THE sudden fall of the former government led by the Bangladesh Awami League for around 16 years due to the July 2024 mass uprising launched by the students, along with political parties and civilians, has given rise to multiple narratives and public discourses. On the one hand, one narrative postulates that the stringent control of governance through three controversial elections, repression of dissent, and extensive state surveillance incited the fervour of the July mass uprising. Additionally, supporters of this narrative believe that by 2024, growing public dissatisfaction brought on by inflation, unemployment, corruption, enforced disappearance, and authoritarian rule had reached a breaking point, especially among young people, and that the final outburst occurred after the quota reform movements. However, the flip side of this narrative is contrasting, derogatory and deceitful, indicating no confession or accountability for the massacre, leading to no hopes of reconciliation. The Bangladesh Awami League and their supporters do not agree that the July uprising was inevitable and that it was an outburst against their fascist rule. Instead, they are continuing to claim that it was a meticulously designed conspiracy against them by the forces defeated during the war of 1971. While many people believe that the sacrifices of hundreds of students and civilians are akin to those of martyrs and that they made the country free from the grip of a fascist regime, the Bangladesh Awami League and their allies believe that those who led the July uprising causing their fall are renegades. The contrasting and competing narratives on the question of whether it was a mass uprising against a tyrannical government or a conspiracy against the tyrant will undoubtedly have a lasting future in Bangladesh.
Another emerging narrative among the citizens is regarding the legitimacy of the interim government that was formed after the fall of the Awami League regime. Was the interim government formed following moral consideration alone, or was there some formal (legal) legitimacy to it? Formal legitimacy is derived from laws, constitutions, elections, or constitutionally recognised procedures. Even if unpopular, such governments are elected through a constitutionally mandated general election. An elected government may have constitutional support but lack moral authority or public trust if perceived as corrupt, unjust, or disconnected from the mass population. On the other hand, moral legitimacy derives from ethical principles, popular support, and the perceived moral rightness of authority. They can be based on values, justice, fairness, or alignment with the people鈥檚 will or higher ethical standards. Such a government system usually emerges from a grassroots revolution or civil resistance. The interim government meets all the conditions of a morally legitimate government. Despite the popular support, its legitimacy has been constantly under scrutiny as the country is at a crossroads. What began as a glimmer of hope, an opportunity to escape the shackles of tyrannical governance, has progressively evolved into a fight for reform. The political process to implement reform, however, drew flak from different groups; the government鈥檚 inherent weakness is also an impediment.
Many raised questions that there was moral support for professor Muhammad Yunus due to his unequivocal popularity, but the same cannot be said about the other advisors to the interim government, so the selection bias remains controversial over time. Subsequent recruitment of additional advisors to the interim government was also contentious, but the government either did not care about public demand or was sceptical. These two recruitments nonetheless called into question the very legitimacy of the government.
The chief advisor and other advisors, civil society, and professionals often reiterated that the July revolution brought few and far between opportunities for the nation to change political culture and massive institutional reforms. The public expectations were elevated. Consequently, the interim government established six commissions to initiate these reforms on September 11, 2024. The heads of these commissions were prominent civil society figures and former officials to oversee critical sectors: the judiciary, electoral system, state administration, law enforcement, corruption, and constitutional matters. In October 2024, the interim government launched four more reform commissions focusing on women鈥檚 affairs, labour rights, media, and health. In addition, the government established eleven inquiry committees to look into claims of corruption against Sheikh Hasina鈥檚 family members and ten significant business conglomerates, including Summit, Beximco, Bashundhara, and S Alam. Initially there was public support for these initiatives. However, over time, such reformation initiatives raise questions about whether they have the legitimacy for this reformation and bring massive changes, particularly in relation to the ratification of new provisions or substantial alterations to the constitution. Most importantly, the constitutional amendments raise concerns over the legitimacy of an unelected government and whether such commissions have a public mandate to make constitutional amendments.
The principal stakeholders of the July revolution, who subsequently established the National Citizen Party, are fervently demanding substantial amendments to the existing constitution. The NCP鈥檚 formation is located in its role in the July mass uprising, a pivotal event in Bangladesh鈥檚 history. They started to dream of a new Bangladesh by subverting the corrupt political culture and demanded the establishment of the second republic. The NCP claims that the present constitution requires 60 to 70 or more revisions under the July Charter, therefore necessitating a thorough revision of the existing constitution. Whereas the BNP seeks to enact possible amendments of the current constitution in the forthcoming parliament by the elected government, Jamaat-e-Islami advocates for a public referendum. Thus, the moral legitimacy of the interim government is called into question due to the conflicting and competing interests of the various stakeholders, placing them in a dilemma about what actions to take and what to avoid. The inability to reconcile this dilemma in a way is an impediment to their ability to effectively govern. It is like a double-edged sword. If they initiate the fundamental changes in the current constitution, their legal legitimacy might be called into question. On the other hand, their moral legitimacy, the foundational basis of this government, will also be questioned if they deny such constitutional amendments. The government did not rule out the demands concerning various reformation steps, including the constitutional amendments, but their activities seem ambivalent, and progress has been exceedingly sluggish and obscure. The dilemma between moral and legal legitimacy pushed the interim government to a Mexican standoff, affecting their performance in reform issues, including significant constitutional changes.
The moral legitimacy of the current interim government is its real strength. Nevertheless, the moral legitimacy of this government is currently being called into question, as they are facing so much abnegation from different sections because of their weak governance, slipshod management or ignorance of public demand. It is true that the interim government has made some noticeable strides, such as improving the precarious financial situation of high inflation, a banking crisis, and declining foreign exchange reserves. Yet, the nation continues to face political and economic uncertainty.
First of all, many of the interim government鈥檚 activities seemed like esoteric influences by certain stakeholders of the July revolution. Such leverage to a particular group convoluted many things, including the mob justice and violence, for which the interim government started to face criticisms and lose their moral legitimacy. To some extent, the coordinators of the July revolution enjoyed more leeway, and their encroachment into different state administrations and activities made them renegades, for which the interim government was criticised, as they did not take decisive actions. In addition, thousands of July uprising casualties are still not receiving enough care, and the administration appears to be beset by bureaucratic red tape. The allocation of funds to the relatives of the July mass uprising victims is being handled poorly. Inefficiency and sluggish processing have compelled families into financial hardship. The interim administration, resulting from the bloodshed of these victims, has ignored, mismanaged, and failed to provide adequate care for them and their families. All this together tore apart the moral legitimacy that the interim government initially enjoyed.
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听Dr Shafiqul Islam is a political analyst and a core faculty member at the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University.
