How New Delhi is mirroring Tel Aviv in the war against Pakistan, asks Arman Ahmed
NOT only for its military size but also for its close similarity to Israeli military strategy, India’s Operation Sindoor — a huge and precision-driven attack operation aimed at alleged terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir — has generated worldwide discussion. Although much of the focus has been on the Israeli-made drones and missile weapons utilised by India, the deeper connection is in strategy: the employment of psychological warfare, media framing, identity politics, and a broad invocation of self-defence to justify preemptive attack.
Ìý
The surface similarity: tactics and weapons
AT THE most obvious level, India’s targeting of Pakistani radar installations using Israeli Harop loitering missiles mirrored Tel Aviv’s battle approach against Iran-backed rebels. Hovering before attacking, the Harop let Indian troops deliver surgical hits over the boundary with reasonable deniability. India has increased its defence purchasing from Israel over the years to cover UAVs, missile defence, and surveillance technologies. What sets Operation Sindoor apart from other cross-border operations, though, is its combination of hardware with psychological strategies — what Israel calls ‘perception dominance.’
Ìý
Information and psychological warfare
FRAMING the attack as an act of restrained yet determined self-defence, India swiftly followed up its May 2025 airstrike with a propaganda blitz. After 26 civilians were killed in Kashmir, Indian officials informed foreign diplomats the operation aimed targeting terror camps to stop more attacks. By contrast, Pakistan condemned the action as aggression, citing civilian deaths and mosque damage.
While fact-checking teams disproved Pakistan’s more outrageous assertions, India’s quick counter-narrative featured releasing high-definition satellite photos of targeted camps. This propaganda war reflected Israeli attempts to shape world narratives following every Gaza campaign. Such warfare’s psychological aspect seeks to paralyse the enemy diplomatically and comfort local and worldwide spectators.
Ìý
A strategic PR tool: symbolic inclusiveness
THE employment of identity optics may be the greatest intentional resemblance to Israeli strategies. Chosen to give India’s main military press briefing was Muslim woman officer Colonel Sophia Qureshi. Though praised locally as a sign of women’s emancipation, the time and setting of her presentation implied deliberate messaging. In a war against a Muslim-majority neighbour, the promotion of a Muslim officer sought to preempt claims of sectarian bigotry or Islamophobia. Israel has also historically highlighted Arab people or female soldiers during wars to suggest that its acts were separate from racial or religious bias.
Critics, on the other hand, say that this action conceals more fundamental problems. From under-representation in the military to hate crimes following terror events, Indian Muslims — particularly Kashmiris — still suffer systematic prejudice. Symbolic inclusion during war may benefit international optics more than it indicates domestic equality.
Ìý
Mixing domestic hatred with geopolitical conflict
THE analogies go beyond outside strategy. Like in Israel, where Arab citizens are sometimes regarded suspiciously during armed crises, India has experienced a troubling blending of foreign dangers with internal sectarian myths. Hindutva social media spread songs and videos condemning Muslims as fifth columnists during the Kashmir assault. Some states saw physical attacks, evictions, and even murders follow; some BJP leaders connected to incendiary speech.
The Indian state blurred the boundary between counterterrorism and communal policing by linking Pakistani-origin militancy with Indian Muslim identity. Public support for military intervention overseas can fuel home majoritarianism much as Israeli actions in Gaza sometimes provoke internal discontent among Arab Israelis.
Ìý
Preemptive self-defence doctrine
A REDEFINING of self-defence is fundamental to both Israeli and Indian strategic reasoning. Citing Article 51 of the UN Charter, India contended Operation Sindoor was a legal reaction to an impending danger. The strike happened almost two weeks after the Pahalgam attack, and some asked if it was a preemptive defence or a revenge action.
India’s theory, like Israel’s justification for targeting suspected Hamas sites, is based on stopping future assaults from non-state entities operating in sovereign countries. But, according to international law, the right to employ force in self-defence is strictly controlled; abusing this doctrine — particularly without clear evidence of immediate threats — endangers sovereignty norms and humanitarian law.
Ìý
Consequences for regional stability
UNLIKE Israel, India confronts a nuclear-armed country with equivalent conventional weapons. Using Israel’s military philosophy in the South Asian setting significantly increases the stakes. Pakistan’s promise of retribution, the army moving close to Rajasthan, and heightened air patrols show a preparedness to react militarily. Not only is escalation conceivable; it is likely should communication fail.
Moreover, normalising cross-border attacks on ‘terror’ grounds erodes regional peace structures like the 2003 LoC truce or the Indus Waters Treaty. The long-term danger is the institutionalisation of preemptive attack as policy, therefore fostering a tit-for-tat cycle.
India’s imitation of Israel is more than a coincidence; it is a purposeful doctrinal appropriation. Operation Sindoor combined high-tech weaponry with identity optics, psychological warfare, and a widened legal self-defence claim. Although this might help India’s short-term strategic and political objectives, it runs the danger of repeating Israel’s long-term problems: moral isolation, internal polarisation, and chronic instability.
In a region as volatile as South Asia, strategic imitation might provide tactical victories but at the expense of strategic peace. India has to question whether it wants to be the ‘Israel of Asia’ and, if so, whether it is prepared to bear the repercussions such a role involves.
Ìý
Arman Ahmed is a research analyst at the Nicholas Spykman International Center for Geopolitical Analysis (Paris) and as a research fellow at the International Council on Human Rights, Peace and Politics.