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THE Bangladesh state in 1971 is complex in its functional identity as it was a state in occupation fighting for liberation. The state formation process followed unorthodox routes, incorporating both formal and informal realities in separate and overlapping spaces. The state defining process, including the nature and growth of sovereignty of the Bangladesh state, is significantly singular and can be traced to its own unorthodox historical roots.

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Lahore Resolution and two-step road to state

ONE of the most important aspects of this historical journey is that Bangladesh had a two-step journey to statehood. The first phase, East Pakistan, was a forced state reality because the pre-1947 mainstream political forces represented by the Bengal Muslim League did not want it. They were let down by the All-India Muslim League that took a resolution in 1946 to set up two independent states in the Muslim majority areas of India, amending the original resolution which was passed by the party in 1940 and is known as the Lahore Resolution.

In 1946, the All-India Muslim League under Jinnah did the cutting and pasting on several grounds, including calling the original resolution a ‘typing error’. So, what emerged in 1947 was basically a typing-error state. The point is: why did it take the All-India Muslim League six years after passing the resolution to figure this out?

Doubts about the sincerity of the purpose of the All India Muslim League are obvious because the Bengal Muslim League began its campaign for an ‘independent state’ immediately after 1940. The All India Muslim League had said nothing. Not just that, but several organisations were formed to push for this ‘state’, including the East Pakistan Renaissance Society which was led by the intellectuals and activists of the Bengal Muslim League. They even drew a map of the new state.

Now, had the two-‘Pakistan’ concept been an error as per the All India Muslim League position in 1946, why was it silent for six years from 1940 to 1946? Or Did they wait till the 1946 elections results when the Muslim League swept the major zones named in 1940 and went for an independent state?

More important is not what Jinnah and his All-India Muslim League thought but what the Bengal Muslim League, the majority’s party in Bengal, thought and did. It mobilised voters in the 1946 elections by promising a new state not as a subservient reality of a centralised Pakistan based on North Indian domination syndrome. The electoral resolution of 1946 Bengali Muslim League should be read to see the vision of the new state.

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Jinnah’s support and Nehru’s opposition to United Bengal

THE period from 1937 to 1947 was a period when it sought a state which it were denied. If the All-India Muslim League was so committed to Pakistan, why did Jinnah support an independent Bengali state proposed by the Bengal Muslim league in 1947?

In 1946–47, disgruntled Bengal Muslim League leaders led by Abul Hashem, angry with the Delhi Resolution of one Pakistan, approached the Bengal Congress to propose a United Bengal, a state independent of India and Pakistan. Initially, the Bengal Congress was interested, but when Jinnah supported the move, the All-India Congress opposed it.

This was naturally echoed by the Bengal Congress that later proposed the Partition of Bengal making East Pakistan inevitable. If Jinnah was such a loyalist thinker of a Muslim state, why did he support the United Bengal Movement, which was an expression of Bengali state-making?

In the same vein, if Nehru was a supporter of ‘non-religious communal’ state-making, why did he not support a Bengali state? Was he against Bengali nationalism? Such facts should make people discuss the convenient and opportunistic net roles of ‘nationalism’ in South Asian history in state-making. Basically, the Jinnah-Nehru conflict or the North Indian conflict between Mughal (All-India Muslim League) and pre-Mughal (All-India Congress) greatly determined the politics of the so-called one India.

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1971: layers of the state

THE 1971 war represents the completion process of state-making that began in 1940. Its roots lay in the multiple aspirations of the people from different class and socio-economic clusters. These groups and clusters were mixed by many factors and elements.

In this discussion, this mix of formality and informality is explored, using the nature of various administrative and warrior groups ranging from the Mujibnagar government-appointed army to the spontaneous partisans not linked to any government formally. Other groups show similar trends lying in various sovereignty gathering processes all linked by a common cause to defend and define the Bangladesh state in occupation.

For the benefit of discussion, the three main layers are analysed — formal = fully structure; non-formal = partly structured; and informal = non-structured.

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Political background to 1971 war

— East Pakistan/Bangladesh was supposed to be an independent state as per the Lahore Resolution of 1940.

