
ON SEPTEMBER 25, an article, titled ‘Is Chittagong port becoming a danger to India’s eastern borders?’, was published in India Today, the most widely circulated Indian news magazine. The article claims that the port of Chattogram, Bangladesh’s principal seaport located in its southeast along the Bay of Bengal, poses ‘real risks’ to India owing to supposedly growing activities of great powers in the region and urges New Delhi to enhance its economic and military influence over Bangladesh. Since the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024, Indian media outlets have consistently expressed similar views and arguments with regard to Bangladesh. Hence, it is highly important to analyse the situation on the ground and verify the authenticity and objectivity of these arguments.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy must be understood in the context of its traditional policies of qualified non-alignment with great powers, benevolent neutrality in great power conflicts and rivalries, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and ensuring good-neighbourly relations with its two neighbouring states. All governments in Dhaka, irrespective of their political-ideological affiliation, have generally pursued these policies. The current interim government of Bangladesh is no exception in this regard.
From 2009 to 2024 Bangladesh was governed by the Awami League. During this period, Bangladesh maintained close relations with India while pursuing extensive economic and security cooperation with other great and emerging powers, including the United States (US), China, Russia, and Turkey. Since the interim government was installed, Indo-Bangladeshi relations have been restrained despite Dhaka’s continuous efforts to normalise ties with New Delhi. Meanwhile, Dhaka’s economic and security cooperation with other great and emerging powers, which is practically a continuation of the policy of the previous government, has been subjected to harsh criticism, misinterpretation, and outright misinformation in the Indian print, televised, and social media.
The article published in India Today contains a number of instances of misinterpretation of events, misrepresentation of reality, and outright false or wrong information. The article portrays Bangladesh and in particular Chattogram as a source of ‘direct challenge’ to India. Hence, its claims should be dissected and analysed in an objective manner.
First, the article argues that the recently concluded Pacific Angel 25-3, a joint Bangladesh-US military exercise held in Chattogram, is an indication of the possible use of Chattogram as a US forward base against India. This is a gross misrepresentation of reality. Small-scale bilateral and multilateral exercises are very common in the current world, and India itself participates in similar joint trainings. On the same day the Pacific Angel 25-3 kicked off, the US Army and the Indian Army concluded a two-week-long joint exercise, named Exercise Yudh Abhyas, in the US state of Alaska. Furthermore, both India and Bangladesh sent military observers to the Pacific Angel 25, a joint exercise between the US Air Force and the Sri Lanka Air Force held on Sri Lankan territory, held earlier in September.
So, when India itself is conducting joint exercises with the US, it should not view US–Bangladeshi joint drills from a threat perspective. Bangladesh participates in several joint exercises with the US every year, and the joint exercises did not start after the fall of the Awami League. It has been happening over the years. Hence, the hosting of a joint exercise cannot and should not be equated with the establishment of a forward base against a third country.
Second, the article highlights the goodwill visit paid by two People’s Liberation Army Navy ships – naval training ship Qi Jiguang and amphibious dock landing ship Jinggangshan – to Chattogram in October 2024 and claims that it is a sign of increased Chinese influence in Bangladesh. While it is true that this was the first visit of a foreign naval flotilla to Chattogram under the interim government, similar Chinese goodwill visits took place in 2010, 2013, and 2016. Hence, the visit of Chinese ships to Chattogram was not the outcome of a hostile policy towards India but a continuation of the policy of the previous government.
Third, the article claims that the Russian Navy’s goodwill visit to Chattogram in April 2025 was the first of its kind in more than 50 years, and this claim suggests that Dhaka is engaging in unprecedented security cooperation with Russia. This is outright false information. Three ships of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy — Admiral Tributs, Admiral Panteleyev, and Pechenga — paid a goodwill visit to Chattogram in November 2023. Moreover, Admiral Vladimirsky, an oceanographic research ship of the Russian Navy, paid a goodwill visit to Chattogram in April 2018. Hence, the visit of Russian ships to Chattogram in April 2025 was not a unique event, as similar events took place during the tenure of the previous government as well.
Fourth, the article argues that US listening posts, Chinese maritime surveillance, and Russian naval logistics in Chattogram pose a ‘real’ threat to India’s economic and military security given the geographic proximity between Chattogram and India’s northeastern states. Indeed, if such US, Chinese, and Russian facilities existed in Chattogram, it would pose a potential threat to India. However, the reality on the ground is different. There are no US listening posts, Chinese maritime surveillance ships, or Russian naval logistics facilities in Chattogram. US troops left Chattogram immediately after the conclusion of the Pacific Angel 25-3, while Chinese and Russian ships left Chattogram immediately after the conclusion of their goodwill visits. Therefore, Chattogram poses no ‘real’ risks to India.
Fifth, the language used in the article towards Bangladesh contradicts the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and good-neighbourly relations. The article suggests that India should upgrade its logistics capabilities in the northeastern states to ensure rapid mobilisation. This statement is an indirect threat to Bangladesh couched in technical language. Moreover, the article states, ‘The port may belong to Bangladesh, but its significance belongs to India.’ This statement stands in direct contravention of Bangladesh’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Imagine the uproar it would cause in India if any Bangladeshi media outlet wrote, ‘The Kolkata port may belong to India, but its significance belongs to Bangladesh.’
Finally, the article deliberately ignores Bangladesh’s consistent efforts to maintain a working and good-neighbourly relationship with India. After the change of government, Dhaka made persistent efforts to arrange a meeting between the Bangladeshi chief adviser and the Indian prime minister, which eventually took place in Thailand in April 2025. Also, Dhaka decided to refrain from joining a trilateral working group with China and Pakistan in June 2025. This demonstrates that Bangladesh does not harbour any hostile intentions towards India and seeks good-neighbourly and mutually beneficial cooperative ties with it on the basis of sovereign equality.
In fact, India itself pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, demonstrated by its simultaneously growing partnerships with Moscow and Washington and its efforts to contain its rivalry with China by engaging with the latter. Bangladesh’s policy of balancing between great and emerging powers actually resembles India’s own policy. Hence, Indian media outlets should act more responsibly and refrain from exaggerating the events taking place in Bangladesh. The US-Bangladesh joint exercise in Chattogram and the goodwill visits paid by Chinese and Russian navies to the seaport are routine procedures, not ‘real risks’ to India. In actuality, Bangladesh and India are next-door neighbours, and they do not have any option but to maintain good-neighbourly relations with each other while respecting each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security concerns. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both Bangladeshi and Indian peoples if Dhaka and New Delhi could initiate a new chapter in their bilateral relations.
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ÌýMd. Himel Rahman is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Gopalganj Science and Technology University.