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THE struggle for democracy in Bangladesh constitutes one of the most compelling political narratives in South Asia. Emerging from the Liberation War of 1971 which was a conflict rooted in demands for political rights, self-determination, equality and dignity, the people of Bangladesh envisioned democracy as the foundation of their newly independent state. The Constitution of 1972 accordingly enshrined democracy as one of its four fundamental state principles. Yet Bangladesh’s democratic journey has been fraught with challenges, marked by recurring political vicissitudes and instability. Military coups, authoritarian regimes, one-party experiments and entrenched partisan polarisation have repeatedly disrupted and weakened democratic institutions. Despite these obstacles, however, the people of Bangladesh have repeatedly mobilised to assert their demands for freedom, accountability and representation, thereby demonstrating an enduring commitment to democratic ideals.

The birth of Bangladesh was fundamentally rooted in democratic aspirations. From the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the people of East Pakistan experienced marginalisation and discrimination, as political power and state resources remained concentrated in West Pakistan despite East Pakistan’s numerical majority. The first organised resistance to this imbalance emerged through the Language Movement of 1948–1952, when the central government attempted to impose Urdu as the sole state language. The protests culminated in the martyrdom of students on February 21, 1952, a turning point that not only secured the recognition of Bangla as a state language but also ignited a wider spirit of democratic assertion. The struggle for self-determination in this land first took root during the Language Movement, where the defence of cultural identity became the seed of a broader political struggle. What began as a fight for linguistic recognition soon evolved into demands for political rights, regional autonomy and meaningful participation in state governance.

In the 1960s, rising demands for democracy and autonomy found expression in the Awami League’s Six-Point Program, which galvanised mass support across East Pakistan. The 1969 uprising toppled Ayub Khan’s regime, while the 1970 election gave the Awami League a historic majority. Yet, the West Pakistani leadership’s refusal to transfer power and the military crackdown of March 1971 turned the democratic struggle into a war of liberation, with independence emerging as the culmination of decades of resistance and later enshrined in the 1972 Constitution.

However, the early years of Bangladesh revealed the difficulties of sustaining democracy in a fragile state. The Awami League government faced daunting post-war challenges: a devastated economy, famine in 1974, rising corruption, and internal dissent among the freedom fighters. However, the Proclamation of Independence served as a provisional constitution, creating a presidential system that concentrated authority in the hands of the president. On November 4, 1972, the country adopted a permanent constitution, which came into effect on December 16 of the same year. This document enshrined democracy, human rights, secularism, the rule of law, and a parliamentary system of governance as its foundational principles.

In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman amended the Constitution through the Fourth Amendment to replace the parliamentary system with a one-party presidential structure under BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League). Though justified by its proponents as necessary for stability and development, the move dismantled democracy, concentrated power in the executive, curtailed political pluralism, introduced censorship and eliminated opposition activity. Mounting resentment against this centralised system ultimately culminated in the tragic assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975, which ushered in a prolonged period of political instability.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination marked a turning point that ushered in an era of military dominance in Bangladesh’s politics lasting until 1990. General Ziaur Rahman (1975–1981) consolidated power under martial law, legitimised military governance through constitutional amendments, and founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1978 to institutionalise his rule. He revived multiparty politics but his assassination in 1981 led to renewed instability, briefly followed by Abdus Sattar’s presidency, which ended with the 1982 coup by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who entrenched military rule for much of the decade.

General Hussain Muhammad Ershad’s nearly decade-long rule in the 1980s was defined by authoritarian consolidation under the guise of electoral legitimacy, characterised by martial law, constitutional amendments — including the declaration of Islam as the state religion and the creation of the Jatiya Party as his political vehicle. Sustained through controlled elections, patronage networks and repression, his regime nevertheless provoked mounting resistance, with student activism, civil society mobilisation, and rare collective movements by the Awami League and BNP converging against military rule. This opposition culminated in the 1990 mass uprising, a defining democratic breakthrough that paralleled the global wave of pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and South Korea, and ultimately forced Ershad’s resignation. A neutral caretaker government subsequently oversaw the 1991 elections, paving the way for the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh.

The fall of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad in December 1990, often celebrated as Bangladesh’s second democratic transition, ushered in a hopeful yet turbulent chapter in the nation’s political history. With the restoration of parliamentary democracy under the newly introduced caretaker government system, the general election of February 27, 1991, widely regarded as free and fair, marked a decisive shift from military rule. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party emerged victorious, and Khaleda Zia became the country’s first female Prime Minister. Yet, despite this democratic breakthrough and the promise of accountability, institutions remained fragile, and politics quickly became defined by the bitter rivalry between the BNP and the Awami League, setting the stage for confrontational and unstable governance.

