THE war and conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Palestine and Israel, and others —Bangladesh’s own political situation for the last couple of months, as it appears — turned the Rohingya refugee crisis a ‘less important’ concern. But the situation of the Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar is dire. On the one hand, the number of Rohingya has been increasing. On the other hand, none of the three conventional solutions — repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration — has been found useful until now. The chief advisor recently termed the Rohingya crisis a ‘time bomb’. Has there been any effective steps taken to neutralise the time bomb safely?
Although in 2022–2023 some forms of dialogue and visits took place between Bangladesh and Myanmar to initiate the ‘Chinese model’ of Rohingya repatriation, it did not yield any result. Indeed, internal conflicts in Myanmar are one of the key reasons. The ongoing conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army has led to violence, mass displacement, and human rights abuses against the Rohingya population. The situation for the Rohingya in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar remains dire and highly volatile. How long such violence and killings will continue is uncertain. But would it be wise for Bangladesh to wait for this conflict to end so it could start talking about the Rohingya crisis, or should it take the necessary initiative proactively?
In 2017, Bangladesh raised a proposal for creating an UN-supervised ‘safe zone’ for the Rohingya in the Northern Rakhine, but the proposal never moved forward because of the pressure of India. Now that the domestic political climate in Bangladesh has changed, this is perhaps the right time to take this idea forward. The chief advisor has already raised the issue in his recent meeting with the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. However, the establishment of a safe space is beyond the control of Bangladesh. The key players in this negotiation are China, India, and Myanmar. Most importantly, the West as well as the UN Security Council must endorse the idea of a safe space. Can Bangladeshi orthodoxy and fragile diplomacy effectively negotiate and convince all parties to support the UN-backed safe zone idea?
This safe zone would aim to provide protection and humanitarian aid to the Rohingyas. Hence, it needs to be demilitarised. Creating a safe zone for the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state involves establishing a secured area where the Rohingyas can live without fear of violence and persecution — a life with safety, dignity, and rights for the Rohingya population.
Since the safe zone is located within Myanmar, along with demilitarisation, attention should be given to establishing an UN-authorised international stabilisation force. Humanitarian organisations access to the zone is necessary for supplying necessary aid, including food, medical care, etc., guaranteeing fundamental human rights, including the right to life, freedom from torture, and personal security, and most importantly, enabling a legal process to grant citizenship or legal status, ensuring freedom of movement and access to education, health care, and employment.
Creating a safe zone for the Rohingya within Myanmar, however, is not free from challenges and obstacles. The Myanmar government has been historically unwilling to create conditions conducive to the safe return of the Rohingya. Bangladesh needs to strategize how, with the support of the superpowers, this resistance can be removed. There are geostrategic and geopolitical concerns that include the Siliguri Corridor (Chicken Neck), China’s renaming of 30 places of northeastern India, China’s territorial claim on Tibbet and Taiwan, etc. heavily shape the patterns of regional cooperation on the Rohingya issue. Moreover, the diplomatic efforts of Bangladesh have always been ineffective on the Rohingya issue. Can Bangladesh utilise its changed political regime to intervene and negotiate on some of the above issues? Establishing and maintaining a safe zone involves complex logistics and security challenges. It requires a well-coordinated international effort to deploy peacekeeping forces, build infrastructure, and provide continuous support to the inhabitants. Will UNHCR take responsibility for building this infrastructure?Ìý
Implementing a safe zone for the Rohingya in Northern Rakhine State requires careful planning, diplomacy, and coordination among multiple stakeholders. Leverage support from regional powers like China can significantly influence Myanmar’s decision to join the conversation with Bangladesh. Bangladesh never actively utilised the regional bodies to solve the Rohingya crisis. Therefore, Bangladesh should explore the regional platforms such as ASEAN, OIC, and SAARC to advocate for the protection of the Rohingya and the establishment of a safe zone.
The world has already witnessed that Russia and China give veto in the UN when it comes to the Rohingya issue, and the USA gives veto when it comes to the issue of the Palestinians. Yet, it is Bangladesh that needs to convince all the big powers—the USA, Russia, and China — as Bangladesh has been strengthening bilateral relationships with these countries through trade, ‘man’power supply, etc. At the same time, Bangladesh should also work through the UN General Assembly and Security Council to build a consensus and secure a resolution supporting the creation of a safe zone. In addition, collaborating with international human rights organisations to raise awareness in favour of the safe zone and pressure Myanmar for action is necessary for Bangladesh.
Learning from successful regional interventions, such as the African Union’s peacekeeping missions, can also be helpful to move ahead with the idea of a safe zone for the Rohingya in Myanmar. Until the safe zone project begins, the ongoing resettlement may seem like a good option for the Rohingya, which has already been emphasised by the interim government of Bangladesh. The huge acceptability of the chief advisor of the interim government of the country can be an asset to mobilise positive support from the US, Canada, and other countries that support the current political regime of Bangladesh and, to some extent, support the resettlement process.
However, we must remember that resettlement cannot be a logical response to the brutal and naked genocide committed against the Rohingya. Therefore, lobbying with ICJ should be a high priority. Last year, Myanmar requested an extension of the time limit to submit its report, and this year it is scheduled to send its counterarguments in response to Gambia’s argument by December 16, 2024. Ensuring a just resolution of the Rohingya genocide case at the ICJ requires fierce advocacy and lobbying from Bangladesh.
Arranging resettlement to a third country and establishing a safe zone within Myanmar are possible ways out of the Rohingya crisis, and Bangladesh must pursue both options simultaneously. By addressing the security, legal, and humanitarian needs of the Rohingya, a safe zone can provide a secure environment for their rehabilitation and pave the way for a more stable and peaceful future in the region.
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Dr Ishrat Zakia Sultana is a faculty member of North South University, and Dr Mohammad Habib Ullah is general secretary of the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, USA.
