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AS THE Shanghai Cooperation Organisation prepares to convene its 25th Heads of State Council summit in Tianjin on August 31, 2025, the mood is one of cautious optimism, shaped by geopolitical turbulence, but anchored in a sense of historical inevitability. Under China’s rotating chairmanship, the SCO has not only survived the headwinds of global disorder but is steadily positioning itself as the anchor of a Eurasian century.

Often caricatured in the West as an ‘Eastern NATO’, a superficial label that neither fits its intent nor captures its trajectory, the SCO has evolved into a forum where connectivity trumps coercion, sovereignty is not just rhetoric, and multipolarity is not a threat but a shared aspiration. Its durability over a quarter century speaks volumes about its capacity to adapt, expand and redefine the contours of regional cooperation.

When it was launched in 2001, the SCO was primarily a security club, focused on countering the ‘three evils’ — terrorism, separatism and extremism — that plagued its founding members. Today, it is a strategic coalition that stretches from the steppes of Central Asia to the shores of South Asia, encompassing ten member states after the recent inclusion of Iran and Belarus. Collectively, they represent nearly half the world’s population, a quarter of global GDP, and a formidable concentration of nuclear and energy assets. Unlike NATO, which is hardwired for confrontation, the SCO is grounded in the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ — mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for cultural diversity. This spirit, often derided in Western commentary as too soft or amorphous, has proven resilient. While the United Nations, IMF and World Bank have been hollowed out by Western hubris and hypocrisy, the SCO is quietly building credibility as a counterweight to unilateralism.

China’s stewardship of the SCO has been anything but ceremonial. True to its pragmatic tradition, Beijing has infused the organisation with ambition, marrying its economic heft to a strategic vision of Eurasian connectivity. The Belt and Road Initiative, once derided in Western capitals as a debt trap, has found a natural complement in the SCO’s cooperative framework. Consider the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) International Highway, which doubled trade volumes since 2018. Now, the CKU Railway — a 523-kilometre artery under construction — is set to shave a week off freight times and diversify Central Asia’s options beyond Russian-dominated routes. The choice of Tianjin as summit host is symbolic too: the port city has poured over 10 billion yuan into eco-friendly upgrades and digital logistics hubs, signalling China’s determination to knit together land, sea and digital corridors.

Pakistan, China’s ‘iron brother,’ is pivotal in this grand design. Gwadar Port — revitalised under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — is expanding with deep-water berths and special economic zones. It is not just a maritime hub but a strategic hinge linking South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf. For Beijing, the SCO is no longer just about security — it is about shaping the sinews of Eurasian interdependence.

Connectivity in the SCO’s lexicon is not confined to asphalt or shipping lanes. It is also about rebuilding broken diplomatic bridges. The resumption of direct flights between India and China in July 2025, after a five-year freeze, is a case in point. While modest, such steps reflect the SCO’s quiet role as a clearinghouse for diplomacy, enabling incremental cooperation even amid simmering mistrust. This ability to compartmentalise disputes while encouraging functional cooperation is what sets the SCO apart from Western-led alliances that are hostage to ideological conformity. For Eurasia, pragmatism — not posturing — is the currency of survival.

Perhaps the most audacious plank of China’s SCO agenda is financial innovation. Beijing has positioned the SCO as a test bed for yuan-backed stablecoins in trade settlements. The Tianjin summit is expected to explore this idea, which, if realised, would bypass the dollar-dominated SWIFT system and chip away at Western financial hegemony. The ground is already being prepared. Hong Kong’s stablecoin ordinance and Shanghai’s digital yuan hub, both rolled out earlier this year, demonstrate that China is not merely theorising but operationalising. For sanctions-hit Russia and Iran, and even India with its unease over dollar dependence, the appeal is undeniable. Predictably, Washington has responded with tariffs and threats, but the SCO’s willingness to experiment with digital currencies underscores a boldness the West sorely lacks.

The inclusion of Iran and Belarus has broadened the SCO’s geopolitical canvas, stretching its footprint from Eastern Europe to South Asia. But this expansion is a double-edged sword. With four members — Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan — embroiled in military conflicts in 2025 alone, the SCO’s diversity is both its strength and its Achilles’ heel. Beijing’s quiet diplomacy — resuming border trade, reopening pilgrimage routes and hosting high-level talks — shows that the SCO can stabilise relations through dialogue rather than diktat.

The ‘Draft SCO Development Strategy for the Next Decade,’ to be unveiled in Tianjin, signals a decisive step towards institutionalisation. Proposals include pooled development funds, harmonised digital customs systems and joint oversight mechanisms. If implemented, these will transform the SCO from a talk shop into a results-driven organisation capable of delivering tangible benefits. Equally significant is the SCO’s embrace of sustainability. Tianjin’s green port terminals and renewable-powered logistics hubs embody a shift towards carbon-neutral development. The SCO Digital Economy Forum, launched last year, is embedding real-time logistics tracking and cross-border supply chain integration into its blueprint. This is Eurasia’s answer to global calls for greener growth — practical, not preachy.

Despite robust growth, SCO trade remains uneven. China’s commerce with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan surged 15 per cent in 2025, according to the Asian Development Bank, but its imbalance with India persists. Restrictions on Chinese investment in India’s tech sector and public scepticism in Delhi remain obstacles. Yet the SCO, by fostering transparency and shared goals, offers a pathway to bridge these gaps. Herein lies the SCO’s quiet strength: unlike Western alliances that demand alignment with Washington’s worldview, the SCO accepts diversity and dissent as part of its DNA. It does not force consensus on geopolitics, focusing instead on consensus for cooperation.

The SCO is a platform for a new multilateralism. One that privileges sovereignty, rejects Western-style interventionism and harnesses connectivity as a form of soft power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s description of the SCO as a ‘model for a new type of international relations’ is not empty rhetoric but a doctrine rooted in pragmatism. The Tianjin summit will test this doctrine. Can the SCO institutionalise its ambitions without fracturing under pressure? Can it reconcile diversity with unity without descending into paralysis? Can China lead without overwhelming its partners?

The answers will not lie in grand declarations but in the quiet mechanics of cooperation — ports humming with trade, digital corridors linking economies and summit halls where diplomacy is practised without fanfare. The SCO’s detractors may dismiss it as a Chinese vanity project, but its achievements — connectivity, financial innovation and a commitment to sovereignty — suggest otherwise. As the world fragments, the SCO stands as a testament to what collective will can achieve. The Tianjin summit, with its promise of bold ideas and practical outcomes, could well mark the moment when the SCO steps out of the shadows and into the spotlight of global geopolitics.

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Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance contributor from Karachi.