consultation with them and with their confidence, and (8) clearly state that his government does not endorse the hateful propaganda or disparaging mockery directed at the army and its officers, and deliver a warning to those responsible.
As an optimistic person, I believe that if the chief adviser mentions these eight points in his address and effectively implements them, then within the next six to seven months, we can surely achieve a transition to a functioning democratic system. Fortunately, our chief adviser himself is a deeply optimistic individual. We trust that a personality like him will evaluate the circumstances and make the right decisions to steer the country in the right direction. We have confidence in him. However, having this confidence does not mean that his government should rule the country for the next five years. Rather, what this confidence means is that we believe he and his government will lead the country towards democracy within the shortest possible time.
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Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is a professor of philosophy at Jahangirnagar University.
