THE recent protests and threats made by members of the BCS (Administration) cadre against the Administrative Reform Commission鈥檚 efforts to recommend competitive exams for promotions and change promotion ratios caught the attention of everyone. These actions demonstrate that the bureaucratic elite is unwilling to embrace changes that could jeopardise its unique status and privileges. The resistance in the form of physical demonstrations and work stoppages typically breaches service rules and manifests how deep-rooted interests can complicate genuine efforts for change. So, what gives the eliticised corps in the bureaucracy the feeling of extreme discomfort?
The administrative corps of Bangladesh鈥檚 civil service showcases a strong ability to adapt and maintain its position, even through various changes in government and efforts to reform. This essay closely examines how a powerful bureaucratic elite has maintained control over government systems using various institutional tools, political alliances and resistance to real reforms, posing significant challenges to democracy and progress.
This bureaucratic elitism has its origins in the colonial Indian Civil Service and continued with the Civil Service of Pakistan. After Bangladesh鈥檚 independence, instead of moving towards democracy and updating the administrative system, successive regimes helped the bureaucratic elite to keep many of the privileges and powers from the colonial period. The administrative corps maintains its strong position by using a few important strategies: holding key positions, pushing back against reforms, using political connections while apparently remaining independent and fostering a culture that distinguishes it from other civil service groups.
The administrative cadre鈥檚 disproportionate control over senior positions is one noteworthy feature of Bangladesh鈥檚 administrative structure. Administrative cadre officers occupy almost all deputy secretary and above positions in the Bangladesh Civil Service, while making up a tiny portion of the organisation. They are able to control the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies thanks to this concentration of authority. It gives them the ability to successfully manage civil service, allowing them to take charge of their own and their colleagues鈥� futures.
The creation of the Senior Services Pool in 1979 further illustrates this pattern of elite entrenchment. While ostensibly designed to open higher ranks to all cadres, its initial composition revealed its true nature: of 523 officers encadred into the pool, only three were non-generalist officers. This stark imbalance demonstrates how institutional mechanisms supposedly designed for democratisation can be co-opted to reinforce existing power structures.
The administrative cadre鈥檚 effective resistance to reform initiatives is a clear indication of its intransigent nature. Political insensitivity and inactivity, bureaucratic rigidity and slowness, anti-reform sentiment in public sector organisations and civil society鈥檚 disengagement from the reform process have all contributed to the failure of several reform projects. The current dispute surrounding the recommendations of the Public Administration Reform Commission exemplifies this trend. Ironically, administrative cadre officers鈥� protests and rallies in response to proposed changes that might impact their privileged status are a violation of their own service behaviour guidelines.
Ironically, the politicisation of the bureaucracy, particularly under authoritarian regimes, strengthened rather than diminished the administrative cadre鈥檚 influence. People at the top of the bureaucratic apparatus were able to preserve and even grow their dominating role in society because of the state鈥檚 support for bureaucratic elitism. The administrative cadre has shown amazing flexibility in holding power under both authoritarian and democratic political regimes, often by supporting the governing party but maintaining some form of institutional 鈥榓utonomy.鈥�
The way the administrative team interacted with political leaders showed their ability to adapt. By restricting outside influence and keeping the process flexible for their parochial purposes, the group effectively guided the policy process while staying aligned with political leadership. Ideas from policy groups, community organisations, and lawmakers often struggled to make their way into the discussions around policy creation. If they ever got involved, it often felt more like a spectacle than real engagement, giving the impression of consultation while keeping a firm grip on the actual decision-making.
The administration cadre鈥檚 arrogance is especially clear in the way it treats other civil service members. The civil service still faces significant inequities due to the unfair distribution of promotions, training and important roles. The control of the elitist group over civil service management results in ongoing discrimination, leading to conflicts and protests from officers who are not part of their own group. Putting professionals and experts in the background repeatedly hurts the growth of government based on knowledge and makes it easier for generalists to take charge.
The complex and self-reinforcing institutional systems sustain this domination. In order to perpetuate its elite culture and principles, the administration cadre manages its own hiring, training and advancement procedures. While the cadre鈥檚 hold on the public administration ministry allows it to govern civil service matters to its benefit, the Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Academy is a tool for elite indoctrination. This self-sustaining structure has guaranteed the persistence of bureaucratic elitism across generations.
The cadre鈥檚 over-influence in development planning and economic decisions is perhaps most unsettling. Their dominance in these areas has constrained the private sector鈥檚 ability to influence economic policy. Policies that are disconnected from stakeholder inputs and market realities fail to solve actual economic issues or advance sustainable development.
The social and governance implications of this bureaucratic elitism are severe, resulting in a lack of transparency and accountability, limited public access to government functions, weak grievance procedures and the virtual exclusion of the public from public management. The administrative cadre鈥檚 resistance to reform has impeded the development of more responsive and citizen-centric governance systems.
The consolidation of elitist bureaucratic power greatly influences Bangladesh鈥檚 governance. The administrative group has created an environment focused on maximising benefits for its members. The bureaucratic elite often stand in the way of reform and modernisation, protecting their own privileges instead of working to improve public service and drive progress.
Moving forward, addressing this bureaucratic intransigence will require more than just structural changes. For any reform to succeed, it is important to tackle the attitudes and beliefs that support elitist behaviour. This could mean finding new ways to achieve sound governance by using market-driven approaches and business-like management in public services, improving accountability, and encouraging more public involvement in the policy-making process.
Transforming a long-standing administrative culture that has been resistant to change for many years is the real challenge. Unless we tackle the core problems of bureaucratic elitism, efforts to bring about change will probably keep running into strong opposition from an entrenched group that has shown a remarkable ability to safeguard its privileged role in the state machinery. For Bangladesh to have effective governance in the future, it is essential to move away from bureaucratic control and create a more balanced, inclusive and responsive administrative system.
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Dr Habib Zafarullah is an adjunct professor of public policy at the University of New England and former professor of public administration at the University of Dhaka. He is the founding president of the South Asian Network for Public Administration.