While the elections of 1991, 1996 and 2001 were competitive and credible under the caretaker government, disputes over electoral integrity deepened mistrust between the Awami League and the BNP. This culminated in a severe crisis between 2006 and 2008, when escalating political conflict and violence led to the emergence of a military-backed caretaker government led by economist Fakhruddin Ahmed. Ultimately, it oversaw the 2008 general election, which restored democratic rule and brought the Awami League back to power through the ninth parliamentary election.

From 2009 onward, Bangladesh witnessed a steady erosion of democratic institutions and the concentration of power in the hands of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. The abolition of the caretaker government system in 2011 marked a decisive turning point, as the opposition BNP boycotted the 2014 election, enabling the ruling party to retain power virtually unopposed. The 2018 polls were similarly discredited by allegations of large-scale vote rigging, voter intimidation and severe restrictions on opposition campaigns, leaving the Awami League with near-total control over the legislature. These elections, widely described as engineered exercises, exemplified a drift towards electoral authoritarianism where voting existed in form but not in substance.

Alongside the decline of electoral credibility, state institutions were systematically brought under executive dominance. The judiciary and law enforcement bodies were subordinated to regime interests, serving as instruments of political consolidation rather than guardians of justice. Innumerable enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of opposition figures and dissenters were unleashed, plunging the country into a reign of terror. The Digital Security Act, 2018, and later Cyber Security Act, 2023, have been used to silence journalists, intimidate academics and constrain civil society organisations. Freedom of assembly was sharply curtailed, while a pervasive culture of surveillance and intimidation fostered widespread self-censorship. Patronage networks and selective distribution of resources entrenched political loyalty, while corruption and cronyism flourished under conditions of impunity.

By the early 2020s, Bangladesh’s democratic space had narrowed to the point that international observers widely characterised the country as undergoing ‘democratic backsliding’. Mounting frustrations over authoritarian practices and shrinking civic freedoms eventually erupted into mass protests in 2024, which culminated in Sheikh Hasina’s forceful ouster and the installation of an interim government. This dramatic turn once again highlighted Bangladesh’s recurring cycle of democracy, authoritarianism and popular resistance, underscoring the resilience of its people’s democratic aspirations despite systematic efforts to suppress them.

Bangladesh is among the world’s most homogeneous societies, with nearly all citizens sharing the same ethnicity, language and religion. Yet, despite this cultural uniformity, its politics are deeply fractured, dominated by two rival blocs locked in prolonged confrontation under an illiberal democracy. This divisive politics has permeated every layer of society, leaving civil society polarised and often reinforcing conflict rather than mitigating it. Paradoxically, while political theory suggests diversity fuels discord and homogeneity fosters unity, Bangladesh demonstrates the opposite, where the forces of division have consistently outweighed the unifying power of shared identity.

A defining pattern in Bangladesh’s political history has been the cycle of accusation, counter-accusation and boycott, with ruling parties dismissing opposition concerns while opposition parties frequently withdrawing from parliament or elections. The introduction of the caretaker government system in 1996 reflected a public recognition that partisan governments could not guarantee free and fair elections, and it was initially hailed as a safeguard of neutrality. Yet its abolition in 2011 by Awami League deepened mistrust and intensified polarisation. The irony lies in the shifting positions of the two dominant parties: while in opposition, both vigorously demand elections under a caretaker authority, but once in power, neither supports it. The Awami League, which once championed the system as essential to democracy, later engineered its removal through judicial intervention, prompting the BNP to boycott elections and demand its restoration. This cycle of expedient reversals underscores the enduring crisis of trust at the heart of Bangladesh’s electoral politics

Another striking feature of national politics in Bangladesh is the pervasive use of political rhetoric — often a blend of half-truths and half-falsehoods — employed to mobilise public sentiment. Leaders frequently invoke the spirit of the Liberation War in their speeches, appealing to the people’s emotions and patriotic feelings. Yet, in practice, many of their actions run contrary to the very ideals of liberation they claim to uphold. Politics has become deeply polarised, confining citizens within rigid party lines and reducing public discourse to a contest of partisanship. This entrenched division fosters a culture of habitual opposition, where political actors tend to reject every initiative of the ruling party, regardless of its potential benefit to the nation. As a result, policy-making often becomes hostage to confrontation, and national interests are subordinated to the compulsions of partisan rivalry.

Bangladesh’s democratic journey has always been shaped by the will of its people, who have repeatedly risen against authoritarianism and demanded accountability from those in power. From the Language Movement of 1952 and the mass upsurge of 1969 to the Liberation War of 1971 and the anti-autocracy struggle of 1990, waves of protest have defined the nation’s political trajectory. More recent movements — such as the 2018 student uprising for road safety, and the student-led movement of 2024 continue this legacy, reflecting deep frustration with corruption, inequality, lack of accountability and governance failures. Much like the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Sri Lanka, and the ongoing imbroglio in Nepal, these mobilisations arise from structural grievances and widespread disillusionment with elites and institutions that fail to deliver justice or basic services.

Bangladesh’s democratic journey has consistently been marked by immense sacrifices of life and property, often paid by ordinary citizens in the form of blood spilled on the streets. Time and again, movements for democracy have reached such intensity that they not only reflected the people’s yearning for freedom and justice but also descended into harrowing episodes of inter-party conflict and internecine strife, waged in the name of restoring democratic order. From the War of Liberation in 1971 to the July Uprising of 2024, Bangladesh has witnessed wave after wave of sacrifice, with countless individuals laying down their lives. The sheer scale of martyrdom in these struggles, both in numbers and in the ferocity of resistance, stands out as an almost unparalleled phenomenon in the global history of democratic movements. All these struggles underscore a central truth that political legitimacy can only emerge from elections that are genuinely free, fair and inclusive. When elections are manipulated or delayed, it not only betrays the sacrifices of the past but also deepens public frustration and erodes trust in the state. A credible electoral process backed by impartial institutions, respect for freedoms, and the rule of law remains the essential foundation for political stability and long-term national progress.

To achieve this vision, Bangladesh needs bold structural reforms and renewed political integrity. This means empowering the Election Commission and other institutions to function independently, ensuring freedom of the press and equal political space for all parties, and building a security apparatus that upholds constitutional values rather than partisan interests. Most importantly, the country must tap into the aspirations of its youthful majority, who represent both the present and the nation’s future. If young citizens grow up in an environment where elections are meaningful, participatory and trustworthy, they will carry forward the democratic legacy and strengthen the republic. Without such reforms, however, the nation risks falling into a cycle of disappointment and disillusionment, undermining both domestic stability and Bangladesh’s credibility on the global stage.

Amid violence, unrest and a surge in crime, analysts remain sceptical about the credibility of holding the February 2026 election, despite the Election Commission’s announcement of a road map. Some actors involved in Sheikh Hasina’s ouster argue that elections under the interim government should only be held after fundamental reforms to governance, the constitution and the electoral system are completed, warning that without such changes the country risks sliding back into authoritarianism. In contrast, major political parties emphasise that the February polls will serve as a litmus test for Bangladesh’s democracy, as elections are the cornerstone of popular sovereignty. Any attempt to obstruct them would not merely be a political manoeuvre but a denial of democratic rights and a betrayal of the sacrifices made by those who fought for change. Ultimately, the upcoming election is viewed as the decisive ‘burning test’ of whether Bangladesh can safeguard its democracy through the ballot box rather than defer power to unelected forces.

The struggle for democracy in Bangladesh remains unfinished, a story inscribed in sacrifice and resilience across generations. From the Language Movement of 1952 and the Liberation War of 1971 to the mass uprising of 1990 and the student-led protests of recent years, especially the July Uprising 2024, the people have repeatedly asserted their democratic will, often at extraordinary cost. Yet, the promise of democracy has remained elusive. Weak institutions, confrontational politics, authoritarian tendencies and shrinking civic space have all conspired to undermine the consolidation of a stable democratic order.

Bangladesh’s democratic future cannot depend on electoral reforms alone; it requires a political culture rooted in tolerance, accountability and inclusivity to turn adversarial politics into constructive dialogue. History at home and abroad shows that democracy is not a one-time achievement but a continuous process of negotiation between state and society, and until such a culture takes root, the people’s struggle for democracy will remain unfinished.

Finally, the people of Bangladesh aspire for their burgeoning democracy to mature and stand on a firm foundation, much like the parliamentary democratic system that gradually evolved in England over the centuries, beginning with the era of Sir Robert Walpole in the early eighteenth century. People hope that, through resilience, institutional growth and political maturity, democracy in Bangladesh will similarly achieve stability and endurance.

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Dr Md Motiar Rahman is a retired deputy inspector general of police.