— Between 1940 and 1946, many activities and some organisations were active for laying the foundation of this new state of East Pakistan.

— Elections of 1946 were won with this mandate in existence.

— It was changed in 1946 by the Delhi Resolution.

— Protests led to the United Bengal Movement of 1946–1947 with the Bengal Congress for the first independent state for Bengalis, but the INC was not keen and it collapsed

— It led to the formation of a secret organisation, the ‘Inner Group’ led by the Bengal Muslim League activist Moazzem Ahmed Chowdhury, who began to work for an independent state outside India and Pakistan

— The person they thought would lead the new state was ‘that tall man from Gopalganj.’

— Moazzem Ahmed Chowdhury: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman never believed in Pakistan. He said, ‘East Pakistan was going to be a colony of Karachi.’

• The independent state was killed by both the All-India Muslim League and the INC, but the struggle continued that had begun long ago in the belly of peasant-powered alliance which was led by the middle class.

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Interregnum period 1947-1971

— There is no happy period between 1947 and 1971 which would display a common state of Pakistan. By 1948, the situation was tense and anti-Pakistan hatred was observed as part of the language movement.

— the Bengal Muslim League overnight became the Awami Muslim League and agitation against Objective Resolution began.

— Jinnah’s speech in Dhaka in 1948 where he threatened East Pakistanis is the best evidence of the state of affairs and East Pakistani exclusion.

— By 1952, the language movement peaked with the firing at Dhaka University. The disappointed salary-aspirant middle class began to go public with resentment.

— 1954 elections led by the United Front showed Pakistan in East Pakistan may never have existed as it totally rejected the Pakistan Muslim League.

— As agitation grew, martial law was imposed to save Pakistan as the civil-political state had become threatened by 1958.

— Active ‘independence’ groups began working from 1958 and never stopped.

— Sheikh Mujibur Rahman went to India in 1962–63 with Moazzem Ahmed Chowdhury’s help, showing how mainstream the independence movement had become.

— Given this evidence, it appears that the 1946 resolution to amend the 1940 resolution was null and void in real terms.

— The period from 1947 to 1971 was one of a subsumed state struggling to become a concrete state.

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Transition process in 1971

MOST state birthday narratives do not elaborate on the process as they are bureaucratic rather than historical. Hence, fixed dates dominate. In the case of Bangladesh, three phases are noticed.

— From March 2 to March 25, when effective state control was with the elected party and for all administrative purposes and function, Pakistan had ceased to exist. This is the transition phase of the Bangladesh state.

— From March 25/26 to April 10, when the Pakistan army cracked down on the ‘state’ and met resistance by state forces. The Mujibnagar government in India came into being which took oath on April 17, 1971. However, Pakistan did not control or complete the occupation before the end-April. This is the interregnum phase, largely informal/non-formal.

— From April 10 to December 16, when the formal government came into being and led the state and all its agencies. However, the nature of the government was not conventional either, as Bangladesh was under occupation as formal/informal both functioned.

As a state in war, it was a compound state with multiple realities that is common with many states in war. Hence, the notion of formal state cannot apply, but it was not a fully-formed informal state either. This duality was a key characteristic of the state and, thus, the Mujibnagar government also.

Some of the key elements are:

— The Bangladesh state was more historical and less in legal existence. Territorially, it was in occupation

— The government, Mujibnagar, was located in another state, Indiam which supported/funded the movement but did not recognise it formally. Its relationship was also, therefore, a co-existence of the formal and the informal.

— The state, territorially, was a legal continuation of the occupier state, Pakistan. It was the residence of the majority of the state while the occupier was the minority.

— The primary activity of the state was to conduct a war against the occupant state and liberate the people and the land. Thus, this period is defined primarily by military activities and other activities contingent to the same.

— The state was significantly defined by this process of engagement through this war and militancy of the participants, formal, non-formal and informal.

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Engagement stages during war

1. The March militancy was free of armed confrontation but the leadership was politically formal as elected members of parliaments but informal as governors of a non-formal phase.
2. It was a transition stage; hence, the leadership, though without any legal administrative power but able to exert power through its legitimacy gained by an electoral victory and public support. It was, thus, a mixed version though dominated by the informal.
3. From March 25 to April/10/17/end, the state was fluid in most of its function, including armed militancy. This mass participation of the resistance constructed by militants ranging from ex-Pakistani members of the armed forces to villagers defined the nature of the state later on, as militancy continued.
4. These militant forces of April subsequently emerged as the formal and informal warriors to define the nature of the state through its actions ending on December 16, 1971.

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Militants and state

THERE were six major armed forces which fought the invaders under the Mujibnagar government

1. The Bangladesh military that was directly commanded by the Mujibnagar government. It fought in the 13 war sectors. It is also referred to as ‘Niyamita Bahini’( regulars).
2. The Mukti Fouj/Mukti Bahini/Gono Bahini/irregulars who were civilians trained in camps by formal forces and then returned to fight inside the occupied Bangladesh
3. The Kaderia Bahini, the Afsar Bahini, the Hemayet Bahini and other forces that were raised inside Bangladesh and were locally trained and fought the invaders but were not directly linked to Mujibnagar but loyal to it.
4. Leftist led forces which were independently led but were (a) not-antagonistic to Mujibnagar, (b) antagonistic to Mujibnagar.
5. The Mujib Bahini which was led by the Indian military and its cadres were Bangladeshi political elements. Its relationship with Mujibnagar was ambiguous, but they fought for a common cause.
6. The armed civilians in the occupied territory of the state

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Nature of military involvement: Formal, non-formal and informal groups

1. The official army of Mujibnagar was part of the readying process for the final assault in December as it was to be largely involved in the formal India-Pakistan-Bangladesh state war. Bangladesh joined officially after recognition and formed a joint force with India. Before that period, its main operations were not significantly in occupied territories.
2. The Muib Bahini was similar and involved in front wars and formally ran who ventured in the final months as the war entered its official stage. It was an intermediate force of the Indian construct but made up of Bangladeshi political activists not part of the Mujibnagar government. It signifies non-formal forces.
3. Armed activities in the occupied zone were largely carried out by the rest of the forces who may be designated as the relatively informal forces

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Nature of the state

— As a non-recognised territory less state as under occupation, Bangladesh in 1971 was significantly largely informal. It was legitimised by public support but not legally supported.

— The Mujibnagar government, therefore, depended on the electoral results of 1970 and the subsequent declaration of independence as referred to in the Mujibnagar documents as the claimant of representation. Its legitimacy lay in public support.

— It had no control over the territory it represented but was the recipient of loyalty of the overwhelming majority.

— It had a functional albeit very limited administration which had no legal basis but was based on global goodwill; hence, largely informal.

— Housed in India physically, its representation inside Bangladesh was through Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra and the armed insurgents.

— Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra was aural not physical, but it became a representation inside the occupied territory of Mujibnagar; hence, the state. The warriors inside were physical and part of the wider non-formal and informal space in which the people in captivity lived.

— The link between Mujibnagar and the people was, therefore, non-formal although in their own space, both were substantive.

— The state was, therefore, not wholly formal but largely non-formal with formal and informal elements. It was, in effect, a mix of various sorts of realities that was rooted in public support more than administrative or bureaucratic reality which was formal in nature.

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End comments

— The Mujibnagar government was the most formal part of the Bangladesh state, but it lacked all the components of being one. Its legitimacy was won through the activities of the informal/non-formal forces as well as its own formal structure.

— The largest part of the Bangladesh state was non-formal and informal as it existed in occupation and its reality was not limited to its government or that of the occupier.

— This combination was more in line with the traditions of an emerging peasant state where informal states limited by territory had been seen before anti-British colonial resistance, too. Hence, informal states had a history in Bangladesh in times of resistance.

— Subsequent memorialising has focused more on the formal spaces of 1971 as the ruling governments were inheritors of the formal rather than the informal.

— Exploration to locate the nature of the Bangladesh state in 1971 needs to continue.

The current Bangladesh cannot be understood without understanding the background and its multiple roots and how they continue to influence the evolving nature of the state.

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Afsan Chowdhury is a researcher and journalist. The draft of this article was presented at the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh in 2022.