INDIA鈥橲 sheltering of Sheikh Hasina following the mass uprising in Bangladesh will shape the future of India-Bangladesh relations. The collapse of Hasina鈥檚 government also signifies a decline in India鈥檚 dominance over Bangladesh. However, it is an oversimplification to view India鈥檚 relationship with Bangladesh in such basic terms. It is unfair to label all Bangladeshis as anti-India. Similarly, if India maintains its previous approach towards Bangladesh without examining why anti-India feelings intensified during Modi鈥檚 leadership, future relations will remain strained. The Bangladeshi people seem to be more against Modi and his Bangladesh policy specifically than India as a whole. I will conclude by explaining the reasoning behind this statement.
Bangladesh鈥檚 simmering anti-India sentiment escalated significantly in the time of Sheikh Hasina鈥檚 regime, her last bilateral visit to India, during which she finalised agreements that her political opponents are denouncing as 鈥榓nti-national.鈥�
During Sheikh Hasina鈥檚 fourth term, after election Hasina had visited India twice within one month. The first visit was to attend the inauguration ceremony of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi鈥檚 third consecutive term in office.
Hasina and her party鈥檚 close ties with the Indian establishment were well-established, and there was a widespread belief among the public that Hasina had maintained her grip on power with direct support from New Delhi.
Hasina鈥檚 political rivals alleged that in return for this support, she consistently ensured India鈥檚 interest during any bilateral state-level visits. Her last visit to India served as a prime example of this practice.
During Hasina鈥檚 visit to India, a memorandum of understanding was signed, allowing India to build a railway through Bangladesh. This railway would bypass the 鈥榗hicken鈥檚 neck,鈥� a narrow corridor connecting India鈥檚 isolated northeastern states with the rest of the country.
Critics of the deal argue that Bangladesh receives no tangible benefits and that the railway would pose a security risk. This development coincides with a growing anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, fuelled by accusations of Indian interference in domestic politics.
The anti-India campaign, led by media activists, has gained traction due to mounting dissatisfaction with India鈥檚 perceived meddling in Bangladesh鈥檚 leadership. Protesters have resorted to boycotting Indian products, aiming to leverage the $12 billion export market Bangladesh provides to its neighbour.
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Anti-India sentiment in historical context
THE roots of anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh date back to the 1971 liberation war, during which some groups expressed discontent with India鈥檚 policies towards the nascent nation.
However, the bilateral relationship remained largely stable until Narendra Modi鈥檚 ascension to power in India back in 2014. Incidentally, that year marked the beginning of three successive controversial national elections in Bangladesh, through which Hasina had been in power for more than a decade and a half.
Hasina-led Bangladesh Awami League is widely accused by opposition parties as well as independent observers of receiving support from India鈥檚 ruling party throughout the nation鈥檚 history.
But when the BJP came to power in 2014, right-wing political factions in Bangladesh, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, had hoped for improved relations with the BJP government, given the Awami League鈥檚 historical alignment with the Congress.
However, these expectations were not met. Modi鈥檚 India, which openly backed Hasina鈥檚 regime, had been facilitating her continuation in power despite controversy surrounding two more elections 鈥� a disputed 鈥榤idnight election鈥� in 2018 and a controversial election characterised as a 鈥榙ummy election鈥� in 2024.
In his autobiography 鈥楾he Coalition Years,鈥� the late Pranab Mukherjee, former Indian president and prominent Congress leader, detailed his role in facilitating Hasina鈥檚 return to power in 2008, actions that were largely shielded by diplomatic channels.
In contrast, during Modi鈥檚 administration, direct support for Hasina had been more overtly apparent. For instance, several Awami League cabinet ministers openly sought India鈥檚 backing for Hasina. AK Abdul Momen, a former foreign minister and Awami League leader, went as far as likening India-Bangladesh relations to that of a husband and wife.
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Anti-India or anti-Modi sentiment?
ADDITIONALLY, Indian prime minister Modi鈥檚 policies, which have targeted Muslims and included incidents of mob violence, have markedly intensified anti-India sentiment among Bangladeshis. Modi has become emblematic of this sentiment due to his stance on Islam and Muslims.
The demolition of Babri Masjid and the contentious court ruling that facilitated the construction of the Ram Temple have further cemented Modi鈥檚 reputation as a foe of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of numerous Bangladeshis. His visit to Dhaka on March 26, 2021, sparked widespread protests, turning the city into a focal point of opposition.
Despite their typical aversion to Islamists, leftist political groups in Bangladesh joined protests against Modi鈥檚 visit at the University of Dhaka. Concurrently, several Islamist organisations also held demonstrations, prompting extensive police crackdowns across the country.
National and international media coverage documented casualties, with reports indicating four protesters were killed by police in Chittagong and eight in Brahmanbaria. The expansive coalition spanning the political spectrum from left to right opposing Modi represented a notable shift in Bangladesh鈥檚 political dynamics.
Despite the fatalities during the protests, Modi鈥檚 visit proceeded as scheduled, while sentiments against India and Modi persisted strongly. The proposal to build a mosque in Bangladesh resembling the Babri Masjid, championed by Maulana Mamunul Haque, a prominent leader of Hefajat-e-Islami recently released on bail, garnered significant public support, adding another layer of complexity to India鈥檚 position under Modi.
Mamunul Haque had previously been imprisoned for nearly three years on a minor, bailable charge, reportedly to prevent the mosque initiative from advancing.
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Will anti-India sentiment subside?
CITIZENS of Bangladesh, yearning for democracy, have closely watched India鈥檚 recent election with unprecedented interest. This heightened attention stems partly from their own lack of voting rights, having been denied the freedom to choose their leaders in the last three elections.
Thousands of activists have faced torture, imprisonment, disappearance and even death for advocating for democracy. Consequently, a sense of hopelessness pervaded the nation.
Given India鈥檚 ability to change governments through elections, many in Bangladesh hoped for Modi鈥檚 defeat, or at the very least, a stronger showing for the opposition. The resulting coalition government, perceived as weak and potentially unstable, was seen by some as a positive development for Bangladesh.
Some analysts argued that India鈥檚 unwavering backing of the Awami League undermined its own interests by fuelling regional anti-India sentiment. They suggest that a more neutral stance from India could potentially mitigate hostility from both the US and China and alleviate anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.
However, despite economic pressures and increasing American influence pushing Hasina towards China, Modi continues to support her administration.
While some analysts overlook the religious motivations driving anti-India sentiment, it is clear that Modi鈥檚 continued leadership will exacerbate movements against India. Boycotts of Indian goods are on the rise, intertwined with Islamic awareness, intensifying anti-India sentiment.
Consequently, Modi鈥檚 re-election seems poised to bolster anti-India movements in Bangladesh, presenting a significant challenge. In Bangladesh, opposition to India had become synonymous with opposition to Hasina itself.
As Bangladesh enters a new political era after the successful July uprising, India must tread carefully. If India provides shelter to Sheikh Hasina and if its broader policy towards its neighbour remains the same, it will significantly influence the future of bilateral relations. The coming months will reveal whether India can adapt its strategy to address the concern of Bangladesh while maintaining its strategic interests in the region.
In essence, the ball is in India鈥檚 court. Will it seize this opportunity to reset relations on a more equal footing, or will it risk further alienating a crucial regional ally? Only time will tell, but the stakes for both nations couldn鈥檛 be higher.鈥夆��
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Rezaul Karim Rony is a thinker and editor of Joban magazine.