THE political landscape of Bangladesh has been irrevocably altered by the events of July and August 2024, when the Awami League, led by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, responded to student-led protests with brutal repression. Law enforcement, alongside party activists, cracked down on predominantly non-violent demonstrations, culminating in the deaths of over 1,400 individuals and injuries to approximately 25,000 more within a mere 20 days. This mass uprising was a desperate cry for a democratic process in the face of a regime notorious for its use of forced disappearances and inhumane treatment of dissenters. Now, six months after the regime鈥檚 collapse, the fate of the Awami League remains a contentious issue, with no consensus among major political stakeholders, which I call the 鈥楢wami League Conundrum鈥�. This is particularly concerning given the possibility of the national election taking place as early as December 2025.
Unless the Awami League Conundrum is dealt with in a timely and decisive manner, Bangladesh risks the emergence of a new strand of ultra-nationalist politics that will thrive only on anti-Awami League sentiments without meaningfully contributing to any constructive state-building procedures. We already saw the grave consequences of such actions by the Awami League that, for the longest time, misused the anti-Jamat e Islami rhetoric for their anti-independence role in 1971 as a means to justify its own wrongdoings for decades. It was only during the turbulent days of the July uprising when the Awami League finally played its 鈥楯amat banning card鈥� as the last resort.
The student leaders who spearheaded the July uprising are adamant that the Awami League has forfeited its right to participate in Bangladesh鈥檚 political arena. Their perspective is shaped by the severe repression they endured and the regime鈥檚 systematic erosion of democratic institutions. They argue that allowing the Awami League to continue its political activities would be a disservice to the countless lives lost and the principles of democracy for which they fought. This viewpoint resonates with many who witnessed the regime鈥檚 brutality firsthand and seek justice for the atrocities committed.
Conversely, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the de facto largest political party in Bangladesh, has adopted a more measured approach. As a self-proclaimed liberal democratic party, the BNP opposes the outright banning of political parties, arguing that the fate of the Awami League should be left to the people. However, this stance raises critical questions: how exactly should public sentiment be reflected in determining the future of a party responsible for systematic oppression? While BNP鈥檚 position aims to project democratic maturity, its ambiguity leaves room for unresolved tensions. Should a national referendum be held? Should public gatherings be used as a gauge of sentiment? Without clear mechanisms, the risk remains that the Awami League could attempt to rehabilitate itself without facing genuine accountability.
As the de facto largest political party, BNP should spearhead the process of addressing the Awami League conundrum in an unequivocal and decisive manner. It cannot afford to adopt an approach that may be perceived by many as disingenuous when dealing with a regime that has been ousted at the expense of thousands of lives. If BNP fails to take a firm stance, it risks alienating the very people whose sacrifices paved the way for the current political transition.
History offers valuable lessons in addressing the political fate of parties that have engaged in systemic violence. In the aftermath of World War II, Germany and Italy banned the Nazi and Fascist parties, respectively, recognising that their continued political existence would undermine democratic recovery. The justification was clear: organisations responsible for grave human rights abuses and the dismantling of democratic institutions could not be allowed to re-enter the political system under a different guise.
The case of Bangladesh, while distinct, bears important similarities. The Awami League鈥檚 documented history of human rights violations, election manipulation, and suppression of dissent presents a fundamental challenge to democratic integrity. If a political party consistently prioritises authoritarianism over democratic norms, should it be allowed to rebrand and continue? While outright bans carry risks, mechanisms must be put in place to prevent the re-emergence of authoritarian elements under a democratic facade.
Moreover, prior attempts to erode democratic principles should also be taken into account when deciding the fate of the Awami League. The abolition of all political parties and the formation of BAKSHAL under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 serve as a stark reminder of the party鈥檚 historical inclination toward autocratic rule. Any future political framework must recognise this legacy and ensure that history does not repeat itself under different pretexts.
One of the starkest contrasts between historical cases and Bangladesh鈥檚 current predicament is the absence of remorse. In post-war Europe, de-Nazification efforts ensured that individuals and institutions complicit in crimes against democracy were held accountable. In contrast, Awami League leaders have yet to express any regret for their actions. Instead, Sheikh Hasina has continued to make provocative statements from India, fomenting political tensions and further alienating the public. Such defiance raises legitimate concerns about whether reconciliation is even feasible in the absence of accountability.
To move forward, Bangladesh must navigate a delicate balance between justice and democratic principles. The key challenge is ensuring that democratic ideals are not weaponised to justify the return of authoritarian forces. BNP and other opposition forces must acknowledge the widespread demand鈥攑articularly among the younger generation鈥攏ot to allow the Awami League to operate in the same capacity again. However, this cannot be achieved through brute force; it requires a systematic approach within the legal framework.
Beyond the immediate question of the Awami League鈥檚 fate, Bangladesh must invest resources to strengthen its democratic institutions to prevent future political monopolisation. Ensuring judicial independence, protecting freedom of speech and assembly, and implementing electoral reforms will be critical in fostering a resilient democracy. A democracy that merely rotates authoritarian actors is not a democracy at all; substantive institutional safeguards must be in place to prevent future abuses of power.
The question of the Awami League鈥檚 political future is not just about one party 鈥� it is about the long-term democratic trajectory of Bangladesh. While the outright banning of political entities is a complex and controversial issue, history has shown that democracy must sometimes take firm action to defend itself. If Bangladesh is to build a truly democratic future, it must ensure that those responsible for systemic repression cannot simply reinvent themselves and return to power unchallenged. Accountability, political consensus, and institutional safeguards will be the cornerstones of this endeavour.
Beyond the immediate question of the Awami League鈥檚 fate, Bangladesh must invest resources to strengthen its democratic institutions to prevent future political monopolisation. Ensuring judicial independence, protecting freedom of speech and assembly, and implementing electoral reforms will be critical in fostering a resilient democracy. A democracy that merely rotates authoritarian actors is not a democracy at all; substantive institutional safeguards must be in place to prevent future abuses of power.
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Dr Anup Raihan is a Bangladeshi-born economist based in the US.