AS BANGLADESH continues to navigate its democratic journey, calls for reforming the electoral system have gained traction. One of the prominent proposals is the introduction of Proportional Representation — a system designed to ensure that the distribution of seats in the legislature mirrors the percentage of votes each political party receives. While Bangladesh currently follows the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, growing concerns around political polarisation, underrepresentation and vote wastage have brought the PR model into public discourse. This article explores the arguments for and against introducing PR in Bangladesh, with insights from global practices and our unique socio-political context.
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Limits of the first-past-the-post system
BANGLADESH’S electoral system, inherited from the British colonial tradition, is based on single-member constituencies where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins the seat — a system known as first-past-the-post. Although this method is straightforward and easy to administer, it has increasingly come under criticism for producing disproportionate outcomes. For instance, in the 2008 general election, the Awami League-led grand alliance won more than 85 per cent of parliamentary seats (262 out of 300) with about 57 per cent of the popular vote, leaving other parties significantly underrepresented. This pattern was even more pronounced in the 2018 general election, when the ruling party secured more than 95 per cent of the seats with just over 70 per cent of the vote. Meanwhile, smaller parties and dissenting voices, despite earning millions of votes collectively, failed to translate their support into meaningful representation in parliament — raising serious questions about the fairness and inclusiveness of the current system.
This disproportionality erodes the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and undermines political pluralism. In such a context, the FPTP model can incentivise political monopolisation, discourage voter turnout and alienate citizens whose preferences are perpetually unrepresented in parliament. These problems are especially troubling in a country where democratic consolidation remains fragile and where competitive multiparty politics is vital for accountability and inclusiveness.
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Proportional representation in Bangladesh
THE primary argument in favour of PR is its capacity to ensure fairer representation. Unlike FPTP, where a party can win a majority of seats without a majority of votes, PR aligns parliamentary seats with vote shares. This means that every vote carries more weight, reducing the sense of disenfranchisement among voters. For Bangladesh, where regional, ethnic and ideological diversities exist, PR can provide smaller parties, minorities and underrepresented voices a platform in national politics.
PR also mitigates the zero-sum nature of FPTP politics, where winner takes all. In contrast, PR encourages coalition-building, compromise and policy-oriented dialogue. It may reduce political violence and election-time hostilities, which are often fuelled by the all-or-nothing stakes of FPTP elections. The possibility of post-election coalitions could make electoral competition less toxic and more constructive, fostering a healthier democratic culture.
Moreover, PR can be a step towards women’s representation. Bangladesh has made important strides in promoting gender equality, but elected women’s representation remains low outside reserved seats. Under PR, parties typically present candidate lists, which can be mandated to ensure gender parity or minimum female participation. Countries like Sweden, Rwanda and South Africa have leveraged PR systems to significantly improve women’s representation in legislatures.
Another major benefit of PR is the reduction of wasted votes. In FPTP, votes cast for losing candidates in a constituency effectively have no impact on representation. In contrast, PR systems — particularly those using multi-member districts — ensure that even smaller vote shares can translate into seats, leading to higher voter satisfaction and engagement.
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Global lessons
MANY democracies across the world have adopted PR systems in one form or another. Germany uses a Mixed-Member Proportional system, where voters cast two votes: one for a candidate in a constituency (like FPTP) and another for a party list. This hybrid model combines the benefits of local representation with proportional outcomes. New Zealand transitioned to an MMP system in 1996 following public dissatisfaction with FPTP, leading to increased diversity in parliament and higher public confidence in the electoral process.
In the Netherlands, a pure PR system with a national constituency has led to one of the most proportionally representative parliaments in the world. Although this has resulted in fragmented legislatures, coalition governments have become the norm, encouraging consensus politics.
In India, PR is used in some upper house and presidential elections, though general elections remain under FPTP. Closer to home, Nepal adopted a mixed PR system following its democratic transition. Its federal parliament now reflects a wider array of political, ethnic and regional identities, which was difficult under the earlier FPTP model.
These examples show that while PR systems are not without challenges, they offer compelling advantages in contexts where democratic inclusion, minority rights and electoral legitimacy are critical concerns.
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Arguments against PR
DESPITE its appeal, introducing PR in Bangladesh is not without challenges. Critics argue that PR systems can lead to political fragmentation, where too many small parties gain representation, making it difficult to form stable governments. Bangladesh’s political history is already marked by sharp rivalries and a lack of cooperation between major parties; adding more players could further complicate governance and lead to frequent gridlocks.
PR also tends to weaken the direct accountability of MPs to their constituents. In FPTP, voters elect a specific individual to represent their area, fostering a direct link between representatives and the electorate. In PR systems — especially those with closed party lists — this bond may be diluted, with MPs seen as accountable primarily to party leadership rather than to the public.
Moreover, the transition to PR would require significant constitutional, legal and administrative changes, which may not be feasible or politically acceptable in the short term. Implementing a new system would involve revising electoral laws, redrawing constituencies or creating multi-member districts, educating voters and election officials, and possibly amending the constitution. In a politically polarised environment like Bangladesh, building the broad consensus needed for such reforms can be extremely difficult.
There are also concerns about elite capture within party lists in PR systems. In the absence of internal democracy within political parties, closed-list PR can empower central leaderships to nominate loyalists and marginalise grassroots leaders or reformist voices. Unless political parties themselves become more democratic, PR could merely shift the arena of undemocratic practices from the constituency level to the party headquarters.
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Gradual reform and hybrid solutions
GIVEN these complexities, the path forward need not be an abrupt overhaul. Bangladesh could consider gradual electoral reform by adopting a mixed system, similar to Germany or New Zealand, which blends FPTP and PR mechanisms. For example, two-thirds of seats could continue to be elected through FPTP, while the remaining one-third could be allocated proportionally based on national vote shares. This would retain local representation while introducing greater fairness into the overall system.
Additionally, PR could first be introduced in local government elections, such as city corporations and union councils, as a testing ground for electoral innovation. Such a phased approach would allow stakeholders to assess the strengths and weaknesses of PR in the Bangladeshi context before scaling it up to national elections.
Reforming the electoral system is not a magic bullet — it must be accompanied by institutional strengthening, greater political transparency and civic education. But electoral design matters. It can shape the incentives of political actors, influence the quality of governance and determine whose voices count in a democracy.
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A debate worth having
THE debate on proportional representation in Bangladesh is both timely and necessary. While the FPTP system has served the country since independence, its limitations in fostering inclusive, representative and peaceful politics are becoming increasingly apparent. PR offers a pathway to strengthen electoral legitimacy, diversify political participation and create a more balanced playing field. However, its successful adoption depends on broader democratic reforms, internal party democracy and political will.
Rather than viewing this as a binary choice between two systems, Bangladesh must engage in an informed, participatory dialogue on the merits and challenges of electoral reform. Only then can we move towards an electoral framework that genuinely reflects the will of the people — and strengthens the foundations of our democracy.
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Musharraf Tansen is a doctoral researcher with the University of Dhaka.
