PUBLIC policy-making is a complex, multi-layered process that involves how governments identify issues, develop solutions and implement them to achieve socio-economic goals. In Bangladesh, this process is both dynamic and intricate, shaped by political interests, bureaucratic systems, involvement from development partners, and economic realities.
Although a strong bureaucratic system and expanding democratic space exist, policy-making often faces issues with coordination, participation, transparency and implementation. To understand these challenges, it is important to use theoretical models such as the stages model, institutionalism, incrementalism, and the advocacy coalition framework.
Making and implementing policies is rarely straightforward; it reflects the country鈥檚 institutional histories, political forces and socio-economic pressures. Bangladesh鈥檚 policymaking thus functions within a hybrid framework: officially guided by institutions but practically shaped by elite negotiations, political lobbying, vested groups and international development agendas.
One of the most common frameworks for understanding policy processes is the stages model or policy cycle, developed by Lasswell (1956) and later expanded by others. The model breaks down policy-making into five stages: agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation.
The agenda-setting process is usually controlled by political elites and bureaucrats, with little involvement from civil society or citizens. For example, key policy priorities like Vision 2041 or the Five-Year Plans are typically developed by the Planning Commission and approved by the cabinet. These agendas often reflect the ruling party鈥檚 political commitments rather than the collective input of stakeholders.
Although consultative workshops are held, they often serve as symbolic gestures rather than genuine inclusion of public opinion. Development partners like the World Bank, ADB, and UNDP also influence this stage through technical assistance and conditional funding, shaping both the design and direction of public policy.
The implementation phase reveals bottlenecks. Bureaucratic inefficiency, political interference, weak monitoring and corruption hinder the transition of policy into action. For example, while the Digital Bangladesh initiative set ambitious goals for digital transformation, gaps in institutional capacity and coordination slowed progress.
The evaluation stage, furthermore, remains underdeveloped. Policy evaluation often occurs spontaneously and is influenced by politics rather than being based on evidence and systematised, which limits opportunities for learning and adaptation.
Charles Lindblom鈥檚 (1959) incremental model provides another helpful perspective. This model indicates that policy change occurs through small, incremental adjustments rather than sweeping reforms, primarily due to bounded rationality and political constraints.
Major policy areas like education reform, public administration and industrialisation have evolved through gradual changes rather than sudden shifts. For instance, the National Education Policy of 2010 was built on earlier frameworks from the 1990s, reflecting a pattern of minor updates instead of fundamental reforms. This slow pace is partly due to the risk-averse nature of the bureaucracy, which favours stability over disruption, and the political leadership鈥檚 goal to maintain control and prevent instability.
Incrementalism also perpetuates inefficiencies. By avoiding radical reform, systemic issues like the politicisation of the civil service or the lack of accountability stay unresolved. The model thus emphasises both the practical aspects and limitations of policy development.
The institutional theory highlights that policy outcomes are shaped by the structure and operation of institutions: formal rules, procedures and norms that influence decision-making (March & Olsen, 1984). Institutionalism is essential for understanding how bureaucracy prevails and how administration becomes centralised.
Despite political democratisation, bureaucratic institutions continue to serve as strong gatekeepers, often resisting change and innovation. This institutional inertia explains why policy reforms like decentralisation or increasing public sector accountability encounter significant internal opposition.
Furthermore, the weak institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms still restricts citizen involvement. Local government bodies, even though they are constitutionally mandated, have limited financial and administrative independence. As a result, the policy-making process remains top-down, with minimal input from the grassroots level.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith鈥檚 (1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework provides another way to analyse how groups of actors with shared beliefs influence policy over time. Different advocacy coalitions, such as political parties, development partners, NGOs, media outlets, and private sector lobbies, compete to shape policy directions. Multiple actors pursue conflicting interests, and policy change happens only when one coalition becomes dominant or external shocks like natural disasters or global crises shift the power balance.
For example, in environmental policy, NGOs and international organisations promote sustainability and climate resilience, while business groups focus on industrial growth and infrastructure expansion. The conflict between these groups often leads to fragmented or conflicting policy outcomes.
Several interconnected factors contribute to the complexity of policy-making. These issues make policy-making a challenging negotiation among competing interests, institutional rigidities and external pressures. The most significant of these are:
Policy decisions are often politicised, with resource allocation reflecting partisan interests rather than public priorities. The hierarchical and compartmentalised structure of the civil service hampers inter-ministerial cooperation. External funding and conditionality often influence domestic policy priorities, sometimes misaligned with local needs. The lack of strong monitoring and evaluation systems prevents learning from policy failures. Civil society, academia and local governments have limited roles in policy development and feedback.
To improve policy-making, Bangladesh must promote evidence-based decisions, strengthen local governance, institutionalise evaluation systems and increase participation. Only through these reforms can public policy move from bureaucratic formalism to genuine public responsiveness and development impact.
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Dr Nasim Ahmed holds a PhD in public policy from Ulster University in the UK and works as associate professor of public policy at the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Management (affiliated with the University of Dhaka).