THE chief adviser of the interim government, Professor Muhammad Yunus, has reasons to be unhappy about certain recent developments, political and otherwise, leading to his discontent to the extent of contemplating his resignation. The developments include the pressures for and against a specific road map for general elections exerted upon him by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its possible contestants in the elections, the BNP and the army’s explicit objection to the government’s unilateral decision to hand over the management of the Chittagong port to an American company and opening a ‘human passage’ to the Rakhine state of Myanmar, embarrassing demonstrations by the BNP and the National Citizen Party in front of his residence, certain amount of public criticism by the newly active sections of civil society about his government’s performance failure, in general, and the lack of visible progress in bringing about democratic reforms of the state, in particular. Yunus, perhaps, did not expect the phenomena. Now that his government has been exposed to the crude reality, an unhappy, uncomfortable and embarrassed Yunus has contemplated leaving, which he expressed in the meeting of the council of advisers behind closed doors on Saturday. But Yunus’s resignation would not help to solve the crises that Bangladesh is now undergoing. It would, rather, deepen the crises. He, therefore, is not expected to do so.
It is true that the BNP has been pressing too hard for a specific road map for elections, particularly in the midst of Yunus’s repeated announcement that the elections would definitely be held between December this year and June next year. However, the BNP has, on the other hand, its own reasons to doubt it, particularly when some of the members of his advisory council are reportedly involved, directly or indirectly, with certain conspiratorial circles, political and extra-political, which are very active to prolong the ‘tenure’ of the interim administration, much beyond the stipulated June, even by way of creating a situation, despite the army chief’s pronounced preference for elections in December this year, that would force the army to take over, primarily to stop the BNP from returning to power through the next elections. Given the small size of the Dhaka power elite, it is quite difficult for any circle to keep its ulterior design secret for long. The information should have reached Yunus’s ears for him to take action.
More importantly, Professor Yunus and his colleagues must understand properly that the source of their ‘political legitimacy’ remains the ‘democratic consent’ of the student leaders who led the victorious mass uprising against the Awami League’s autocratic regime, the BNP and other political parties that actively supported the movement for democracy and the leadership of the country’s armed forces that facilitated the installation of the interim government. Any rift in the forged consent would, therefore, affect the legitimacy of the interim administration. The interim government, which is a transitional administration, not like a regular one elected directly by the people, therefore, functions in tandem with all these three forces, not being biased for or against any of the three, let alone playing one against the other.
Meanwhile, the forces of the mass uprising need to realise that despite political and ideological differences, any parochial, partisan interest-driven division among themselves at this critical juncture of the country’s history would not only harm them politically, but it would also push the country into deeper crises, for which history would hold them responsible. Under this circumstance, Yunus and his colleagues, particularly the errant ones, need to have some soul searching and behave while the political authorities of the mass uprising need to reconcile their differences to ensure a peaceful transition to a democratic political order.
