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The Israel Defence Forces on September 9 conducted an airstrike on Qatar’s capital Doha. Senior leaders of Hamas, including negotiators from the Palestinian group, were the target of the attack. Immediately after, the Israeli prime minister’s office released an X-post claiming: ‘Today’s action against the top terrorist chieftains of Hamas was a wholly independent Israeli operation. Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility.’

The White House took hours to respond. As the US president described the bombing, a feeling ‘very badly’ and ‘unhappy’ about Israel’s actions stopped short of condemnation. White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated during a briefing, ‘Unilaterally bombing inside Qatar, a sovereign nation and close ally, does not advance Israel or America’s goals. However, eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal.’ The secretary of state assured Israel that the attack would not alter US-Israel relations.

Emboldened, Benjamin Netanyahu issued a warning to Qatar: ‘I say it to Qatar and all nations [in the Middle East] who harbour terrorists, you either expel them or bring them to justice. Because if you don’t, we will.’ An analysis of the statements suggests that the operation was conducted with an expectation of continued US support, based on perceived alignment with strategic priorities. A secondary consideration is that Israeli planners may have calculated that the US response would not escalate to the level of a formal condemnation.

The betrayal was profound. Just months before, in May 14–15, the US president visited Doha, pocketing a $1.2 trillion deal while the Qatari emir happily gifted a $400 million private jet — ‘a palace in the sky.’ In the aftermath of the strike, the Qatari prime minister could only helplessly lament, ‘we are betrayed.’ The attack was a deliberate violation of the international law and Qatari sovereignty. The world reacted with words of mouth but little else. Arab leaders flocked to Doha with their borrowed fluid security guarantees from the United States in their pockets and, critically, aÌýfew tangible options for retaliation.

The US military presence in Qatar, governed by bilateral agreements since 1992 and centerd on the massive Al Udeid Air Base, was supposed to provide an iron-clad security guarantee. Qatar spent more than $8 billion to expand and build the base and continues sharing annual cost burden to host the 10,000-strong military supposed to provide national security to Qatar through deterrence by presence, a powerful deterrent against any aggression; extended nuclear deterrence, protection under the US ‘nuclear umbrella;’ integrated air and missile defence, protection from threats via US Patriot batteries, AWACS, and fighter jets; and intelligence sharing, access to unparalleled US intelligence on regional threats.

Yet, during the Israeli attack, this formidable defence apparatus was conspicuously silent. Israeli aircraft flew into Qatari airspace unopposed, but likely not undetected, bombed their targets and retreated safely. The event proved a harsh truth: the primary mission of Al Udeid is to serve US interests. The defence of Qatar is a beneficial byproduct if US interest is attacked, but there is no obligation when an attack comes from Israel.

The countries that signed the Abraham Accords with Israel — the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco — would play a critical and for Doha, a disappointing role.ÌýThey cannot be trusted to join any meaningful Arab retaliation.ÌýIn fact, their purpose would be to actively prevent it.

Their strategic calculus is fundamentally different from Qatar’s. The accords were built on a shared fear of Iran and a desire for a deep integration with the US-led security and economic architecture. Retaliating against Israel would mean retaliating against their primary security patron, the United States, a risk that they will not take. Furthermore, a key ideological driver for the United Arab Emirates, in particular, is countering political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which is ideologically aligned with Hamas. While they would publicly condemn the violation of sovereignty, they privately have little sympathy for the target of the strike.

Their likely role would be that of aÌýmoderating force, working within the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council to block any resolutions calling for collective military or severe economic action. They would advocate symbolic diplomatic condemnations to placate public anger while ensuring they lead to no concrete consequences for Israel. Their presence in any solidarity meeting in Doha would be to manage the fallout and protect their own investments in the normalisation process, not to formulate a united front. This inherent division shatters any illusion of Arab unity and drastically limits Qatar’s options from the outset.

For Qatar and its Arab allies, formulating a response is fraught with complexity and risks. Their options range from symbolic to severe, but each carries a heavy cost.

The expulsion of the United States from Al Udeid is the most powerful symbolic retaliation available for Qatar. Terminating the Defence Cooperation Agreement would be a seismic shock to US force projection in the Middle East, forcing a hasty and logistically nightmarish relocation of assets. However, this would also instantly remove Qatar’s US-backed security umbrella, leaving it exposed to a resurgent Iran and an emboldened Israel. The economic repercussions together with the threat of regime change could be severe throwing Qatar into chaos.

For several Arab nations, the severance of diplomatic ties cold be a testament to their political impotence. Their strong rhetoric, as showcased in the polished communique of the Arab-Islamic summit held on September 15, serves only to mask a fundamental inability to take meaningful action, demonstrating that their opposition remains symbolic and without practical consequence for Israel.

The GCC nations, particularly Qatar, an LNG giant, and Saudi Arabia, could threaten to slow energy exports or withdraw investments from the United States. However, this is a double-edged sword that would destabilise the global market and harm their own economies, which are deeply tied to the US dollar and western financial systems.

Military retaliation against Israel is the least likely scenario. Engaging in direct conflict with Israel, which possesses a modern military and nuclear arsenal, would be suicidal for a divided Arab League. A unified Arab military response is a fantasy given current political divisions and military disparities. Furthermore, US arms sales to Arab states include strict conditions that forbid their use against Israel, underscoring the United States’ unwavering commitment to its security.

Arab states could increase funding and arms to groups hostile to Israel, such as Hezbollah or Palestinian factions. This would inflame the entire region but would be an indirect and deniable form of retaliation. The risk, however, is sparking a wider war that could easily spiral out of control and draw in Iran directly.

Betrayed by the United States, the Arab Gulf states could accelerate their strategic pivot towards Moscow and Beijing and deepen energy ties in exchange for political and military support. However, neither China nor Russia will come forward to offer an immediate, on-the-ground security guarantee that the US military presence provides against Iran.

The stark reality for Qatar and the Arab world is that their options are limited by the very architecture of security that the United States built and then revealed to be conditional. The fractured response from Abraham Accords signatories underscores the deep divisions that prevent a unified stance. Any meaningful retaliation, expelling the US military base, energy embargo, etc, would cause self-inflicted wounds potentially greater than the original insult. Meanwhile, military options are largely off the table because of Israel’s superiority and a lack of Arab unity. And, the use of American-origin weapons by Arab is restricted by end-user agreements that prohibit their deployment against Israel, a key US ally. Therefore, the most probable response will be a furious but ultimately restrained combination of diplomatic condemnation, symbolic gestures and a quiet, futile attempt at reducing dependence on the United States. They have been shown that their security is not an American priority, but they lack the collective power or individual will to secure it themselves. The Arab leaders left Doha after the summit with little option but to seethe in silent, impotent rage.

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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst.