IT IS many years now since the French, bless them, revolted as Disneyland Paris arose near the previously uninvaded village of 惭补谤苍别-濒补-痴补濒濒茅别-颁丑别蝉蝉测.
Soon enough came the Disney H么tel New York, the Disney H么tel Santa Fe, the Disney H么tel Cheyenne, the Disney Newport Club, the Disney Sequoia Lodge, Disney Village, Parc Disneyland, Parc Walt Disney Studios. Let us not omit Star Wars Hypersonic Mountain among these monuments to the Americanisation of Europe.
Blocking imports of American 鈥榗ulture鈥�, and we need the quotation marks, is among the world鈥檚 more quixotic undertakings, given the failure rate. But losing the battle against the infantilisation of European sensibilities seems the least of the Continent鈥檚 worries at this point.
The irrational Russophobia, the proxy war in Ukraine, the disruption of the Continent鈥檚 natural place as Eurasia鈥檚 western flank, the conjured-from-nothing 鈥榯hreat鈥� of Russian expansionism, support of Israel鈥檚 siege of Gaza: These are US imports, too, and Europe finds itself in crisis in consequence of them.
Who are we, Europeans now ask in one or another way. What have we made of ourselves? Are we always to be America鈥檚 obedient underlings, taking all orders and refusing none? What has become of us in the 21st century?
European social democracy in its various forms has been vulnerable to the attacks of market fundamentalists and neoconservative ideologues for many years. Now the apostles of 鈥榮avage capitalism鈥�, as its Latin American casualties call it, and their warmongering siblings begin, this time in the name of Cold War II, what appears to be their final assault.
Europe has vacillated between two contradictory impulses 鈥� asserting its sovereignty and succumbing to an undignified dependence on American power 鈥� since the mid鈥揅old War years. Charles De Gaulle was the last European leader to stand with conviction for the Continent鈥檚 independence and autonomy.
But Gaullism is no more than a faint and far-off light around Europe today. I reluctantly conclude that, in the moment of truth now upon it, the Continent will make the unwise choice, a self-condemnation that could endure for decades to come.
A long-evident divide between Europeans and those who purport to lead them now widens. The former defend what remains of the socially advanced state erected across the Continent during the first postwar decades.
The latter are poised to tear it down to import a version of America鈥檚 military-industrial complex precisely as The Walt Disney Company brought Sleeping Beauty鈥檚 Castle to the French capital鈥檚 outskirts.
鈥楨urope鈥檚 leaders have woken up to hard power鈥� is the headline atop a commentary Janan Ganesh, a Financial Times columnist, published on this topic last week. 鈥楾o militarise as much as it needs to鈥�, he wrote, 鈥楨urope needs its citizens to bear higher taxes or a smaller welfare state.鈥�
This is bitterly succinct. Europe鈥檚 leaders and the media that serve them are in the process of normalising the 鈥榥eed鈥� to turn Europe into a warrior state in the American image 鈥� suffused with animus and paranoia, beset with 鈥榯hreats鈥�, never at ease as the social fabric deteriorates.
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Identity crisis
AN ACUTE identity crisis 鈥� and this is at bottom Europe鈥檚 present disorder 鈥� has been rolling the Continent鈥檚 way like a big, black bowling ball since, I would say, the US began to realise that Vladimir Putin was other than his pliant predecessor as Russia鈥檚 president. It has been ever more obvious lately, as I noted in this space a year ago.
鈥楬owitzers instead of hospitals鈥� is how The New York Times put the case at the time. Again, it is dismally on the mark.
There are various reasons the choice Europe faces has since grown yet starker.
One, the Ukraine war is lost and America鈥檚 enthusiasm for the Kiev regime has plainly weakened. This leaves Europe to manage the mess on its doorstep while the US can, as is its habit, 鈥榤ove on.鈥�
Hence the European Union鈥檚 commitment two months ago to provide Ukraine with 鈧�50 billion in 鈥榬eliable and predictable financial support鈥� over the next four years.
