WHEN power operates unchecked, even a global superpower risks undermining its own legitimacy. This article investigates how US tariff and sanction policies, intended to compel compliance, may instead erode constitutional checks, international credibility and long-term economic influence.
In the US, Trump鈥檚 tariffs on foreign exporters were declared unlawful by a federal appellate court, a ruling now awaiting review by the Supreme Court. Under the Constitution, it is Congress 鈥� not the executive branch 鈥� that holds the authority to enact tariff policies. The powerful exploit their position against weaker actors: the state extracts from foreign exporters under the guise of policy.
The Trump administration鈥檚 recent move 鈥� imposing a 100 per cent tariff on Indian exports and pressuring the EU to impose similar restrictions on countries purchasing Russian oil 鈥� represents an attempt to coerce alignment with Washington鈥檚 strategy to end the war in Ukraine. However, such unilateral tariff actions run afoul of US law, since tariff authority rests with Congress.
Taken together, unilateral tariffs in the US reveal a deeper truth: when power operates unchecked, it erodes the rule of law 鈥� whether in domestic statutes, international trade agreements such as WTO provisions, or broader norms of governance. The World Trade Organization has already ruled against several US tariffs imposed under Trump, highlighting how such practices undermine not only constitutional order at home but also multilateral trade rules. When Washington disregards both its own courts and international rulings, it weakens its moral authority to criticise corruption, lawlessness and abuse of power abroad.
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Beyond tariffs: America鈥檚 other coercive tools
TARIFFS are only one instrument in America鈥檚 foreign policy toolbox. When Washington seeks to pressure or punish a country into alignment with its objectives, it often relies on mechanisms that do not face the same constitutional limitations. Economic sanctions, travel restrictions, banking barriers and exclusion from financial networks such as SWIFT are among the most common.
Tariffs and sanctions, therefore, are not simply tools of punishment but necessary instruments of self-protection. Imposing them is justified against countries that act against US interests, whether by undermining national security or exploiting the American economy. In today鈥檚 interconnected global system, there is no free riding and no free lunch 鈥� every concession, loophole or unchecked dependency ultimately translates into hidden costs. Those costs do not evaporate into the ether; they fall squarely on American taxpayers, who should not be expected to subsidise the ambitions of adversarial states or the complacency of allies unwilling to shoulder their fair share. Recognising this dynamic is essential, for the failure to act decisively not only erodes US leverage but also entrenches patterns of dependency that make future corrections even more costly.
The US has repeatedly used sanctions to cut off targeted countries 鈥� Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Russia 鈥� from global markets. These sanctions often freeze assets, block access to US technology, and prohibit American firms from engaging with the sanctioned state. Travel restrictions further isolate elites by barring officials, business leaders, or even family members from entry into the United States or allied countries. While not formally tariffs, these measures serve the same coercive purpose: to inflict economic and political pain until compliance is secured. Many of these measures are already in effect: Russian banks cut off from SWIFT, oligarchs鈥� assets frozen, and high-tech exports blocked to both Russia and China.
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Tariffs v sanctions: legal and political dimensions
THE distinction between tariffs and sanctions is significant. Tariffs, under the US Constitution, are the prerogative of Congress, which makes presidential attempts to impose them unilaterally especially vulnerable to legal challenge. Sanctions, by contrast, can be justified as national security measures, giving the executive branch more leeway to act without immediate congressional approval.
This explains why sanctions are often preferred: they can be imposed quickly, justified broadly, and extended indefinitely. Yet both tariffs and sanctions share the same coercive logic: designed to compel behaviour through pain. The difference is mainly in framing 鈥� one as trade policy, the other as security policy. Both, however, raise questions about legality, legitimacy and long-term effectiveness.
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Implications for India, China and other Russian oil buyers
WHILE the Trump administration attempted tariffs as a blunt instrument, sanctions or other non-tariff measures could achieve similar ends. These alternatives might target banks, restrict market access, or limit mobility for officials and business actors. Sanctions are less likely to face immediate constitutional challenge, since presidents can invoke national security authority.
