Pete Hegseth, the US secretary of defence, left European defence ministers in shock during a meeting in Brussels on February 12, 2025, as he unequivocally stated that European security is no longer a primary focus of the United States. Hegseth鈥檚 blunt remarks reinforced what had already been evident for years 鈥� Washington鈥檚 strategic priorities were shifting, and Europe could no longer rely on the US to guarantee its security as it had during the Cold War and its aftermath. This shift, however, is not an abrupt departure but rather the culmination of a long-term recalibration of US foreign policy that has been years in the making.听
The realignment of US strategic interests has been influenced by the rise of 鈥榥ew threats鈥�, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past two decades, China has emerged as a dominant global power, rapidly expanding its economic influence and military capabilities. Beijing鈥檚 assertiveness in the South China Sea, its modernisation of the People鈥檚 Liberation Army, and its growing technological advancements have compelled the United States to refocus its military and diplomatic resources on countering China鈥檚 rise. This shift was first formally articulated during the Obama administration鈥檚 鈥淧ivot to Asia鈥� policy, which sought to strengthen US alliances in the Indo-Pacific while reducing the overreliance on American military commitments in Europe. The Trump administration further accelerated this trend by questioning NATO鈥檚 value and advocating for a redistribution of responsibilities among allies. The Biden administration, despite its commitment to transatlantic ties, continued pressing European nations to increase their defence spending. Now, with Trump鈥檚 return to office in 2025, the de-prioritisation of Europe appears to be taking full effect.
Europe鈥檚 military capacity has long been a point of contention. While the European Union collectively possesses substantial economic resources, its ability to independently secure the continent remains questionable. Despite NATO鈥檚 continued presence, European nations have underinvested in their own defence for decades, relying instead on American military power. Even though European NATO allies and EU member states outspend Russia by a factor of four on defence, the continent remains highly dependent on the United States for logistics, intelligence, and nuclear deterrence. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), established in the late 1990s, aimed to provide the EU with autonomous military capabilities, but its effectiveness has been limited. Europe lacks a unified command structure, and individual nations often have conflicting strategic priorities. France and the United Kingdom, the two most militarily capable European nations, have led calls for a stronger continental defence posture, but progress has been slow. The reluctance of many European countries to meet NATO鈥檚 defence spending target of 2 per cent of GDP has only reinforced Washington鈥檚 perception that Europe is not taking its security responsibilities seriously.听
In light of these realities, Hegseth鈥檚 remarks in Brussels did not emerge in a vacuum. The belief that Europe is 鈥渇reeloading鈥� on American security commitments has been a persistent theme in the US foreign policy discourse. The post-Cold War era saw NATO shifting from a collective defence organisation to a collective security entity, engaging in conflicts outside Europe, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. However, as America鈥檚 strategic focus turned towards the Indo-Pacific, maintaining extensive military commitments in Europe became increasingly difficult to justify. With China鈥檚 rise demanding greater attention and resources, the US military presence in Europe has gradually diminished. The closure of American military bases across the continent and the withdrawal of troops underscored this shift, signalling that Europe must now take primary responsibility for its own security.听
Domestic political and economic considerations within the United States have also played a significant role in this transformation. American public opinion has grown increasingly sceptical of the country鈥檚 role as the world鈥檚 security guarantor. The prolonged military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with mounting national debt, have led to a reassessment of foreign policy priorities. Successive administrations have faced growing pressure to prioritise domestic concerns over international commitments. Budgetary constraints have further driven the push to redistribute the burden of security among allies. With US voters demanding a focus on economic stability, infrastructure, and social programs at home, policymakers have found it politically expedient to reduce defence expenditures abroad, particularly in regions where allies are perceived as capable of sharing the burden.听
The Trump administration was instrumental in accelerating this shift. Trump鈥檚 鈥淎merica First鈥� doctrine questioned the foundational assumptions of US alliances, arguing that NATO was an outdated and costly arrangement that unfairly benefitted European nations. His administration repeatedly pressured NATO members to increase their contributions, warning that the United States could reconsider its commitments if European allies failed to meet their obligations. Trump鈥檚 rhetoric often strained relations with European leaders, who were deeply concerned about the potential unravelling of the transatlantic alliance. In the 2024 US presidential election, many European Union leaders openly supported Kamala Harris, hoping to prevent Trump鈥檚 return to power. However, with his re-election in 2024, Trump is now poised to take a more confrontational approach towards the EU, reinforcing his stance that Europe must assume greater responsibility for its security.听
As the United States pivots away from Europe, the implications for transatlantic security are profound. European nations now face an urgent need to reassess their defence strategies and invest in autonomous security structures. The concept of European strategic autonomy, long championed by French president Emmanuel Macron, is gaining renewed momentum. Efforts to enhance Europe鈥檚 defence capabilities are underway, with discussions about a more integrated EU defence framework gaining traction. Recent reports indicate that Britain and France have been engaging in clandestine talks about deploying troops to Ukraine for post-war security, highlighting a growing recognition of Europe鈥檚 need to act independently of US support.听
Despite these developments, significant challenges remain. Europe鈥檚 fragmented defence landscape, political divisions, and the continued reliance on NATO鈥檚 infrastructure make the prospect of full strategic autonomy difficult to achieve in the short term. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding US policy shifts with each administration complicates long-term planning for European security. While some nations, such as Poland and the Baltic states, advocate for stronger NATO commitments, others, like France and Germany, push for a more independent European defence identity. This divergence in strategic outlooks could hinder the continent鈥檚 ability to develop a cohesive security framework.听
The slow but steady recalibration of US foreign policy underscores a fundamental reality: the era of unquestioned American commitment to European security is over. While NATO is unlikely to dissolve overnight, its role will inevitably evolve as Europe assumes greater responsibility for its defence. The United States, now preoccupied with countering China and addressing domestic challenges, has made it clear that it expects its allies to step up. The transatlantic alliance must adapt to these new realities, forging a partnership based on shared responsibilities and mutual interests. As Europe navigates this transition, its ability to rise to the challenge will shape the future of global security in the years to come.
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MA Hossain is a political and defence analyst.听