Two, Donald Trump has reignited talk of either a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation without the US or the disintegration of NATO. The first of these is a logical impossibility: Is NATO anything more than Washington鈥檚 instrument for projecting power across the Atlantic?
And the pleasing thought of life without NATO is, very regrettably, nowhere near even a medium-term possibility. The whither鈥揘ATO conversation has nonetheless prompted European leaders to think, or appear to think.
Emmanuel Macron is not stepping back from his assertion last month that Europe must be prepared to send ground troops to the Ukrainian front 鈥� this despite vigorous objections to the French president鈥檚 position.
Macron, who nurses a de Gaulle complex, purports to favour a more independent Europe when he says such things, and there are those who buy into it. 鈥業f we want to be peacekeepers in the world鈥�, Antonio Tajani, Italy鈥檚 foreign minister, said in an interview with La Stampa a couple of months ago, 鈥榳e need a European military.鈥�
I find this sort of thinking altogether facile. Josep Borrell, the EU鈥檚 usefully forthright foreign policy chief, went straight at the reality when he outlined 鈥榯he four main tasks on EU鈥檚 geopolitical agenda鈥� in his speech to the Munich Security Conference two months ago.
The second of these was, yes, 鈥榮trengthening our defense and security.鈥� The fourth was 鈥榮ustaining these efforts in cooperation with key partners, and in particular the US.鈥�
I thought Borrell was impossibly paradoxical when I first read his remarks in External Action, an online EU publication. On reflection, he seems simply a man of forthrightly stated realpolitik: Europe can arm itself all it wants; its current leaders will keep it a dependent adjunct of the US imperium.
It is not difficult to detect among Europeans their restive dissatisfaction with the direction Europe鈥檚 leaders are choosing. You find among them a fundamental desire to reject all cold war-like animosities and live plainly and simply as Europeans.
Polls indicate that large proportions of those surveyed do not trust the U.S. These polls also record a similar distrust of 鈥淧utin,鈥� but this reflects the power of the relentless propaganda in major European media as they incessantly demonise the Russian president, as there is considerable acceptance of Europe鈥檚 position as the western flank of the Eurasian landmass and the interdependence with Russia this implies.
Zeit鈥揊ragen, a German-language journal published here (and in French and English as Horizons et d茅bats and Current Concerns), recently quoted Egon Bahr, a former German minister and a key figure in the design of the Federal Republic鈥檚 Ostpolitik, on this topic.
鈥極ur self-determination stands alongside and not against America鈥�, Bahr said. 鈥榌But] we cannot give up Russia because America doesn鈥檛 like it.鈥�
Bahr spoke at the German鈥揜ussian Forum in Berlin six years ago. As Zeit鈥揊ragen鈥檚 editors make clear, the speech still resonates because the majority of Germans 鈥� and considerable proportions of other Europeans 鈥� strongly favor a return to the rapprochement with Russia the US has more or less required Europeans to abandon.
鈥榃ho thinks voters will prioritise rearmament?鈥� Janan Ganesh asked in his FT column last week. 鈥楾here is little to suggest electorates are willing to accept a rupture of the welfarist social contract in order to tool up.鈥�
I hope Ganesh is right in this observation. As Europeans try to rediscover who they are, the historical magnitude of this moment is difficult to overstate.
The very best one hopes for now is a ripping confrontation between the defenders of Europe-for鈥揈uropeans and those who sponsor a version of the militarised monster that long ago overtook America.
Barricades, blocked highways, yellow vests, occupied ministries: As we used to say in the 1960s, 鈥楲et it happen, Cap鈥檔.鈥� This will be a war worth waging for the Continent鈥檚 soul.
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Consortiumnews.com, April 3. Patrick Lawrence, a correspondent abroad for many years, chiefly for the International Herald Tribune, is a columnist, essayist, lecturer and author, most recently of Journalists and Their Shadows.