INDIA and China fought a full-scale war in 1962. After 70 years of the war, the two Asian giants have two of the largest military forces in the world. They have a very wide range of military stockpiles. The both have second-strike nuclear capability. With so much mutually destructive capabilities, the question is: will they fight another war? Let us hope, not. Unfortunately, there are flash points on their common borders to trigger a war. The Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh, the McMahon Line separating Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet and the Line of Actual Control in the Aksai Chin plateau are examples.
China seized 38,000 square kilometres of Aksai Chin during the 1962 war. India has not given up the ownership of the Aksai Chin. LOAC is a de facto border line where India and China stopped the war in 1962. This undemarcated and unrecognised line denotes a fluid border which has been the principal cause of border scuffles between Chinese and Indian troops on the borders. The McMahon Line denotes the border agreed between Tibet and British India in 1914. China does not recognise the McMahon Line and claims Arunachal Pradesh as its own and calls it South Tibet.
Besides these flash points, there are strategically important spots along the border which possession will give military advantages to either country if a war breaks out. The Doklam Plateau at the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and China borders is an important spot in military perspective. Bhutan and China have common borders. China disputes the border agreement between the former Tibet and Bhutan which gave Doklam鈥檚 ownership to Bhutan. China considers that Doklam is an extension of the Chumbi/Yatong valley. Besides Doklam, China also lays claims on a couple of other enclaves inside the Bhutanese territory in the north and east.
India handles Bhutan鈥檚 foreign policy and territorial security. India has a military training unit stationed in Bhutan. India and Bhuta have renewed friendship treaty in 2007. In 2017, India and China had two months鈥� stand-off over the construction of a road in Doklam by China. In 2023, Bhutan expressed its intention to establish formal diplomatic relations with China and settle border disputes. India fears a possible land swap between Bhutan and China which could include Doklam. Will the tri-junction turn away from India鈥檚 control? Doklam was India鈥檚 worry in the past and it will remain so in future.
The Doklam Plateau is a rugged mountainous terrain approximately 24,000 feet above the sea level. The area of Doklam is about 89 square kilometres. The Siliguri town is approximately 99 kilometers from Doklam. Itanagar, the capital of Arunachal Pradesh, is approximately 150 kilometres from the nearest point on the McMahon Line. The possession of Doklam and construction of military facilities in the area could give China the high ground to monitor India鈥檚 geographical weak point in the Siliguri corridor, also known as the chicken鈥檚 neck.
The Siliguri corridor is 160 kilometres long and 22 kilometres wide at the narrowest point. It connects India鈥檚 north-east region composed of seven states, commonly known as 鈥榮even sisters鈥�, with the rest of the Indian territory. This region has a land area of 262,230 square kilometres, almost 8 per cent of the Indian territory. Forty-six million people live in this region.
Doklam came into limelight because of China鈥檚 intended presence in the area and growing tension over Chinese persistent ownership claim over Arunachal Pradesh. India decided to build 12 hydro-electric dams in Arunachal Pradesh. China issued a statement protesting at Indian initiative which said, 鈥業ndia has no right to build these hydro power plants鈥� South Tibet [Arunachal Pradesh] is China鈥檚 territory.鈥�
The Siliguri corridor is India鈥檚 鈥榮trategic vulnerability鈥�. It is also a 鈥榩ersistent difficulty鈥� to travel to seven states in the northeast. Both the weaknesses bring to the fore the strategic importance of Bangladesh to India. Bangladesh is the decisive enabler to offset India鈥檚 vulnerabilities embedded in the Siliguri corridor. To offset both the vulnerabilities, India has obtained from Bangladesh multimodal bypass to the Siliguri corridor. India is so sensitive about the security of the Siliguri corridor that it does not want to see Chinese presence even in the distant vicinity. China was interested to work in Bangladesh鈥檚 River Teesta basin management project. But India seized the project from China. Bangladesh has given the project to India in June 2024 much to the diplomatic anguish of China.
Bangladesh is the gateway to South East Asia. It is the first country in India鈥檚 look-east policy. The country is also an important enabler connecting India with Asian highway/trans-Asian railway. The highway/railway will enter Teknaf, Bangladesh from Maungdaw in Myanmar. After entering Bangladesh, road/rail links will connect different north-eastern states and West Bengal. India wants the highway/railway to enter Bangladesh through Mizoram to keep Bangladesh鈥檚 access to Asian highway/railway network under its control. It will be a matter of Bangladeshi negotiator鈥檚 skills in dealing with Bangladesh鈥檚 interests associated with the Asian highway/trans-Asian railway network.
India鈥檚 seven sisters and the rest of India are now connected by air, waterways, railway and roads using Bangladesh鈥檚 air space, rivers and roads. India is reportedly considering an overland express way between West Bengal and Meghalaya in the seven sisters. Its location in the Bangladesh territory could be abound 80-100 kilometre south of the Siliguri town.
While West Bengal-Meghalaya expressway could be a strategically important bypass when built,agreed rail corridors connecting Haldibari (India) and Chilahati, Nilphamari (Bangladesh), Changrabandha (India) and Burimari, Lalmonirhat (Bangladesh) and Singhbad and Rohonpur, Chapai Nawabgonj (Bangladesh) will be a tactical bypass to Siliguri with the expansion of internal rail links in Bangladesh part.
India is also pursuing an opening through the Debangarh Union, Tetulia in Bangladesh, called the Tetulia corridor. The听corridor听is 4 to 6-kilometre passage connecting the subdivision of Chopra in North Dinajpur, India and the towns of Jalpaiguri and Mainaguri in Jalpaiguri.听 The corridor would reduce the travel distance by about 84 kilometres and facilitate an easy access to the northeast India.
India has also obtained access to Chittagong Port and Mongla Port to transport its cargo to the western and eastern part of the country. India now has flexible options to transport people and goods through Bangladesh.
Agreements and protocols that the two countries signed on connectivity and port access have not been made public. However, it is understandable that the network of connectivity will be used for the movement of civilians and goods between two parts of India. The network of connectivity has immediately eased significantly India鈥檚 鈥榩ersistent difficulty鈥� associated with the Siliguri corridor. It has appreciably reduced the distance by a couple of hundred kilometers, saved many hours of travel time and millions of dollars on logistics and fuel costs. The network of connectivity should have given India the confidence to offset the 鈥榮trategic vulnerability鈥� entrenched in the Siliguri corridor. Multimodal connectivity through Bangladesh will be India鈥檚 lifeline to sustain military logistics in war during peace time.
Despite diverse connectivity arrangements through Bangladesh, the country will certainly prefer to stay neutral in the event of a confrontation between China and India. But in such extremely difficult scenario, Bangladesh cannot do away with its foreign policy dictum 鈥榝riendship to all, malice to none鈥�. In a real-time war scenario, if India wants to use the network of connectivity to move military logistics and personnel, will Bangladesh be able to roll back the connectivity agreements and arrangements? The movements of military personnel and military goods through a third country compromises its neutrality. When neutrality is compromised, the country becomes party to the conflict to bear the brunt of other鈥檚 war. It begins with diplomatic wrangling in peace time.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.