On March 1, 2001, president George W Bush, speaking at the National Defence University in Washington DC, stated that the United States and Russia ‘are not and must not be strategic adversaries.’ Yet, more than two decades later, as the 2024 US presidential elections approached, Republican nominee Donald Trump remarked during a televised interview on November 2, 2024, ‘One thing we never wanted to happen — Russia and China reuniting. We united them. It’s a shame… I’m gonna un-unite them.’
Ironically, it was president Trump’s own trade war policies during his previous term that strengthened the Russia-China relationship and, simultaneously, nudged India closer to this emerging axis of upheaval. The Biden administration’s decision to cross Russia’s red line in Ukraine further elevated the Russia-China alignment into a fully-fledged alliance. Trump 2.0 cemented the alliance.
Despite president Bush’s stated intent, US foreign policy in the early 2000s, including NATO expansion and pressure tactics in the Balkans, alarmed both Moscow and Beijing. As a result, on July 16, 2001, Russia and China signed a landmark Friendship Treaty, rekindling ties that had frayed since the 1970s.
In October 2000, in ‘Sea powers’ political equation in the Asia-Pacific region’ published in the Naval Review, UK, I mentioned that India joining the Russia-China alliance would make things difficult for the United States. I also posed a question: if a Russia-China alliance were to take shape, would India join them? At the time, the answer appeared to be ‘no.’ India sought contradicting foreign policy — military ties with Russia, economic engagement with the United States and not improving relations with China. Trump’s tariff war pushed Indian closer to Russia and China.
Until 2024, India walked a cautious diplomatic line. Even as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, India signalled its western preference when the prime minister skipped the 2024 SCO summit.
India’s strategy of balancing was upended in 2025 when the United States imposed a steep 50 per cent tariff on Indian export. The stated reason: India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil, which Washington claimed it was funding Russia’s war in Ukraine.
This sudden economic retaliation marked a turning point. India, perceiving it as a betrayal of its sovereign economic choices, began re-calibrating its position — leaning back towards the Russia-China axis through the SCO framework.
The SCO, originally formed as the Shanghai Five in 1996 (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), became a formal organisation in 2001. It aimed to strengthen regional security, economic cooperation and political trust. Over time, it expanded. Uzbekistan joined in 2001, India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024. With 10 permanent members and 16 observer states, the SCO has become a major platform on the Eurasian landscape.
India signalled disinterest in the SCO by sending only its external affairs minister to the 2024 summit. But after the terrific tariff shock in 2025, India returned with a high-profile delegation to the SCO Summit held in August 31–September 1, 2025, in Tianjin, China.
President Xi Jinping welcomed prime minister Modi’s participation, announcing renewed diplomatic efforts, including resuming direct flights between Beijing and Delhi, restoring cross-border trade and lifting bans on critical exports to India, including rare earth minerals. Xi has not offered anything to ease the 50 per ceht tariff burden on Indian goods worth $90 billion, leaving India’s key trade concern unaddressed.
The 2025 SCO summit attracted extraordinary global attention as it was held during a time of multiple major international crises. These included a 12-day war between Iran and the United States (June 13–24, 2025), an aerial clash between India and Pakistan (May 7–11, 2025) and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that began on February 24, 2022. Hostility between China and the United Staes over trade also remained high. Meanwhile, the US-supported Israeli military campaign in Gaza and the West Bank has been widely criticised as genocidal. The situation became more intense after the International Criminal Court had issued a warrant for the arrest of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu, leading the United States to impose sanctions on the ICC judges involved. Additionally, the United States and the United Kingdom launched airstrikes against Iran, further escalating global instability. India found itself entangled in several of these developments — balancing strong ties with Israel, economic ties with Russia, political support for Ukraine, security concerns with China and Pakistan and egoistic friction with the United States.
The SCO summit began with new energy and strong calls for multilateral cooperation to challenge the dominance of a single global power. However, divisions among member countries remain. Russia managed to get most SCO members to support its stance on the Ukraine war, but India kept its ties with Ukraine while still buying oil from Russia. The group criticised Israel’s military attacks on Iran, but India chose not to sign the joint statement because of its close relationship with Israel. Meanwhile, border tensions between China and India, especially over areas like Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, remain unresolved. India also continues to have strained relations with SCO observer countries such as Nepal, the Maldives and other small neighbours. India has created string of threats around it.
India is an important member in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a US-led strategic alliance that includes Japan and Australia, aimed at countering China’s growing influence on the Indo-Pacific. With India set to host the Quad Summit 2025, questions arise over how it will navigate its dual commitments — balancing Quad’s strategic stance with its participation in the SCO, where China is a prominent member.
Will Trump join the Quad Summit in Delhi? The potential absence of Donald Trump from the 2025 Quad Summit carries a risk of being interpreted as a sleight against India, thereby undermining the integrity of the alliance. 2026 BRICS presidency. Given that the group’s de-dollarisation agenda was a catalyst for Trump’s tariff wars, this alignment places India in a delicate position, potentially foreshadowing renewed diplomatic strains with the United States.
India’s foreign policy is increasingly defined by strategic dilemmas and contradictions. It seeks deeper economic ties with the United States and the European Union while simultaneously maintaining strong economic and military relations with Russia and fostering ties with Ukraine. While it aims to counterbalance China through its engagement with the Quad, it is also compelled to cooperate with Beijing within the SCO to mitigate the impact of Trump-era tariffs. India supports the Palestinian cause in principle yet provides strong political support to Israel and maintains robust military and technological partnerships with Israel. Although it aspires to lead the global south, it finds itself entangled in complex triangular power dynamics involving the east, west and south.
India’s current posture reflects the struggles of a rising power in a multipolar world — striving to maintain sovereignty, secure energy and trade interests, and prevent encirclement by hostile powers, while avoiding being drawn too deeply into any singular alliance.
India’s return to the SCO marks not only a diplomatic gesture but also a strategic re-calibration driven by economic coercion and global turbulence. However, this pivot brings its own set of challenges, particularly as contradictions emerge between India’s SCO engagement and its persuasion for the Quad and its western allies.
As the world continues to fragment along new geopolitical fault lines, India’s ability to navigate these crosscurrents, without compromising its core interests, will determine whether it remains a balancing power or becomes a battleground of competing influences. India’s recent pivot back towards the SCO is less a strategic embrace of the Russia-China axis than a reaction to the US coercion, a risky re-calibration in an increasingly fragmented world.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst.
