THE Rohingya refugee crisis is not the event that took place only in 2017. It is a recurring tragedy, a painful cycle of persecution, exodus and displacement. The waves of 1978, 1992, 2012 and the influx of 2017 represent a persistent and collective failure of international and regional response to a profound humanitarian challenge. While the primary responsibility for the persecution lies unquestionably with Myanmar, a critical examination should show that Bangladesh, as the primary victim of the crisis, has failed to develop a strategic, proactive policy to prevent the recurrence.
The approach of Bangladesh, which is the lone victim of the Rohingya refugee crisis, has been fundamentally reactive, trapped by political hindsight, diplomatic incapacity and the 鈥榟abit of (military) deterrence without credibility.鈥� This analysis argues that the refugee problem since 1978 is the result of a blurred political vision, an inability to negotiate complex regional geopolitics and a lack of credible leverage, which together have kept Bangladesh on the receiving end of the refugee crisis that it did not create.
Political hindsight. Bangladesh鈥檚 political approach to Rohingya refugee problems is characterised by a 鈥榗risis management鈥� approach rather than a 鈥榗risis prevention鈥� one.
Myth of temporariness: Since 1978, the only political objective has been a quick-fix, ie a quick repatriation after each exodus. Governments have viewed each wave of Rohingya exodus as an isolated incident and failed to acknowledge that the policy of persecution is a deliberate and enduring plan for ethnic cleansing. Such a failure precluded the development of long-term national strategy preventing persecution within Rakhine State.
Ad-hoc engagement: Against the backdrop of persistent refugee problem, Bangladesh has never formulated a coherent 鈥楳yanmar policy.鈥� Engagement was sporadic, dictated by the urgency of the moment, with no sustained effort to build relationships across Myanmar鈥檚 complex political landscape, with the Tatmadaw, the democratic opposition or ethnic Rakhine groups. Such an approach has left Bangladesh with no influential allies inside Myanmar when the crisis erupted.
Domestic politics: No political party in power has wanted to deal with a long-term solution. While the public sentiment is generally humanitarian, there is also a deep-seated fear for the long-term demographic and security implications of hosting a massive refugee population. This has often led to a disconnect between strong domestic rhetoric and a more conciliatory, often desperate, private diplomacy aimed solely at returning the refugees.
Geopolitical blockade: Bangladesh鈥檚 diplomacy has been hampered by an over-reliance on forums such as international organisations, diplomatic groupings or multilateral platforms that, while providing a stage for dialogues and principle-setting, lack the substantive power, enforcement mechanism or political unity to produce tangible outcomes that override the strategic interests of major global powers.
Bilateral trap: For decades, Dhaka has clung to the hope that bilateral diplomacy and appeals to 鈥榞ood neighbourliness鈥� would yield results. Myanmar used this channel to delay, complicate and engage in endless verification processes and empty memorandums of understanding and Bangladesh gave the impression of having no leverage to enforce agreements.
Ineffective internationalisation: Bangladesh is hesitant to back internationalising the crisis. This reluctance meant the international community only engaged fully during full-blown catastrophes, as it happened in 2017, rather than being mobilised to prevent them. A sustained global campaign demanding an end to systematic ethnic cleansing has been absent all through.
China-India conundrum: This is the serious political and diplomatic disappointment. Bangladesh鈥檚 two big neighbours are Myanmar鈥檚 primary strategic partners with diverse geoeconomic and geopolitical interests.
China:听 Myanmar is China鈥檚 non-negotiable asset. It is Myanmar鈥檚 chief arms supplier, investor and diplomatic shield in the United Nations and elsewhere. Bangladesh has failed to adopt a strategy to pursue China meaningfully and limit its unwavering support for the Tatmadaw鈥檚 atrocity.
India: Driven by its 鈥榓ct east policy,鈥� counter-insurgency concerns in its northeast and competition with China, India views the Myanmar government as a critical partner. It has provided military aid for the Tatmadaw and avoided supporting the Rohingya refugees to keep Naypyidaw in confidence. Bangladesh鈥檚 political diplomacy could not convince India that a stable Bangladesh-Myanmar border was no less important than its engagement with Myanmar.
Absence of military deterrence: Naypyidaw has perceived Bangladesh鈥檚 non-response to major border violations by Tatmadaw and former NaSaKa (Border Guard Police) since 1991 as evidence of political and military insouciance.
Conventional and asymmetric disadvantage: The Tatmadaw is a battle-hardened force significantly larger and more heavily equipped. The notion of mere conventional military deterrence is not a credible option, rendering threats of retaliation empty.
Indirect leverage: A potential form of leverage, high-risk though, would have been to develop relationships with ethnic armed organisations like the Arakan Army, which fights the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State. While risky because of potential blowback, a discreet and intelligent engagement could have created a strategic dilemma for Myanmar. Bangladesh鈥檚 predicament to engage with non-state actor has avoided this path, thereby missing a potential pressure point.
From reaction to prevention: To break the cycle of Rohingya refugee crises from repeating, Bangladesh must adopt a proactive, multi-dimensional and long-term strategy.
Global conscience: Learning from the power of global conscience in shaping nations stands for the Palestinians. Bringing to the fore the genocidal crimes and ethnic cleansing happening quietly in Rakhine State and building global conscience to end the cycle of crimes against humanity are needed.
Targeted sanctions: Lobbying the global players to expand and rigorously enforce targeted sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans against Tatmadaw-owned conglomerates and their international revenue streams are necessary.
China card: China should be formally and consistently pursued to use its influence to ensure the implementation of its own repatriation proposals. The continued crisis should be framed as a threat to regional stability that undermines China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative investments in Rakhine.
Narrative for India: A dedicated diplomatic campaign should be conducted to convince India that a destabilised Bangladesh and radicalisation by the prolonged refugee crisis are a greater threat to its security than its unfettered support for Myanmar. The cross-border drug and arms trade fuelled by the crisis should be highlighted.
Rakhine lobby: Discreet channels should be developed with Rakhine鈥檚 political and civil society groups. Although challenging, finding a common ground on issues of regional development and autonomy from the central government could create allies inside Myanmar. They could help to build trust among ethnic groups in Rakhine for peaceful and mutually beneficial living.
Relentless advocating: The conditions in the camps and the narratives of refugees should be systematically documented to build an unquestionable record for ongoing legal and advocacy campaigns and empowering the Rohingya voice in international forums.
Plan contingency: In the context of the developing political and military situation, large-scale repatriation is unlikely soon. Therefore, a master plan is needed for the camps that integrate better refugee management, skills development and environmental restoration to mitigate the impact on host communities and connect pressure points for the repatriation of refugees.
Strong border oversight: Radar and satellite monitoring of the border should be enhanced to document any military buildup and incursion and drug smuggling and gun running should be prevented by providing immediate evidence for diplomatic protests.
A repeated Rohingya exodus has exposed the fundamental political, diplomatic and military limitations in Bangladesh鈥檚 long-term political strategy. Bangladesh has treated each exodus as a temporary anomaly and relied on a diplomatic playbook which Myanmar mastered to ignore. Bangladesh has remained trapped in a reactive cycle. Breaking this cycle requires a fundamental shift, from pleading bilaterally to building international coalitions and global conscience for accountability, navigating power politics to actively shape them and from managing a humanitarian crisis to strategically pursuing its solution. The path forward is rugged, but it must be secured to end this decade-long crisis and prevent its recurrence.
听
Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst and research director in the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies.