THE history of foreign invasion in Afghanistan is a chronicle of imperial hubris and strategic misadventure. Britain burnt its fingers in the 19th and the early 20th century. The Soviet Union exited in shame after a decade of brutal occupation (1979鈥�1989). The United States, in turn, concluded its 20-year war in 2021 with a frantic and chaotic withdrawal, leaving behind a resurgent Taliban and billions of dollars in advanced military hardware. The financial cost over the 20 years of deployment was an estimated $2.26鈥�2.60 trillion, but the cost to American prestige and strategic positioning was arguably greater. Afghanistan, yet again, lived up to its grim moniker: the graveyard of empires.
In a striking historical volte-face, the United States, under the second administration of president Donald Trump, is now seeking to reacquire the very symbol of its former military footprint: the Bagram air base. This move, articulated during a joint press conference with UK prime minister Keir Starmer on August 19, signals a dramatic shift in US foreign policy and raises profound questions about the lessons learnt, or ignored, from the recent occupation and withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump reclaimed the base in transactional terms, 鈥榃e gave it to them [the Taliban] for nothing. We鈥檙e trying to get it back because they [the Taliban] need things from us. We want that base back.鈥� However, the strategic motivations of the United States run far deeper and carry significant risks of wider regional destabilisation.
The Trump administration鈥檚 renewed interest in Bagram, first discussed internally in March, is rooted in a multi-faceted and ambitious geopolitical strategy:
Strategic surveillance of China:听Bagram鈥檚 location is its primary asset. Situated more or less than 800 kilometres from China鈥檚 western border, it offers an unparalleled vantage point. Trump highlighted its proximity, noting that it is 鈥榡ust an hour away鈥� from Chinese nuclear facilities. A re-established base would provide a persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance hub to monitor China鈥檚 Xinjiang region, a critical area for Beijing鈥檚 domestic security and its Belt and Road Initiative.
Access to rare earth elements:听Afghanistan possesses vast, untapped mineral wealth, estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, including vital rare earth elements essential for modern technology. A permanent US presence would grant significant leverage and access to these resources, countering China鈥檚 near-monopoly on their global supply chain.
Counterterrorism node:听Despite the defeat of territorial caliphate of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the group鈥檚 Khorasan province remains a potent threat in Afghanistan. The administration believes Bagram could serve as a 鈥榗ounterterrorism node鈥� for targeted operations against the group, preventing it from establishing a stronger foothold and trigger neo-geopolitics around 鈥榗ounter terrorism.鈥�
Restoring regional influence:听The 2021 withdrawal created a power vacuum that competitors, namely China and Russia, have been eager to fill. The control of Bagram would reassert US influence on Central Asia, a region traditionally within Russia鈥檚 sphere of influence and increasingly courted by China. It would directly challenge the expansion of China鈥檚 BRI and signal a renewed American commitment to the region.
To understand the the desired return of the United States, one must first grapple with the logic of the initial departure. If Bagram is so strategically invaluable as it is today, why was it not a non-negotiable asset during the withdrawal negotiations in 2020鈥�2021? The answer lies in the fundamental nature of the Doha agreement and the political imperatives driving the US exit.
The deal struck between the Trump administration and the Taliban in February 2020 was not a nuanced peace treaty. It was a withdrawal agreement designed to facilitate a political exit. Its core condition was the听safe exit and a complete withdrawal of all US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.听For the Taliban, this was the absolute cornerstone of the deal, the very definition of victory. Any proposal for the United States to retain a strategic outpost like Bagram would have been immediately rejected and would have collapsed the negotiations. The Taliban鈥檚 entire insurgency was predicated on expelling foreign forces; agreeing to a permanent US base would have undermined their legitimacy and fractured their movement.
Furthermore, the political context in the United States made retention impractical. There was a powerful, bipartisan war-weariness and a strong public mandate to end what was widely perceived as a 鈥榝orever war.鈥� The Biden administration, which executed the withdrawal, operated on the premise that the primary US objective, degrading al-Qaeda, had been achieved. Maintaining a large, expensive base required thousands of troops, who would need to be protected from Taliban that viewed their presence as a violation of the agreement. This would have necessitated a continued, open-ended combat mission, the very thing the American public and successive administrations sought to end. The strategic value of Bagram was ultimately outweighed by the political and security costs of keeping it.
The airfield itself is a palimpsest of great power rivalry. Founded in the 1950s as a Soviet-built airstrip, it was the central command hub for the Soviet occupation throughout the 1980s. After their withdrawal, it became a no man鈥檚 land, a frontline in the civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States transformed Bagram into the centre of gravity for its global war on terror, a massive complex capable of hosting thousands of troops and launching strikes across the regions, including the Middle East. It is, perhaps, the only airbase in the world to have served as the primary military hub for two superpowers, back to back, but 鈥榥ot learning鈥� the hard lessons about the limits of power in Afghanistan.
The reoccupation of the Bagram air base is fraught with perils of the geo-politics.
Direct provocation of major powers:听The move would be viewed by China, Russia and Iran as a direct and aggressive challenge. For China, a US base so close to its border, explicitly justified by the need for 鈥榮urveillance,鈥� would be a major escalation, likely triggering a forceful response, potentially including increased military cooperation with the Taliban and bolstering of its own border defence. It could draw the United States and China into a close quarter situation, even direct confrontation. Similarly, Russia would see this as an intrusion into its traditional sphere of influence and Iran would perceive a heightened threat on its eastern flank.
Destabilising and Afghanistan:听The Taliban regime is fragile. Granting a base to the United States would be seen by many factions as a profound betrayal of the insurgency鈥檚 core principles. It could shatter the Taliban鈥檚 cohesion, reignite civil war and make the United States a direct participant in Afghanistan鈥檚 conflicts once again. The notion of peaceful coexistence with a permanent US presence is a fantasy.
A 鈥榞raveyard of empires鈥� redux:听The most significant risk is repeating a variation of the same mistake. A smaller footprint does not equate to a lower risk. It could become an isolated fortress, constantly under threat, requiring a perpetual cycle of defence and reinforcement, a symbolic and tangible target for every anti-American group in the region.
The desire to return to Bagram reflects a world where great power competition has superseded counterterrorism. It is an attempt to correct what some now see as the strategic error of a full withdrawal. However, the initial abandonment was not an oversight but a consequence of the realities of 2021.
Reacquiring the base now would be an infinitely more complex endeavour than simply striking a deal with a desperate Taliban. It would mean willingly stepping back into the graveyard of empires, this time with the explicit aim of confronting China and Russia on their doorsteps. The potential rewards of a strategic foothold in Central Asia are seductive, but they are dwarfed by the risks of triggering a wider regional conflict, destabilising Afghanistan further, and embarking on another open-ended commitment in a land that has consistently humbled the world鈥檚 greatest powers. The return to Bagram may be a march towards a new confrontation that the United States and the world can ill afford.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst.