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BANGLADESH is home to both ethnic and religious minorities. In many cases, ethnic minorities also belong to the category of religious minorities. For example, religious minorities such as the Hindus and the Christians include many ethnically Bengali individuals. The Hindus represent the most significant minority group, both in terms of population and for political and historical reasons.

South Asia has experienced significant and persistent ethnic conflicts rooted in historical divisions that emerged with the establishment of modern nation-states. The tension was exacerbated by British colonial policies, which strategically manipulated communal identities and fuelled societal divisions. The fracturing of local communities undermined social cohesion and served the interests of the British raj and in the subsequent period after India’s independence. Thus, the Hindu-Muslim divide has been constructed and has been played on and exploited by the political elite most effectively and almost in a routine manner for their benefits in the name of ‘nation’ and ‘state.’

Bangladesh’s interplay of identity, history and politics demands a nuanced understanding of its sociopolitical landscape. Islam is deeply embedded in the nation’s culture and politics. While Bengali nationalism had a territorial aspect, Bangladeshi nationalism’s evolution in 1975 marked a significant resurgence of Muslim identity, gaining widespread acceptance among the population. The ethnic divisions heightened by the British colonial rule continue to influence modern political discourse, often impacting the Hindu community in Bangladesh the most. While other minorities, like those in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, also face significant challenges, the unique historial and political legacy of the Hindus has intensified their ethnic identity, which is frequently and sometimes inaccurately linked to India.

The Hindu community in Bangladesh faces political and economic insecurity, often targeted by vested interests under the guise of religious sentiments, particularly in land grabbing. This insecurity intensified after the Babri Masjid incident in India, leading to anti-Hindu riots in Bangladesh in 1990 and 1992, which resulted in attacks on temples and a subsequent out-migration. This tense atmosphere has affected Bangladesh-India relations and fuelled anti-Muslim propaganda in India, further complicating the situation for the Hindus in Bangladesh.

Majoritarian democracy has turned politics into a game of numbers. Human beings and communities have been turned into vote banks and constituencies. This dehumanising of politics took a hideous form in the October 2001 elections in Bangladesh. Minorities, especially the Hindu community, were targeted. The reasons for violence against them were not limited to communal factors. Instead, the main factors behind such actions were purely political and structural. The Gujarat riots in the preceding year in India did not help the situation, fuelling anti-India sentiments. Despite various circumstances, it is essential to note that the long-standing anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has, unfortunately, been exploited for personal gain and has led to violence and violations against the Hindus. Religious extremists within the Muslim majority have caused significant suffering to many innocent Hindus.

India’s unequivocal, unapologetic and unwavering support for the Sheikh Hasina-led government, along with its direct involvement in Bangladesh’s policies and politics, has contributed to a rising anti-India sentiment. As the Narendra Modi-led government in India increasingly adopts an anti-Muslim stance, often using Bangladesh as a focal point for its hostility towards Muslims, incidents such as the attack on Muslims in Delhi and reports of vigilante assaults on mosques and members of the Muslim community have intensified this sentiment. Consequently, the anti-India feeling has taken on a religio-political tone. For instance, despite mass demonstration in 2022 protesting at the comments by Bharatiya Janata Party leaders defaming the Prophet, the Awami League government remained silent, which was yet another gesture of the AL government’s subservience.

Instead of addressing the challenges faced by the Hindus, political parties — particularly the Awami League — have historically politicised their struggles. The Hindus are viewed as a vote bank for the Awami League, making them targets for opposition parties and their allies. In some cases, supporters of the Awami League have attacked local Hindus, believing they did not vote for the party as expected. Additionally, terrorists have exploited this situation to engage in extortion and looting. The increasingly anti-Muslim narrative propagated by the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party, along with anti-Islamic propaganda and attacks on the Muslims, coupled with Indian support for the Awami League and the now-deposed prime minister Hasina, further complicates the situation. These perceived ongoing efforts of India to undermine the interim government in Bangladesh are not helping matters either. Several Indian media and experts try to portray the anti-India sentiment as an Islamic extremist narrative and Chinese influence. However, the reality is not so. During the August uprising in Bangladesh, Indian media claimed that Chinese and Pakistani intelligence were linked to the protests, exaggerating attacks on the Hindus. As Hasina fled the country, reports tried to suggest that the Inter-Services Intelligence aimed at turning Bangladesh into an Islamic state with support from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami.

The aftermath of the political crisis in Bangladesh has once again made the Hindu community a vulnerable target. The student protests quickly became a pretext for vigilantes and vested interests to perpetrate violence against the Hindus. Within just a day and a half after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led government, the country experienced a surge in violence explicitly targeting Hindu houses and places of worship in several districts. Although tension had become manageable in successive weeks, the ISKCON leader issue in recent weeks has exacerbated the situation once more. Several Islamist political parties, including the far-right Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh, have called for a ban on ISKCON in Bangladesh. An organiser of the student-led uprising that overthrew Hasina posted on social media, labelling ISKCON as an ‘extremist’ group that is ‘trying to implement various treasonous plots to destabilise’ Bangladesh.

Religious tension is escalating in Bangladesh after violence related to the arrest of a Hindu religious leader in Chittagong. Hindu leader Chinmoy Krishna Das was denied bail on charges of sedition on Tuesday for allegedly insulting Bangladesh’s flag during a rally in October. In response, the police reported that hundreds of his supporters clashed with security forces as Das was being carried back to jail. During the confrontation, a Muslim lawyer named Saiful Islam Alif was killed. In the aftermath of the incident, some Muslim groups have called for action against the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. Although Bangladesh ISKCON stated that Chinmoy Krishna Das was expelled from the organisation in July because of disciplinary issues, the president of ISKCON Bangladesh claimed that Das defied the order and continued his activities. Nevertheless, ISKCON Bangladesh and the global ISKCON also issued statements condemning the arrest.

Regrettably, there is a troubling rise in Hindu extremism in the country, evident in social media narratives and violent actions, such as the mob lynching of two brothers in Faridpur in late April. This trend highlights the ongoing exploitation of religious tensions by various vested interests. Under prime minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party, the surge in Hindu nationalism in India has marginalised not only Muslims but also other religious groups. Legislative measures promoting cow protection have fuelled extremist organisations that receive support from the Bharatiya Janata Party. Scholars warn that state propaganda and communal violence are fostering a ‘Nazi conscience’ among the Hindu majority, leading to moral justification for violence. This shift raises alarm among the Muslim majority in Bangladesh, heightening anxiety and emboldening local Muslim extremists. Disillusioned by the treatment of Muslims in India, some Bangladeshi Muslims are responding with hostility towards Hindu minorities. This escalating tension demands vigilance to prevent a cycle of retaliation. ISKCON is seen by many as a significant promoter of growing Hindu extremism, particularly highlighted by an incident at an annual book fair in Bangladesh. During this event, the Awami League government allowed ISKCON to have a separate stall while publishers of Islamic books were denied space. When the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh condemned atrocities on the Hindus and minorities in Bangladesh and demanded the release of ISKCON monk, the concerns stated above only became more pronounced.

Deep-seated beliefs, regional factors and sentiments against India shape the religious tensions in Bangladesh. Bangladesh and India’s relationship is being re-evaluated with the interim government in power. The interim government has committed to conducting free and fair elections. However, there is growing concern in New Delhi that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which has historically had a hostile stance towards India, may win overwhelmingly. Since the decline of the Awami League, no political party has been as popular or influential as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This potential outcome raises alarms in New Delhi regarding the strategic stability of India’s north-eastern region, which shares a border with Bangladesh, as well as Dhaka’s shifting geopolitical dynamics. With the Indian diaspora in the United States calling for sanctions against Bangladesh, West Bengali chief minister Mamata Banerjee calling for deploying peacekeepers in Bangladesh is undoubtedly calling for increased focus on how Bangladesh needs to calibrate its relations with India.

In contexts where national sentiments run high, expressing admiration for even the Indian cricket team can be contentious, particularly in gatherings predominantly composed of Bangladeshis. While appreciation for individual Indian figures such as Sachin Tendulkar, Amitabh Bachchan or Salman Khan may be more palatable, a collective endorsement of anything associated with India often elicits strong negative reactions from a significant portion of the Bangladeshi populace. This phenomenon underscores the complexities of national identity and inter-country perceptions, suggesting that collective representations of India are viewed with scepticism or outright disdain in certain circles.

Unfortunately, religion has also become embroiled in this context and the religious tension that we see prevailing in Bangladesh is just a symptomatic reflection, with its roots going deep and wide.

India and Bangladesh share a geographically contiguous territory, leading to strong mutual dependence between the two countries that necessitates sharing common resources. India is among Bangladesh’s top 10 sources of foreign direct investment and is the third-largest contributor of bilateral foreign assistance from non-aid group countries. India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner. While historical, economic and strategic ties make India a geopolitical reality of existential scope, India’s approach to Bangladesh must also change based on people-to-people relations and not single-party relations that excessively benefit India.

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Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.