¶¶Òõ¾«Æ·

With increasing global interest in the Indo-Pacific, a volatile Myanmar border, and rising internal discontent, the country cannot afford to treat defence policy as a side chapter of governance. Reform must be driven not just by generals, but by a national compact — anchored in law, managed through institutions, and checked by democratic norms, writes M A Hossain

BRIGADIER General (Retd) HRM Rokan Uddin’s recent call for rethinking Bangladesh’s defence reforms, published in ¶¶Òõ¾«Æ·, deserves recognition for reigniting a largely dormant strategic debate. His essay presents an aspirational vision for modernising Bangladesh’s armed forces in a time of shifting global power dynamics, emerging hybrid threats, and evolving national priorities. Yet, as a defence analyst tasked with weighing strategic coherence, operational feasibility, and institutional integrity, one must raise a fundamental question: does this proposal offer a realistic roadmap, or is it another well-meaning wishlist?

A closer analysis reveals that while Mr Rokan Uddin’s article is valuable as a conversation starter, it falls short in three critical dimensions: implementation realism, geopolitical calibration, and institutional safeguards. Without anchoring reform in these foundational elements, Bangladesh risks embarking on yet another rhetorical detour rather than a genuine transformation.

Ìý

Strategic autonomy: rhetoric untethered from reality

THE article rightly stresses the need for strategic autonomy. However, it fails to confront the elephant in the room: Bangladesh’s deep structural dependency on Chinese military hardware. Nearly three-fourths of the country’s arms imports come from China, including naval platforms, air defence systems, and training modules. This overreliance is not merely logistical — it is strategic. The terms of Chinese defence cooperation often embed long-term dependencies through maintenance contracts, supply-chain monopolies, and intelligence vulnerabilities.

Yet, Mr Rokan Uddin avoids confronting this hard reality. He warns against foreign interference, but without identifying the mechanisms through which such interference is embedded — procurement dependency, doctrinal training, and political leverage. A credible reform agenda must address this imbalance through procurement diversification, technology transfer agreements, and a phased indigenisation strategy. Why are countries like Turkey, South Korea, or even Brazil not mentioned as alternative partners? Why is there no plan for embedding offset obligations in major procurement deals?

Moreover, as the Indo-Pacific turns into a theatre of competition between the US-led Quad and China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative, Bangladesh’s hedging strategy is increasingly unsustainable. The article references India’s assertiveness and China’s influence, but without prescribing any actionable policy. Should Bangladesh expand trilateral security dialogues with Japan and India? Should it negotiate defense access arrangements with EU partners? Reform without strategic alignment is destined to be hollow.

Ìý

Civil-military divide: idealism without insulation

MR ROKAN Uddin’s article voices strong support for civilian oversight of the military — a constitutional ideal that every modern democracy must uphold. But his articulation lacks institutional realism. Bangladesh’s civil-military interface is marred by opaque promotions, politicised postings, and executive overreach. Civilian control is often conflated with political manipulation. The military’s professional autonomy is frequently compromised, not by lack of doctrine, but by lack of insulation from partisan impulses.

What mechanisms does the author propose to safeguard against this? Codes of conduct and procedural fairness are only as strong as the institutions that enforce them. Why not advocate for an independent military promotions board, free from political interference? Why not suggest a Defence Reforms Act, legislated through bipartisan consensus, that codifies the military’s role in national security while limiting its use in civilian functions?

The proposal that parliamentary standing committees ensure accountability also ignores political context. Bangladesh’s Parliament has long been dominated by the ruling party, rendering oversight symbolic. A depoliticised reform agenda must therefore create autonomous institutions, not merely invoke democratic ideals.

Ìý

Intelligence reform: a blind spot in strategic thinking

MODERN defence reform cannot succeed without a coherent and depoliticised intelligence framework. Bangladesh’s current intelligence apparatus — split between civil and military agencies — suffers from jurisdictional overlap, weak coordination, and political misuse. Yet, the reform article does not even begin to address this foundational vulnerability.

A robust reform strategy must include the creation of a National Intelligence Coordination Authority that brings all agencies under a single strategic doctrine, governed by a national security council, not party loyalists. The lack of this discussion in Rokan Uddin’s article exposes a critical blind spot. Intelligence drives doctrine, procurement, and deployment — it cannot remain an afterthought.

Ìý

Illusion of defence industrialisation

THE vision of a domestic defence industry is politically seductive but economically disconnected. Bangladesh lacks the technological base, skilled labour, and regulatory framework needed to indigenise defence production at scale. The idea that domestic manufacturing can substitute for decades of import dependency is not just optimistic— it’s misleading.

Countries like India, despite decades of state-led effort and billions in investment, still import major defence platforms. Turkey only recently achieved drone self-sufficiency through aggressive R&D, private-sector incentives, and export diplomacy. Rokan Uddin’s article contains none of this granularity. It does not identify areas of easily achievable goals (e.g., small arms, non-lethal equipment, or maintenance components) that could be locally produced. Nor does it mention public-private partnerships, tax incentives, or export promotion schemes.

Without these, the idea of a domestic defence industry remains a pipe dream — and could become a drain on the national budget with little strategic return.

Ìý

Hybrid warfare and cybersecurity: vague and incomplete

PERHAPS the most troubling omission is the lack of operational detail regarding hybrid threats. Bangladesh has already been the target of foreign cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. Yet, Rokan Uddin’s recommendations — ‘cyber hygiene’ and ‘electronic warfare capacity’ — remain abstract. Where is the call for a dedicated Cyber Command? Where is the proposal for military-civilian tech incubation hubs? What about counter-disinformation units embedded within the defence intelligence ecosystem?

Similarly, climate security is touched upon only briefly. As one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations, Bangladesh faces severe national security risks from environmental degradation, mass displacement, and water insecurity. The military’s role in climate resilience — from disaster logistics to strategic waterway control — must be incorporated into national doctrine. Ignoring this is not just shortsighted; it is strategically negligent.

Ìý

No reform without political consensus

THE important flaw in Rokan Uddin’s piece is the implicit belief that defense reforms can be shielded from Bangladesh’s volatile political culture. The country has a long history of abrupt policy reversals, bureaucratic purges, and reform sabotage with every shift in power. Unless reforms are institutionalised through bipartisan consensus, they will collapse under political pressure.

A serious proposal must therefore begin with the establishment of a permanent National Security Council, with representation from major political parties, military leadership, and strategic experts. Defense budgets should be ring-fenced from political tampering. White papers must be published annually. Civil society and academic institutions must be consulted in the policymaking process.

Until these steps are taken, any reform — no matter how well-intentioned — will remain vulnerable to politicisation.

Ìý

From vision to viability

MR ROKAN Uddin’s vision is undoubtedly rooted in integrity, professional insight, and a patriotic call for reform. But vision without confrontation of structural obstacles can become abstraction. Defence reform in Bangladesh will not succeed through technical prescriptions alone. It demands political will, institutional reform, and strategic clarity.

Bangladesh stands at a pivotal juncture. With increasing global interest in the Indo-Pacific, a volatile Myanmar border, and rising internal discontent, the country cannot afford to treat defence policy as a side chapter of governance. Reform must be driven not just by generals, but by a national compact — anchored in law, managed through institutions, and checked by democratic norms.

Only then can the armed forces truly serve as a bulwark of national sovereignty — professional, accountable, and prepared for the complex realities of 21st-century warfare.

Ìý

ÌýM A Hossain is a political and defence analyst based in Bangladesh.