SUN Tzu’s The Art of War outlines three ways a ruler can bring misfortune upon the army (the word ‘army’ in modern context implies the military forces.
First, ‘By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.’ This means the ruler issues unexecutable orders, which paralyse the army.
Second, ‘By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom [a country in today’s context], being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers’ minds.’ This implies that the ruler governs the military as if it were a civilian administration, creating confusion among soldiers.
Third, ‘By employing the officers of his [or her] army without discrimination so that the government is not careful to use or employ the right man in the right place.’ Here, the ruler appoints officers based on political favouritism rather than merit.
The first two points highlight the dangers of political interference in an army while the third reveals the corrosive effects of politicisation. The principles align with Sun Tzu’s broader philosophy that true excellence in war lies in subduing the enemy without battle. The application of this three principles serves as tools to subdue an opposing army without fighting — the worst possible cost of politicising an army which is not measurable in any financial yardstick,
The first principle that ‘hobbling the army’ warns against rulers micromanaging military operations without understanding battlefield realities. Sun Tzu asserts, ‘A kingdom should not be governed from without, an army should not be directed from within.’ This means that a nation must be ruled based on its own principles, not by external pressure, while battlefield tactics should be left to generals who grasp real-time conditions.
War is fundamentally an extension of politics by other means, requiring political leaders to maintain strategic oversight while military commanders handle operational and tactical execution. The most successful conflicts achieve perfect alignment between battlefield operations and political objectives, creating conditions for swift victory. A prime example occurred in 2008 when Bangladesh’s coordinated use of naval deployment and political diplomacy compelled Myanmar to withdraw its drilling rig from disputed Bay of Bengal waters, demonstrating how synchronised military and political diplomacy can achieve objectives without escalation.
Another stark modern illustration occurred during the India-Pakistan conflict of May 7–10, where political restrictions imposed on the Indian air force led to avoidable losses. Despite possessing advanced aircraft like the Rafale and Sukhoi-30, Indian pilots were barred from striking Pakistani military installations or air defences, as Indian military officials claimed. On the other hand, the perfectly aligned Pakistan’s political and military leadership caught Indian air force by surprise, resulting in the shooting down of five Indian fighter jets and degrading critical air defence assets such as S-400 launchers.
The second principle emphasises that armies and governments operate under fundamentally different rules. While states thrive on order and bureaucracy, armies require flexibility and adaptability. Injecting elements of political ideology into military affairs, bureaucracy or democratic theories and habit, demoralises troops and undermines effectiveness. The Vietnam war exemplifies ‘military and governance’ where US political leaders handpicked bombing targets from Washington, ignoring generals’ advice, leading to prolonged conflict and mor ethan 58,000 American deaths. The Johnson administration, fearing Chinese or Soviet intervention, restricted the bombing of key North Vietnamese infrastructure such as Haiphong Harbour, airfields, etc. Military leaders such as General Curtis LeMay and General William Westmoreland advocated more aggressive campaigns but were overruled. This micromanagement contributed to a protracted war with high casualties.
The third and the vital principle concerns selecting military leadership. Sun Tzu warns that rulers invite disaster by promoting and appointing officers based on personal or political loyalty rather than merit, mismatching skills to roles and disrupting the chain of command.
The Iraq war (2003–2011) demonstrated this when US leaders dismissed military advice, deployed insufficient troops and disbanded the Iraqi army, geopolitical instability in the region and contributing to thousands of deaths and bloody civil wars in Syria and Libya. The ‘Generals’ Revolt’ in 2006 saw retired commanders publicly criticise Rumsfeld’s Iraq war micromanagement. Russia’s war in Ukraine has been marred by the appointment loyalists like Sergei Shoigu, corruption and political meddling, resulting in high casualties and mutinies. These cases demonstrate that politicisation erodes an army’s strength. After the losses in the 2025 Indian-Pakistan clash, Pravin Sawhney, a former Indian army officer and defence analyst, accused India’s political leadership of politicising the military. He argued that such politicisation was a key reason for the Indian forces’ ill-preparedness for a war against Pakistan.
Politicisation, besides weakening an army’s professionalism, promotes internal corruption, too. Politicisation and corruption in an army adversely impact its war-making capability and gradually foster a compromising culture.
Corruption is a dangerous disease in an army and a reversal gets tough. It erodes meritocracy, sidelines skilled officers and weakens leadership ladder. Resource management falls into disarray with a short term vision draining budgets meant for sustainable modernisation. Most alarmingly, the army dips into morale decline. Soldiers lose trust in politicised commanders, undermining cohesion.
This politicisation overreach risks a force’s readiness. When promotions hinge on personal likes and dislikes or political loyalty rather than competence, individuals compete to demonstrate allegiance to get noticed. Consequently, morale and discipline suffer. Excessive commercial engagement diverts focus from core defence duties and corruption undermines trust in leadership. History shows while armies were politicised for short-term domestic political gains, nation paid a long-term price with diminished cohesion, weakened effectiveness, and vulnerability in crises.
For an army, reversing the moral decline is critical to recovering from the adverse effects of politicisation and maintaining a force capable of defending national interests. The military leadership must withstand political interference and prioritise and practice meritocracy to retain effectiveness. Sun Tzu’s wisdom remains relevant that an army’s strength lies not in its size but in the quality of its leaders and their freedom from political interference.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.