But sanctions are not purely unilateral. Their effectiveness depends on cooperation from allies such as the EU. Without coordination, unilateral sanctions may falter. By contrast, tariffs 鈥� if permitted by the Supreme Court 鈥� could serve as a blunt unilateral weapon. If the Court rules against Trump鈥檚 tariffs, the administration may have to refund nearly a trillion dollars already collected. A favourable decision would give tariffs new life as a unilateral enforcement tool, while sanctions remain dependent on multilateral consensus.
The stakes are high. Using sanctions against large economies like India or China, or against oil buyers defying US policy, would have major diplomatic and economic repercussions. Such moves would provoke resistance, destabilise trade and accelerate the search for alternative financial systems.
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Global consequences of overreach
THE overuse of tariffs and sanctions carries global costs. It erodes the credibility of multilateral institutions like the WTO and weakens the rules-based order the US claims to defend. States repeatedly subjected to unilateral coercion increasingly turn towards alternatives 鈥� regional trade blocs, bilateral arrangements, or alignment with rising powers like China and India. The rise of BRICS+ and new payment systems reflects, in part, backlash against Washington鈥檚 economic overreach.
Beyond emerging economies like China, India and Brazil, even neighbouring nations such as Canada and Mexico remain highly dependent on the US economy. Their trade, investment and supply chains are closely entwined with American markets, making them particularly sensitive to US tariffs, sanctions and other coercive measures. While these countries are economically advanced compared to India or Brazil, their proximity and integration ensure that US leverage directly shapes their economic and policy choices.
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Dependency through the development gap
EVEN as countries experiment with BRICS+, alternative payment systems, and regional blocs to reduce US dominance, the structural gap in per-capita income and technological capacity ensures persistent dependency. Using 2024 per-capita GDP estimates 鈥� United States $80,000, China $13,000, India $2,700, and Brazil $10,000 鈥� and hypothetical long-term annual growth rates (US 2.5 per cent, China 5.5 per cent, India 6.5 per cent, Brazil 3.5 per cent), the projected trajectories illustrate the scale of the challenge. Under these assumptions, China would require roughly 63 years to reach US per-capita parity, India about 89 years, and Brazil approximately 214 years, assuming the US continues growing at a steady 2.5 per cent per year.
If the US growth rate rises to 3.0 per cent while other countries maintain the same growth rates, the timelines extend: China would require roughly 76 years, India about 102 years, and Brazil approximately 430 years to catch up. Even with higher growth rates in those countries, the sheer magnitude of the current income gap with the US means convergence for India and Brazil remains a multi-century phenomenon.
Technological capacity further compounds the disparity: US dominance in frontier sectors such as semiconductors, AI, aerospace, biotechnology, digital platforms, and global finance reinforces structural leverage. Even if China narrows the gap in manufacturing or India advances in services, the US retains outsized influence through innovation, capital markets and intellectual property.
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The moral authority question
IN THE US, unilateral tariffs and aggressive sanctions may yield short-term tactical wins, but at the cost of undermining constitutional checks and balances, international credibility and long-term leadership.
The WTO has already ruled against several US tariffs, spotlighting Washington鈥檚 own disregard for the rules it urges others to follow. When the US ignores both its domestic courts and international rulings, it compromises its credibility. Unchecked power 鈥� whether exercised locally or globally 鈥� corrodes the very systems that sustain order. The outcomes are clear: diminished legitimacy, growing distrust and the steady erosion of moral authority.
Yet, given the mixed consequences of America鈥檚 economic and military leverage, the community of nations may still have to wait decades (as estimated above) before a true rival emerges 鈥� one capable of confronting US dominance while offering a more favourable, concessional and compassionate trading partnership that surpasses what exists today.
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听Dr Abdullah A Dewan is a former physicist and nuclear engineer at the BAEC and professor emeritus of economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA.